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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the role of British newspaper coverage of Africa in the process 
of decolonisation between 1957 and 1960.  It considers events in the Gold 
Coast/Ghana, Kenya, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, South Africa, and 
the Belgian Congo/Congo.  It offers an extensive analysis of British newspaper 
coverage of Africa during this period.  Concurrently, it explores British journalists’ 
interactions with one another as well as with the British Government, British MPs, 
African nationalists, white settler communities, their presses, and African and 
European settler governments, whose responses to coverage are gauged and 
evaluated throughout.  The project aims, firstly, to provide the first broad study of 
the role of the British press in, and in relation to, Africa during the period of ‘rapid 
decolonisation’.  Secondly, it offers a reassessment of the assumption that the British 
metropolitan political and cultural context to the end of empire in Africa was 
extraneous to the process.  Thirdly, it aims to contribute to a growing literature on 
non-governmental metropolitan perspectives on the end of empire.  
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Introduction 
 
Prelude 
 
When Anthony Sampson set foot in Cape Town in the middle of 1951, he 
was embarking on a personal and professional journey that would forever change his 
life.
1
  Describing himself as ‘shy and awkward’ as a boy,2 with ‘an incurable mania 
for writing’,3 he felt different in the environment in which he grew up, yet at the 
same time very English, and though he described himself as un-academic, was 
fortunate enough to win a scholarship to Westminster School, from where he 
followed the traditional route on to Oxford University after a two-year stint in the 
Royal Navy in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.
4
  His experience, 
whilst in the Royal Navy, of living with arrogant British officers in occupied 
Germany, began to chip away at his sense of pride in being English, and helped to 
stimulate a personal intellectual interest in power and powerlessness,
5
 which would, 
arguably, inform his later writings. 
Yet it was Africa, which he first glimpsed through the darkness across the 
ocean as lights twinkling and a magnificent flat-topped mountain, that would give 
him the gift of personal freedom he had always yearned for, and would transform 
that existing interest in power and its mainsprings into a lifelong passion.
6
  Sampson 
travelled to Africa on the invitation of Jim Bailey, a South African friend he had met 
at Oxford, to edit and to help transform the ailing fortunes of African Drum, a four-
month-old South African magazine for Africans.  In the paper’s offices, Sampson 
worked alongside black South Africans, who inspired and energised him, and in his 
spare time he immersed himself in the life of the vibrant Johannesburg townships, 
gradually distancing himself from the staid white South African society with which 
he had at first expected to identify.  He returned to Britain four years later, was 
approached by a nephew of Lord Northcliffe of the Daily Mail, but held out for a 
career at David Astor’s Observer, with which he had first come into contact through 
                                                          
1
 Anthony Sampson, The Anatomist: The Autobiography of Anthony Sampson (London, 2008). 
2
 Ibid., p. 3. 
3
 Ibid., p. 4. 
4
 Ibid., pp. 3-16. 
5
 Ibid., pp. 8-14. 
6
 Ibid., pp. 17-42. 
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Drum.
7
  Sampson would work there for the next four decades, writing prolifically on 
Africa, and returning there frequently.  In the mid-1990s, Nelson Mandela 
commissioned Sampson to write his authorised biography.
8
  Sampson had first met 
Mandela in a print shop in Johannesburg in the early 1950s, but confessed that he 
found the encounter hard to recall.
9
 
This is a short overview of part of a life of one of the men at the heart of 
producing British newspaper coverage of Africa at the end of empire, drawn from 
sections of his autobiography.  It is condensed and deficient for that.  Yet even in its 
shortened form, it illustrates some of the themes and complexities which run 
throughout this thesis, and which, it is hoped, will seem worthy of investigation.  As 
a journalist, Sampson was influenced by his personal experiences, allying himself to 
the cause of the Africans, and seeking out a newspaper which would allow him to 
write in accordance with his personal truth.  Yet the overture from the right-leaning 
Daily Mail points to the importance of avoiding describing the role of the British 
press in or in relation to Africa during these years solely in terms of the story of an 
individual.  Sampson’s path from England to South Africa to England, and the role 
of Bailey, also indicates the significance of transnational links and information 
flows, personal connections and fortune in conspiring in such a way as to produce a 
certain kind of press coverage in both Britain and Africa.  His interactions with black 
South Africans, including Mandela, suggest that there were links between British 
journalists and African nationalists during this period.  Yet Sampson’s hazy memory 
of his first encounter with Mandela must also point to the fragility of these 
connections and remind us that there was nothing preordained about the course either 
of these relationships or of the process of decolonisation. 
 
1. Focus and argument 
 
This thesis is about British newspaper coverage of Africa between 1957 and 
1960.  It speaks to historiographical debates on the role of the British press at the end 
of empire, the significance of British low politics or British public opinion to the 
process of decolonisation, the cultural impact of the end of empire in Britain, and 
                                                          
7
 Ibid., pp. 40-3. 
8
 Ibid., p. 248. 
9
 Ibid., p. 35. 
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decolonisation as ‘lived’ experience, a term taken from the title of Jan-Bart Gewald 
et al’s edited collection, Living the End of Empire: Politics and Society in Late-
colonial Zambia, in which the contributors explore how the end of empire was 
experienced locally, in Africa.
10
 
The thesis focuses on seven main features of British press coverage and 
discusses their wider significance, in addition to the significance of other subsidiary 
or more peripheral characteristics, whilst also drawing distinctions between different 
papers or sections of the press. 
The first central feature, discussed in Chapter One, concerns the British 
press’s very swift, negative portrayal of Ghana under Prime Minister Kwame 
Nkrumah during the first few months of independence in 1957.  The second central 
feature, the subject of the second chapter, turns on the press’s diminution of the issue 
of British colonial misconduct in Kenya and Nyasaland during 1959.  British 
journalists’ characterisation of African nationalism as organic, muscular and all-
powerful, and the white settler response in Central and South Africa as mad or 
dangerous are the third and fourth features, which form the focus of chapters Three 
and Four on Harold Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ tour (1960).  Chapter Five uses 
the lens of press coverage of the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa in 1960 to 
explore the nature of the press’s views on apartheid, which it concludes were 
disapproving, but also highly ambiguous at times and conflicting, particularly 
concerning the question of how Britain should respond to the issue of white 
violence, a fifth, twinned, characteristic of coverage.  Chapter Six explores a sixth 
main feature, which centres on the British press’s support for Belgian action in the 
Congo following independence in 1960.  A further characteristic, which runs 
throughout, concerns the press’s positive portrayal of Britain and British 
involvement in the decolonisation process. 
The thesis makes three central arguments concerning the overall effects of 
press coverage, whilst striving to acknowledge differences dependent on the 
countries, regions and moments under scrutiny.  Firstly, press content influenced the 
British Prime Minister and the British Government on matters of policy.  Press 
coverage also functioned as an irritant and an obstacle in the path of the British 
Government’s claim to sole authorship of ‘Britain’s view’ overseas.  Secondly, in 
                                                          
10
 Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola (eds.), Living the End of Empire: Politics 
and Society in Late-colonial Zambia (Leiden, 2011). 
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Africa, press coverage fomented a mix of anxiety, conflict and division among 
competing social and political groups.  Thirdly, it may have mitigated feelings of 
loss, regret, weakness and decline on the part of British readers at the end of empire.  
On the issue of why British press coverage had the first two sets of effects, the thesis 
highlights the significance of the specific ways in which British newspaper articles 
interlocked, on the one hand, with the different contemporary and historical concerns 
of separate reader groupings; and on the other, with those groupings’ assumptions 
regarding the relation between British press content and British public opinion; or 
content, public opinion and Government policy. 
On the subject of the production of coverage, the thesis underscores the 
significance of cultural, ideological, political, personal, experiential and institutional 
factors influencing British journalists, locally, in Africa, as well as in Britain.  In 
their precise articulation, these were highly specific to the region and events under 
scrutiny.  Yet some common factors included the efforts of the British Government, 
the British Labour Party, African nationalist parties prior to independence, African 
opposition parties following independence, and separate white settler groupings to 
influence British journalists; journalists’ local experiences; editorial imperatives; and 
the personal perspectives of British editors and journalists. 
Further crucial, yet in a sense secondary,
11
 influences were paper’s 
narratological and visual or contextual ‘frames’, which this thesis defines as factual 
or ideological assumptions or preoccupations within which subsequent events were 
processed by journalists and viewed by readers.  The term ‘frame’ is drawn from the 
field of Media and Communications, specifically Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 
because it seems appropriate for what I wish to describe.
12
  However, this thesis does 
not employ a CDA approach, strict or otherwise, to the analysis of newspaper texts, 
chiefly because the method is far too restrictive and too teleological, operating in its 
most fundamental sense to confirm the view that discourse re-produces not only 
existing patterns of power within the society of which it is a product, but existing 
patterns of power as already understood.  Rather, this thesis favours an historical 
approach to the study of the production and the significance of press content. 
 
                                                          
11
 These functioned as a repository of influences, as accumulated over time. 
12
 Two works in this field which I have found particularly useful are: Norman Fairclough, Media 
Discourse (London, 1995); and John E. Richardson, Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from 
Critical Discourse Analysis (Basingstoke, 2007). 
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2. The British press and the end of empire in Africa 
 
The primary justification for this thesis is that there is no comprehensive 
existing work devoted to examining the role of British newspapers in, and in relation 
to, Africa during this period, and yet, as the short discussion of Sampson indicates, 
the British press was a group which interacted with the main political protagonists in 
the process, and experienced decolonisation ‘at first hand’.  Its products were also 
extremely widely-read.  Between 1947 and 1961, paid circulation figures alone for 
British national morning papers stood in the region of 15 to 16 million.
13
 
A number of smaller or specific case studies have greatly enhanced our 
understanding of the subject.  Yet there is no single work which ties the topics, 
themes or conclusions together, probes them further, and in doing so, provides a 
uniform approach to the material across a range of case studies.  Relevant existing 
works include a section in Susan Carruthers’s Winning Hearts and Minds (1995) on 
the British Government’s efforts to influence British media coverage of Kenya 
during the Mau Mau war;
14
 Tony Shaw’s work on the British Government’s 
relations with the right-leaning British press during the Suez crisis (1995);
15
 small 
sections of James Sanders’s South Africa and the International Media (2000);16 
Joanna Lewis’s chapter on British popular press coverage of Kenya during the 1950s 
in E.S. Atieno Odhiambo and John Lonsdale’s Mau Mau and Nationhood (2003);17 a 
chapter on the relationship between the Colonial Office and the British press during 
1959, written by Joanna Lewis and Philip Murphy for Chandrika Kaul’s Media and 
the British Empire (2006);
18
 and sections of Håkan Thörn’s book on the international 
media and the transnational anti-apartheid movement (2006).
19
  Additional studies, 
                                                          
13
 Colin Seymour-Ure, The Press, Politics and the Public: An Essay on the Role of the National Press 
in the British Political System (London, 1968), p. 27. 
14
 Susan Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial 
Counter-Insurgency, 1944-1960 (London, 1995). 
15
 Tony Shaw, Eden, Suez, and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez Crisis 
(London, 1996). 
16
 James Sanders, South Africa and the International Media 1972-1979: A Struggle for Representation 
(London, 2000). 
17
 Joanna Lewis, ‘“Daddy Wouldn’t Buy Me a Mau Mau”: The British Popular Press and the 
Demoralization of Empire’ in E. S. Atieno Odhiambo and John Lonsdale (eds.), Mau Mau and 
Nationhood: Arms, Authority, Narration (Oxford, 2003), pp. 227-50. 
18
 Joanna Lewis and Philip Murphy, ‘“The Old Pals’ Protection Society”?  The Colonial Office and 
the British Press on the Eve of Decolonisation’ in Chandrika Kaul (ed.), Media and the British 
Empire (Manchester, 2006), pp. 55-69. 
19
 Håkan Thörn, Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society (Basingstoke, 2009). 
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such as Richard Rathbone’s article on Ghana’s independence celebrations (2008);20 
Joanna Lewis’s chapter for L. J. Butler and Sarah Stockwell’s The Wind of Change 
in which Lewis discusses Harold Macmillan’s visit to Northern Rhodesia (2013);21 
and Howard Smith’s article on BBC reporting of the Sharpeville massacre (1993);22 
speak to the role of British newspapers at the end of empire, yet this is not their 
primary focus. 
Concerning emphasis and approach, the above works might be characterised 
as falling into two main categories.  First, would be those by Carruthers, Shaw, and 
Lewis and Murphy, which draw on British Government documents as a means of 
investigating Government relations with the media.  Second, would include those by 
Lewis and Thörn, which focus on press content as a means of identifying press 
attitudes.  A third approach, unique to Lewis, is that of using journalists’ 
observations as a lens through which we might begin to interrogate the validity of 
certain accepted historical narratives.
23
 
This thesis operates on the basis that only by combining and extending the 
first and second approaches, is it possible to arrive at a full understanding of the 
significance of British newspaper coverage.
24
  Press content alone cannot tell us 
definitively about how it was perceived by outsiders or the extent to which it 
influenced them, and thus important aspects of its relevance.  Similarly, studies 
which work in from the key-hole of a specific reader group’s interactions with the 
press or its perceptions of press content, to an assessment of coverage and its 
significance, can miss both the full profusion of other influences bearing down on 
British editors and journalists as they composed their articles, and the opportunity to 
draw out the significance of any disjuncture between outsiders’ strategies and 
perceptions, and content as a whole. 
The thesis aims to build on the existing literature by marrying these 
previously distinct approaches to the study of the press, one focusing on newspaper 
                                                          
20
 Richard Rathbone, ‘Casting “the Kingdome into another mold”: Ghana’s Troubled Transition to 
Independence’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 97: 398 
(2008), pp. 705-18. 
21
 Joanna Lewis, ‘“White Man in a Wood Pile”: Race and the Limits of Macmillan’s Great “Wind of 
Change” in Africa’ in L. J. Butler and Sarah Stockwell (eds.), The Wind of Change: Harold 
Macmillan and British Decolonization (Basingstoke, 2013), pp. 70-95. 
22
 Howard Smith, ‘Apartheid, Sharpeville and “Impartiality”: The Reporting of South Africa on BBC 
Television 1948-1961’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 13: 3 (1993), pp. 251-98. 
23
 Lewis takes this approach in ‘“White Man”’. 
24
 The third does not speak to the role of the press at the time per se, although it might suggest that its 
significance lay with those of its narratives which diverged from the official record. 
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content, the other on outsider interactions with or perceptions of that content; and 
adding a third: journalists’ own accounts of events published in places other than the 
press.  It provides a discussion of outsider interactions with and perceptions of press 
content which moves beyond existing studies, moreover, by including an assessment 
of the African in addition to the British dimension.  British newspaper readerships 
extended to African and white settler societies, very important, yet 
historiographically neglected publics.  The thesis also strives to identify the internal, 
press, or personal influences affecting the production of coverage, which have not 
formed the subject of any previous study of the British press and Africa at the end of 
empire. 
The arguments of the above works reflect the approaches adopted.  In other 
words, the first set of works discusses the degree to which the British Government 
influenced the British press; while the second set of works explores the influence of 
the British press.  Carruthers and Shaw present the role of British newspapers in 
relation to the Mau Mau war and Suez respectively, as essentially that of reproducing 
a conservative British Government-inspired narrative of events for those sections of 
the British newspaper-reading public which British politicians deemed it most 
important to influence.
25
  Both think it important to address the question of the extent 
to which the British public absorbed these narratives, and thus the degree to which 
the Government achieved its ultimate propaganda aims.  Yet although Carruthers 
senses a critical opposition on certain key issues, neither author reaches any 
confident conclusions. 
Lewis and Murphy’s study of the relationship between the British press and 
the Colonial Office during 1959 is comparable in the sense that it describes how 
officials and MPs successfully used British newspapers to achieve policy-related 
goals.  Yet it differs from the studies by Carruthers and Shaw in its emphasis on the 
internal, governmental or parliamentary significance of British press content as 
opposed to the British press or public dynamic, and on progressive as opposed to 
conservative aspects, arguing, for instance, that the Colonial Office nurtured the 
British media as a stick with which to beat the Commonwealth Relations Office into 
confronting difficult issues concerning British policy towards the Federation.
26
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In contrast to these three works, Joanna Lewis’s chapter on British popular 
press coverage of Kenya during the 1950s suggests that journalists’ progressive 
perspectives may have influenced British politicians directly; whilst they also 
reflected and informed a growing British public disengagement from empire, which 
contributed to the country’s relatively peaceful decolonisation. 
The works of Carruthers, Shaw, Lewis and Murphy, speak of particular 
places, relations and historical moments.  That they lay emphasis on different press 
roles does not mean that they simply ‘cancel one another out’, and therefore call for 
further investigation.  Differences concerning place, time and relationships are 
highly important, a point which this thesis bears out.  Nevertheless, engaging in a 
comparative, and fuller approach, assessing a range of press content and influences 
across time and place, not only enables us to add further important arguments on the 
role of the British press at these and other junctures, which form the subject of the 
previous section, but also permits us to engage with the existing literature from a 
different perspective, and thus offer some further views, which it is hoped will be 
valuable. 
The second chapter, on 1959, agrees, for instance, that the British 
Government engaged in strenuous efforts to influence British newspaper coverage of 
colonial violence in Kenya and Nyasaland, and had some important successes, 
which, in the case of Kenya, also betrayed the extent of its earlier propaganda 
achievements during the Mau Mau war.  Yet it also maintains that further factors, 
such as journalists’ local experiences, settler-press relations, editorial pressures, and 
the political and other perspectives of editors and journalists were equally, if not 
more, significant to the production of coverage, suggesting that the press was itself a 
de facto conservative force on the issue of colonial misconduct and Britain’s 
involvement during these months.  In the case of the Colonial Office, and on the 
subject of Africa’s future, influence is found to have flowed the other way, from 
press to politics.  The thesis as whole places emphasis on press content as the 
embodiment of a range of different influences, including, but not limited to, the 
British Government.  Further, it highlights the tenacity of the press, and its impact on 
government. 
This thesis would not wish to contest the emphasis Lewis and Murphy have 
placed on the more progressive nature of British newspaper content by the end of the 
1950s.  It is not able to, given that it begins in 1957.  Nevertheless, the conclusions 
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reached here do suggest that many sections of the British press continued to express 
highly conservative views on Africa-related issues throughout the period, that 
progressive views would ebb and flow, and that content which appeared progressive 
was not always very radical.  In other words, what appeared as a reflection of a 
contemporary profusion of left-wing sentiment, often betrayed the continued 
presence of more conservative thoughts or anxieties such as the press’s 
preoccupation with African threat and violence, which informed its critique of 
colonialism.  Neither was coverage purely ideological in its inception, being also a 
question, and thus a reflection, of practicalities.  British press coverage may still 
have performed the function of reflecting or informing critical public, cultural 
dynamics behind Britain’s relatively peaceful domestic decolonisation, and in this, 
the thesis makes much of Lewis’s argument.  Yet it adds that this was also both for 
conservative and for non-ideological reasons. 
 
3. British ‘low politics’, British ‘public opinion’, and the process of 
decolonisation 
 
 The thesis also speaks to debates on the impact of British low politics more 
generally or British public opinion at the end of empire.  Again, there are very few 
existing studies devoted to the topic, but all except Lewis’s chapter on Mau Mau,27 
suggest that the British metropolitan context to decolonisation bore very little 
positive relation to the process.  Historians put forward two main interrelated reasons 
for this: first, that the British public knew little and cared less about Africa, empire 
or decolonisation; and second, that the primary protagonist in the process, regarded 
as the British Government, was not influenced by those of the public’s ideas that did 
trickle out. 
Some popular histories of sixties’ Britain, such as Dominic Sandbrook’s 
Never Had It So Good, forcefully argue the case for its marginality.
28
  Sandbrook 
claims that ‘the reaction of the general public to the end of empire was one of almost 
total indifference’.29  ‘Even at the 1959 election, at the height of the post-war 
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imperial crisis’, he argues, ‘colonial issues were strikingly unimportant’.30  In-depth 
studies of critics of empire, such as Stephen Howe’s Anticolonialism in British 
Politics, and Nicholas Owen’s piece on ‘Critics of Empire’, reach conclusions which 
are in some ways comparable to Sandbrook’s in terms of emphasis, yet which relate 
specifically to the role of anti-colonial activists and intellectuals.
31
  Howe argues 
both that the British Government was not substantially influenced by the views of 
anti-colonial groups in relation to its handling of decolonisation, and that anti- (and 
pro-) colonial movements were popular only with a small minority throughout the 
period under discussion.  Although critics’ aims were ‘achieved’, in the sense that 
the empire was soon no more, Howe suggests that this owed less to the efforts of 
activists and intellectuals than to global and colonial circumstances as well as to 
changes in Conservative thinking, which pushed towards the same conclusion.  
David Goldsworthy’s Colonial Issues in British Politics, makes a similar argument.32  
Goldsworthy finds evidence of fluctuating degrees of political partisanship on 
colonial affairs in Britain.  Yet he also states that during the course of his research, 
he came across ‘few examples of obvious and direct influence (of domestic political 
activity) on policy-making’.33 
This thesis’s findings differ in a number of respects.  The first has already 
been alluded to, and is that the British press, as an historiographically neglected 
institution partaking in politics, influenced the British Government on African-
related issues throughout this period.  In making this argument, it conceives of 
decolonisation in more processual terms than Howe and Owen, in particular, whose 
studies of the impact of critics of empire are, on the whole, limited to the question of 
the extent to which these groups forced the Government’s hand on ‘the idea’ of 
ending empire. 
The second conclusion pertinent to this literature concerns British public 
opinion and its effect on British politicians, which it also affirms.  The supposedly 
ephemeral nature of this concept appears to have discouraged its scholarly analysis.  
Yet this thesis illuminates some of the ways in which ‘British public opinion’ 
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operated within historical processes by virtue of how it was perceived, and shows 
that outsider or reader groupings more often than not regarded British newspapers as 
important repositories of the public’s views.  While this author would expect a 
certain degree of elision between public attitudes and public opinion as represented 
in the press, the important point is that it is not necessary definitively to determine 
what the public thought in order to arrive at conclusions regarding the concept’s 
historical salience. 
A third conclusion, which further underscores the significance of both British 
low politics and British public opinion to the process of decolonisation in Africa, 
concerns the emphasis this thesis places on reader groupings other than the British 
Government.  These have not previously formed the subject of any study of the 
importance of the British metropolitan dimension to decolonisation.  Reader groups 
included African nationalists, African opposition parties, and most conspicuously, 
white settlers, important constituencies whose levels of concern over British press 
content previous studies have obscured in their discrete, national approach to the 
issue of press/reader relations. 
The fourth significant relevant argument concerns the British press’s possible 
mitigation of feelings of loss, weakness, regret or decline on the part of British 
readers at the end of empire because it extends the issue of the impact of British low 
politics on the decolonisation process beyond the professional political realm to 
include an appreciation of the public aspect.  This builds on Lewis’s work on the 
British popular press’s Kenya coverage. 
 
4. The cultural impact of the end of empire in Britain 
 
The thesis therefore also speaks to debates on the cultural impact of the end 
of empire in Britain, which turn on the issue of the extent of its impact, and the 
nature.  As noted, Sandbrook underscores what he terms British public ‘indifference’ 
to the end of empire, and Howe and Owen argue that anti- (and pro-) colonial 
movements were popular only with a small minority of the population, indicating 
that Africa, empire and/or decolonisation did not preoccupy the British public as a 
whole.  Others, however, chiefly cultural historians or academics interested in 
culture, such as Stuart Ward, Bill Schwarz and Wendy Webster, maintain that the 
end of empire registered deeply among important sections of British metropolitan 
22 
 
society.
34
  Ward, for example, thinks that the end of empire presented a ‘formidable 
challenge’ to the legitimacy and credibility of ‘key ideas, assumptions and values’ 
which had become implicated in the ‘imperial experience’, such as notions of duty, 
service and stoic endurance, and that therefore the imperial context ‘underpinned 
contemporary perceptions of national degeneration’.35 
Lewis’s chapter on popular press coverage of Kenya is different from both of 
these sets of works because it suggests that the end of empire did not register deeply 
in a negative sense for the very reason that it registered deeply in other ways, which 
either cultivated or reflected particularly helpful public viewpoints on the changes 
afoot.
36
  John Darwin’s work on the British domestic side to decolonisation might be 
classed in the same category as Lewis’s chapter because he has underscored the 
significance of Macmillan’s skilful use of notions or institutions such as ‘the 
Commonwealth concept’ in ensuring there was no fatal impact.37 
This thesis’s argument that British press content may have mitigated the 
effect of undesirable feelings on the part of British readers, characterises 
decolonisation’s metropolitan impact as non-negative, an assertion which contrasts 
with the emphasis Ward, Schwarz and Webster have placed on the links between 
decolonisation and increased British domestic fears or anxieties.  Instead, it sides 
with Lewis and Darwin in their discussion of the possible significance of certain 
notions or institutions in cushioning the domestic impact of decline.  It strives to 
reach beyond their analyses, however, in the emphasis it also places on the 
conservative and non-ideological ways in which the press created or channelled 
certain of these helpful impressions.  On the specific issue of whether or not the 
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Commonwealth concept helped to assuage Britain’s ‘fear of falling’, this thesis 
would largely concur.  Yet, at the same time, it throws into relief the often fraught 
nature of the relationship between the British press and the countries of the 
Commonwealth in Africa, which suggests that the concept was neither regarded as 
fully positive in press circles nor performed a wholly positive function at the end of 
empire. 
The thesis does not surmount the methodological difficulties involved in 
analysing public attitudes or thought processes, which historians such as Howe have 
highlighted,
38
 being foremost a study of press content, as opposed to public beliefs in 
the fullest sense.  Yet it offers an assessment of an important set of understudied 
narratives on decolonisation, which large sections of the British public would have 
been aware of, and which, it is hoped, contributes to broadening our understanding 
of the nature of British metropolitan thought.  It therefore also takes issue with 
certain of Sandbrook’s claims regarding British public ignorance of or indifference 
towards decolonisation.  It reveals that ordinary people had a great deal of material 
on Africa and empire at their disposal in the form of newspaper articles during these 
years, indicating that editors believed the subject interested consumers. 
Neither does the thesis surmount the methodological conundrum of how to 
position in broader historical terms the results of investigations into popular or 
cultural narratives.  Arguing that press content mitigated the impact of decline 
suggests a degree of acceptance that decline would otherwise have been negative, 
that loss (the ‘loss’ of empire) is fundamentally negative, that decline was decline, 
and so on; and this is obviously problematic in that these assertions need also to be 
proved.  It is important to say at the outset, then, that the way in which the thesis 
verbally frames this particular conclusion does not reflect any underlying 
assumptions regarding Britain’s historical experience.  Rather, it proceeds from an 
analysis of the material, which is then positioned within those historiographical 
debates it believes it can most usefully inform: in this case, on the extent and the 
nature of ‘impact’.  The use of the words ‘potential’ and ‘may’ in the framing of the 
argument is conscious.  An alternative way in which it might be phrased, however, is 
to say that through the British press, British readers experienced the end of empire in 
Africa in largely non-negative terms, the word ‘non-negative’ deliberately chosen to 
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encompass a very varied range of characteristics, yet revolving, importantly, on the 
issue of Britain’s role, which was central to coverage.  This very phrasing difficulty 
is in a sense a good illustration of one of the thesis’s running themes on the role of 
the press; namely, that it is hard for writers or investigators to escape the linguistic 
and conceptual frames that proliferate in any given area of inquiry, and that this, if 
accompanied by a lack of explanation or even awareness, can result in the 
mechanical re-production of consistent underlying implied narratives over time, even 
at moments when conscious arguments or perspectives do in fact diverge. 
As a study of the years 1957 to 1960, the thesis does not and cannot contest 
the veracity of Howe’s suspicions that the impact of decolonisation was felt 
negatively only in later years.
39
  Nor does it strive to challenge the specific 
conclusions, only the overall emphasis, of works whose sources relate to those later 
years.
40
  Yet what is striking about press coverage over the period analysed is the 
consistency of its presentation of Britain and Britain’s role in or in relation to Africa 
as non-negative, a trait which may have endured, because it was part-product of 
factors whose significance snowballed, discouraging ruptures.  This does not mean 
that the press articulated unprogressive views on African or colonial-related issues.  
Indeed, it was its consistent ability to dissect, to debate and to rationalise Britain’s 
colonial role in non-negative terms, whilst accepting the need for an over-haul of its 
and other European systems, in addition to post-colonial African ones, which was 
perhaps its most defining, and for many in Africa – irritating, characteristic. 
In this, it did not purely mirror or reiterate the British Government’s take on 
events, as the existing historiography might lead us to conclude.  The narratives were 
instead press-generated in the sense that they were the product of a profusion of 
different influences bearing down on British newspapers, internal as well as external, 
local and foreign, practical and ideological, through which editors and journalists 
carved paths.  As such, the thesis draws a critical distinction at important, potentially 
damaging, points between press views on Britain and press views on events in 
Africa, which appear as inextricable concepts in the majority of existing studies of 
the possible effects in the metropole of ‘negative’ African or colonial issues in the 
British Empire, and which may provide one answer to those historians, such as 
                                                          
39
 Stephen Howe, ‘When (if ever) did Empire end? “Internal Decolonisation” in British Culture since 
the 1950s’ in Martin Lynn (ed.), The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival? (Basingstoke, 
2006), pp. 214-37. 
40
 For example: Schwarz, White Man’s World. 
25 
 
Caroline Elkins and David Anderson, who ask why it was that Britain appeared so 
able psychologically to weather the more unsavoury aspects of its imperial 
endgame.
41
 
 
5. British newspapers, Africa, and mid-Twentieth Century developments in the 
history of the British press 
 
One further set of studies deserves some attention.  These are histories of 
British newspapers, and of the British press during the twentieth century.  Examples 
would include Richard Cockett’s David Astor and the Observer, Duff Hart-Davis’s 
The House the Berrys Built, The History of The Times Volume V  by Iverach 
McDonald, Colin Seymour-Ure’s The Press, Politics and the Public, and Peter 
Catterall et al., Northcliffe’s Legacy.42  Some of these works, such as The History of 
The Times Volume V, are approached here as primary sources, if the authors, in this 
case an ex-editor, appear to be drawing on ‘insider knowledge’ or their own personal 
experiences to document the history of the institution.  Yet, as the example given is 
also an ‘official’ history, this thesis might also engage with it as a secondary source. 
The first key characteristic of this body of works as a whole, and the official 
histories in particular, which this thesis can offer a perspective on, is the claim that 
British newspapers took an ‘enlightened’ view on events in Africa, and backed the 
cause of the independence movements.
43
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While the conclusions reached here support this broad claim, particularly in 
the case of the Observer, at the same time they point to a number of very important 
caveats.  One of these concerns is the discrepancy between editorial comment and 
news reportage, whose content often conflicted, which had the effect of distorting or 
undermining the strength of the editorial message.  A second caveat would be that 
although some editors backed the cause of the independence movements, in so 
doing, they helped to prompt some white settler readerships to adopt an aggressive, 
yet essentially defensive, posture, which in the short-term appears to have 
contributed to the prolongation of European colonial rule, and thus also to the plight 
of Africans living under the rule of white minorities. 
A third caveat concerns the motivations which underlay the British press’s 
support for Africans.  As mentioned previously, it should not be assumed that this 
reflected a liberal turn on the part of all of those concerned.  In some important cases 
it did, but on other occasions, the support which British editors and correspondents 
gave to Africans reflected a hard-nosed pragmatism which turned on older racial 
fears, arguably, as well as on the issue of how best to conserve Britain’s global 
influence.  At moments when offering substantive support to Africans was not 
considered necessary to achieve this, as in the case of sufficiently ‘foreign’ South 
Africa, following the Sharpeville massacre, even the left-leaning press was notably 
more reticent.  These caveats are important, not least because they help to explain 
something of the true nature of the complex and often strained relationship of the 
British press, and Britain, with the peoples of Africa.  The claim that British 
newspapers backed the cause of the independence movements falls short of this, for 
obvious reasons. 
A further set of arguments on which this thesis can provide a perspective, 
albeit tentative, concerns post-war, mid-twentieth century developments in the 
history of the British press.  These include changes such as the decline in press 
partisanship during the 1950s, which some authors tie to British domestic social 
change and development, and a certain amount of political consensus; the 
comparative devolution of editorial authority during this period; and a notable 
increase in foreign news coverage, which manifested itself partly in the appointment 
of Africa specialists and an expanded foreign press corps. 
This thesis’s conclusions suggest that on African or colonial affairs between 
1957 and 1960, British newspapers did display partisanship often by directly backing 
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either the Conservative Party or the Labour Party, which, as the thesis will show, 
publicly articulated very different views on events in the colonies.  There was also an 
important connection between the content of British newspapers and British 
parliamentary debates on Africa, which deserves scrutiny, and which this thesis 
explores.  At the same time, however, it also analyses the significance of press 
narratives which defied partisan bounds, such as many of its comments on 
Federation and apartheid. 
On the subject of the devolution of editorial authority, particularly from press 
barons, the findings of this thesis would support the existing literature, except, it 
seems, in the cases of the Express and the Mirror, whose owners, Lord Beaverbrook 
and Cecil King, respectively, appeared to be deeply engaged in their day-to-day 
running.  However, it is necessary to avoid the implication that this comparative 
devolution resulted in British newspapers becoming the embodiment of a cacophony 
of voices, including of the less privileged.  Institutionally and culturally embedded 
patterns of employment, behaviour and reporting were important factors guiding the 
production of coverage over these years, as indeed were narratological frames for 
different stories and regions whose confines even fresh minds appeared to find it 
hard wholly to escape. 
This thesis does not contest the view that these years witnessed a profusion of 
foreign news coverage, including of Africa.  At the same time, however, it is 
important to take into account the distinction between foreign and colonial news, 
which this literature overlooks, because in the case of Britain and Africa, the British 
press had a decades-long engagement, as illustrated by the character of the coverage 
which forms the focus of this study.  Neither do the conclusions reached here 
conflict with the related claim that there were more foreign correspondents covering 
Africa locally during this period.  Yet, equally, it is important to note that the vast 
majority of these journalists could not accurately be classed as ‘Africa specialists’.  
Most were roving reporters, or luckless or intrepid types repeatedly sent to ‘trouble 
spots’ all over the world, which also had implications for the kind of coverage that 
emerged.  To call these men Africa specialists would be to imply that they produced 
a certain kind of quality coverage by virtue of more than their first-hand experience, 
but also studied research, which would be largely inaccurate. 
It is true that there were more Africa specialists during this period than 
before, but by the beginning of the sixties, they could be counted on one hand: 
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perhaps only Colin Legum (Observer), Anthony Sampson (Observer), Oliver Woods 
(Times), and Basil Davidson (Herald).  Additionally, Sampson did not consider 
himself to be one; nor was Africa part of his job description.  Davidson wrote 
sparingly on Africa for the Herald.  Only Legum and Woods would be given the job 
title of ‘Africa correspondent’, but in this period were still referred to as colonial 
correspondents.  Judging from the nature of Times memoranda from Woods, the 
journalist spent more time with white men than black.  Legum, a South African, was 
barred from South Africa, one of countries at the heart of the story of decolonisation 
and on which he offered frequent comments.  In other words, the picture appears 
more complex.  Further, British newspapers which did not send out either roving 
reporters of their own or Africa specialists, relied heavily on stringers, freelancers 
often drawn from local white settler communities.  And therefore, lastly, it is again 
important to avoid the implication present in some of these works that more 
coverage meant more diverse or better reporting.  This period might best be 
characterised as marking the beginning, rather than the culmination, in Britain, of a 
long process of learning about Africa in new ways. 
On the issue of popularly held views on what various British papers stand or 
stood for, including the utility of the right/left distinction, and the categorisation of 
the Express, for instance, as the paper of Empire, or the Mirror as the representative 
of youth, or the Observer as the paper whose offices constituted ‘the capital of 
Africa’ during these years, this thesis finds no reason to dissent strongly.  However, 
as stated previously, it also finds numerous similarities between the different papers’ 
Africa coverage, which were partly, but not exclusively, related to the indirect ways 
in which newspapers conveyed certain messages which conflicted with their 
explicitly stated editorial perspectives. 
 
6. Structure and outline 
 
 The body of the thesis is divided into six chapters.  These work 
chronologically to reveal the role of British press coverage in relation to a range of 
African and British imperial contexts over the period 1957 to 1960.  For clarity, each 
of the chapters also corresponds to a particular colonial territory or region of Africa, 
and as far as possible, highlights one particularly prominent feature of coverage 
concerning that country or region.  It is important to note, however, that these 
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characteristics did not operate discretely.  Rather, each flowed through coverage as a 
whole over the period, and they are therefore also discussed at other critical points.  
The era of rapid decolonisation forms the thesis’s focus because it is both one of the 
most understudied eras in British press-colonial relations, and a period of great 
change, which is therefore ripe for analysis. 
The thesis concentrates on regions which were once part of the British 
Empire again due to the extent of political and other activity occurring at this time in 
those areas.  Yet practical considerations, such as the extent of press interest, and 
thus material, as well as ease of access to sources, also influenced these choices.  An 
omission is that the thesis does not focus on stories which did not attract the attention 
of the British press, although it does discuss those elements of the stories the press 
did cover but which it did not or chose not to amplify.  The decision to include a 
chapter on the Congo crisis introduces a further comparative element, which allows 
for some consideration of the question this author is most often asked at seminars; 
namely, how did the British press portray Britain as compared to other European 
powers?  It also allows for a comparative, cross-imperial, assessment of the 
production and effects of press content, which, it is felt, cannot be neglected in any 
study of the role of British coverage in decolonisation which sets out to identify 
over-arching themes. 
The chapter summaries which follow focus on these broad themes.  These are 
explored alongside nuances and specifics in the main body of the thesis. 
The first chapter discusses the press’s lauding of the British role in the Gold 
Coast’s peaceful transition to independence in 1957, followed by its swift 
denunciation of the nature of Nkrumah’s rule.  It sets out and begins to explore the 
three central running themes of the thesis which concern the overall effects of 
coverage.  To reiterate, these concern its largely disruptive impact on the British 
Government and groups in Africa, and its probable positive effects for British 
readers.  In the Ghana example, British press content was an irritant and an obstacle 
in the path of the British Government’s claim to sole authorship of ‘Britain’s’ view 
in Africa, a dynamic which turned on the subject of consolidating, or undermining, 
the Commonwealth.  It exacerbated tensions between the governing Convention 
People’s Party (CPP), and the National Liberation Movement (NLM), whose cause 
large sections of the British press championed.  At the same time, it conveyed a 
30 
 
positive impression of colonial rule to British readers, and in so doing, distanced 
Britain from the negative characteristics of the independent state. 
On the topic of the dynamics which underlay the critical commentary, the 
chapter foregrounds the significance of the public rhetoric of opposition groups 
within Ghana, combined with their efforts to cultivate links with the right-leaning 
press in Britain.  It also discusses the importance of Nkrumah’s attacks on press 
freedom, the historically tense relationship between the CPP and the British media, 
the CPP’s efforts to exploit or deepen the divide for internal political reasons, and 
the political and other perspectives of British editors and journalists.  Further factors 
included the translation to Ghana of British domestic political tensions made 
possible by the presence of expatriate officials; and correspondents’ limited 
historical awareness. 
Violence and its fall-out in Kenya and Nyasaland during 1959 form the 
subject of Chapter Two, which turns on the press’s diminution of the issue of British 
colonial misconduct.  The chapter speaks predominantly to the third of this thesis’s 
themes on the effects of coverage: its cushioning of the domestic psychological 
impact of decline.  It discusses the potentially positive implications of this for the 
British Government, which faced an election that year.  Yet it also identifies 
important ways in which aspects of press content continued to work at odds with 
elements of British colonial policy, in this case chiefly concerning its portrayal of the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and African nationalism and white settlers 
therein.  Press coverage was somewhat out of kilter with British policy towards 
Central Africa, and there is evidence to suggest that it influenced it.  Locally, 
newspaper articles began to trouble and antagonise sections of the ruling white 
community, damaging their relations with Britain, and affecting their visions of the 
future. 
Concerning the factors which influenced the nature and proliferation of such 
content, the chapter discusses the significance of official government media 
management strategies, which the existing historiography underscores.  Yet it 
continues to describe press content as the product of a range of different factors, 
which, in the case of Central Africa, in particular, were numerous.  During 1959, 
additional influences included racism, cultural or literary depictions of Africa, 
journalists’ local experiences, African activism, the activities of Labour MPs and 
critics of empire, settler-press relations, editorial constraints, the perspectives of 
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editors and journalists; and, relatedly, the press’s narratological and visual framing 
of events. 
Chapters Three and Four turn the thesis’s consideration to press treatment of 
Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ tour of Africa in January and February 1960.  Chapter 
Three concentrates on the tour as a whole, spanning stops in Ghana, Nigeria, the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and South Africa.  Chapter Four is devoted to 
press coverage of an African demonstration in Blantyre, which occurred during 
Macmillan’s visit to Nyasaland. 
Chapter Three argues that the primary significance of press coverage of the 
tour lay with its depiction of the African nationalist challenge to colonial authority as 
strong, and white settler intransigence as downright dangerous, or mad.  At first 
glance, these characteristics might seem to represent little more than a reiteration, 
albeit sensationalised, of the Prime Minister’s famous ‘wind of change’ theme, and 
thus an affirmation of British Government statements.  But it is the argument of this 
chapter that throughout the tour Macmillan was in fact far less concerned publicly to 
promote acquiescence in the face of change than he was an acceptance of the status 
quo, as embodied in concepts such as interdependence, patience, and the promotion 
of mutual understanding and respect through dialogue and Commonwealth ties.  
That African nationalist muscle and white settler psychosis shone through as the 
principal themes in British press coverage of the tour reflects the continued 
resonance of the institutional, cultural, political, personal, and experiential factors 
that influenced journalists’ coverage of the southern region, which, critically, 
interacted with African nationalist efforts to exploit the British presence on the 
ground as a means of advancing the nationalist cause and fighting Federation and 
apartheid. 
The British press’s treatment of the tour frustrated the Government’s ability 
to impose its narrative on the politics of the imperial endgame.  Press content 
concerned and irritated Macmillan and his colleagues, and had policy implications.  
It also fuelled the fears of white groups inside the Federation and South Africa.  And 
although it had some positive implications for African nationalists, white anxiety 
tended to translate into retrenchment, which meant that, overall, the effects of British 
newspaper coverage of the tour for Africans living in this southern region can best be 
characterised as negative.  Due to the nature of the press’s portrayal both of the 
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decolonisation process at large and of Britain’s place within it, these articles tended 
once again not to diminish Britain’s role, but instead to elevate it. 
Chapter Four, which examines press coverage of an African protest in 
Blantyre, Nyasaland, pursues and develops the arguments in Chapter Three by 
looking specifically at British press treatment of Central African affairs.  This is 
considered necessary due to the sheer extent of press interest in the question of the 
future of the Federation during these months and years.  The opportunity is also 
taken, mid-way through the thesis, explicitly to foreground some of its core 
subsidiary, non-press-related running themes, which speak to the character of the 
decolonisation process at large, and which tend not to feature very heavily in the 
existing literature.  These concern the significance of ordinary people and publics; 
the sense of contingency or possibility, which, it suggests, suffused each moment; 
the British Government’s handling of the business of decolonisation, which it argues 
was messy at times, and even farcical; the impact of ‘imaginaries’, such as 
perceptions, hopes and fears, on the historical process; and the centrality of African 
action to decolonisation, a feature of coverage whose incorporation into the thesis as 
a ‘neglected narrative’ the chapter is careful to justify. 
Chapter Five is devoted to South Africa, and concentrates on press coverage 
of the Sharpeville massacre.  British newspapers sorely criticised the South African 
Government and the system of apartheid during these weeks.  Yet they tended to 
portray Sharpeville and the events which followed it as a story of African action, 
violence and power, rather than African victimhood.  They also displayed ambiguity 
on the subject of direct responsibility for the deaths and a lack of consensus, 
particularly initially, on the appropriate international, including British, response to 
the issue of white violence. 
The press’s emphasis on African power was firstly a reflection of dogged 
African efforts to stimulate a transformation locally.  It stemmed, secondly, from the 
nature of the press’s central narratological frames by March 1960 for interpreting 
events in ‘white’ Central and South Africa, the subject of the preceding two chapters; 
and, thirdly, from the specific ways in which the British press produced its South 
Africa coverage, which hinged on its close relations with South African English-
language newspapers.  The British press’s initial ambiguity on the issue of direct 
responsibility for the deaths, and its later lack of consensus on how Britain should 
respond to the issue of white violence reflected the specific dynamics, and 
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limitations, involved in evaluating unexpected events.  Yet the political perspectives 
of some British journalists and editors were also important influences, together with 
the limits of the British press’s vision for South Africa. 
 British newspaper articles fomented division locally, circulating opposition 
views in the context of stringent internal censorship, and fuelling debates in white 
society on the causes of the troubles, which, in the Union Government’s view, the 
stringer personified.  British press content also helped prompt the South African 
Government to crack down more stringently on press and other freedoms, further 
turning the country in on itself.  In Britain, the effects of coverage were less 
transformative, chiefly because interested organisations or institutions, such as the 
British Government, had their eyes and interests fixed on places other than the 
British public sphere; yet in the ambiguity and the lack of consensus mentioned 
previously, it may have performed a small inhibiting function.  Despite this, British 
press content was also remarkable for the degree to which it upheld the ‘enlightened’ 
British example against the white racialism of the apartheid state, a perspective 
which may have appealed to British readers, and which could therefore have 
continued to mitigate the psychological impact of decline. 
 Chapter Six takes us out of British Africa to the Congo, where journalists 
grappled with a very different set of issues, but where there were also important 
continuities in coverage.  British press treatment of the country in its first few 
months of independence, between June and October, 1960, proved essentially 
favourable for Belgium and inauspicious for Patrice Lumumba, the country’s first 
Prime Minister.  Recurring themes were Congolese political and tribal division, the 
strength and credibility of Lumumba’s rivals, white vulnerability and victimhood, 
Lumumba’s unpopularity and unpredictability, and the logic behind the intervention 
first of Belgium, and then of the UN.  Crucially, papers made little attempt to 
investigate the full significance of those of Belgium’s behind-the-scenes or more 
underhand activities of which they were aware.  This pro-Belgian/anti-Lumumba 
coverage was, again, born of a variety of influences, including cultural, editorial, 
personal, institutional and experiential. 
British press content helped impede Lumumba’s ability to rule.  It lent 
support to the idea of external intervention whilst obscuring the full extent of that 
intervention in practice, contributing to an international socio-political environment 
in which the West was able to act with impunity and Lumumba found few, and even 
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lost some, allies.  It also advanced the cause of Lumumba’s Congolese political 
opponents, fomenting division locally.  Throughout it all, Britain came across very 
well, partly because of the British press’s positive portrayal of parallel constitutional 
developments in British colonial territories such as Nyasaland, but also due to the 
way in which it depicted the Western, including Belgian and British, role in the 
Congo itself.  Journalists set Britain firmly on the side of Belgium, rather than in 
opposition to it. 
 
7. Sources and methodology 
 
The thesis aims to build on the existing literature partly in its approach to the 
material, which, as stated previously, involves combining two previously distinct 
approaches to the study of the press in Africa at the end of empire, one focusing on 
newspaper content, the other on outsider interactions with or perceptions of that 
content, and adding a third: journalists’ own accounts of events published or 
recorded in places other than the press.  For the first of these, the study of press 
content, the thesis draws on a wide range of mainstream British newspapers, popular 
and serious, left- and right-leaning.  These include The Daily Express, The Daily 
Herald, The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror, The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, 
The Manchester Guardian, The News Chronicle, The Observer and The Times.  
Further papers are consulted if they played a particularly prominent role in events; if, 
for instance, a member of their staff was arrested or deported from Africa, and if this 
is considered significant. 
 For the second element of the approach, the study of outsider interactions 
with or perceptions of press coverage, newspaper articles also form important 
sources.  Previous studies have not paid adequate attention to those aspects of press 
content which reveal journalists’ sources or other influences behind the production 
of coverage, including journalists’ local experiences.  Rather, they have chosen to 
privilege the substantive content, and in many cases, comment, leaving some stones 
unturned.  In addition, the thesis utilises British Government documents; the 
published memoirs and diaries of prominent British politicians; the memoir of 
Harold Evans, Harold Macmillan’s Public Relations Adviser; UK Hansard; 
published Government reports; the published memoirs and diaries of a number of 
politicians and officials on the African continent, with whom journalists interacted; 
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the papers of Sir Roy Welensky, the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland; the papers of Sir Robert Armitage, the Governor of Nyasaland; the 
Devlin Commission Papers; the records of the South African Government; material 
relating to the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the South African Liberal Party, 
found in the Gail M. Gerhart Papers; and South African Hansard. 
African and white settler newspapers also form important sources for 
information on outsider interactions with and perceptions of British press content.  
This is firstly because they provide an opportunity to identify some of the more 
popular or more widely-circulated African or settler responses to British press 
narratives, which official documents cannot always help us with; and secondly, due 
to the nature of the relationship, in some instances, of these papers and their 
correspondents to the British press, with whom they were largely either in 
collaboration or at ‘war’.  The newspapers from Africa this thesis utilises include: 
The Ashanti Pioneer, The Ashanti Times, The Daily Graphic (Ghana), The Ghana 
Evening News, The Rhodesia Herald, The Bulawayo Chronicle, Malawi News, The 
Nyasaland Times, The Cape Times, and The Rand Daily Mail.  The thesis also uses 
press cuttings found in the Gail M. Gerhart Papers, in the records of the British and 
South African Governments, and in the Welensky Papers. 
Concerning the third element of the approach, journalists’ own accounts of 
events published or recorded in places other than the press, the thesis utilises The 
Times Archive; the records of the Manchester Guardian; the Colin Legum Papers; 
and the memoirs and other published works of British journalists and editors and of 
foreign (non-British) correspondents either writing for or commenting in the British 
press.  Oral interviews were held with Derek Ingram, Stanley Uys and William 
Kirkman.  A written interview was conducted with Peter Younghusband, whose text 
is in this author’s possession. 
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Chapter 1 
Ghana’s slippery slope:  Independent Ghana, 1957 
  
On 6
 
March 1957, the Gold Coast became Ghana, the first sub-Saharan 
African territory to achieve independence under a democratically elected African 
leader: Kwame Nkrumah of the Convention People’s Party (CPP).  Within little less 
than a decade, all but the white settler colonies of Central and Southern Africa would 
be free from European colonial rule, this region to experience some of the most 
violent and protracted struggles for independence the world would ever see. 
In contrast to this tortuous experience, Ghana’s independence appears in the 
historiography as an almost wholly peaceful success story.  Some have attributed this 
to the nature of British colonial policy.  Richard Rathbone, Frank Furedi, and Ronald 
Hyam have described how, against a backdrop of incipient violence, colonial 
officials carefully cultivated relations with ‘moderate’ African successors to whom 
they progressively, carefully and intentionally transferred political power.
1
  Others, 
such as David Birmingham and Richard Reid, have emphasised the pivotal role 
played by Africans, including Nkrumah and the CPP, in sparking and spurring on the 
decolonisation process, as well as in negotiating with the British a peaceful and 
productive transition to African majority rule.
2
  Only Jean Marie Allman and 
Richard Rathbone have chosen to examine in detail the more disquieting narrative of 
fractures within Ghanaian society prior to and following independence, Allman in 
relation to the trials and tribulations of the main opposition party, the National 
Liberation Movement (NLM), and Rathbone regarding the experience of chiefs in 
southern Ghana.
3
 
Yet it was Africans who would suffer the effects of these divisions.  From the 
British perspective, the story is said to have remained a largely rosy one, and was, 
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Rathbone claims, widely accepted as such at the time.
4
  In an article elucidating ‘the 
distinctive unhappiness which swirled around Ghana’s last days as the British 
colonial territory of the Gold Coast’,5 Rathbone argues that this bitterness has been 
largely ignored outside Ghana ‘because international interest focused, and still 
focuses upon, the political struggle for independence from British rule rather than 
upon the internal struggles for the eventual domination of the post-colonial state’.6  
The narrative ‘best known to the outside world…is an undeniably exciting story of 
the triumphant reassertion of sovereignty achieved by a courageous, radical political 
party led by the internationally renowned, charismatic figure of Dr Kwame 
Nkrumah’.7 
International media treatment of Ghana’s independence celebrations, replete 
with their ‘radiant iconography’,8 is thought to have been central to the creation and 
distribution of this jubilant, rather air-brushed narrative.  ‘Much the most 
memorable, if clichéd, illustration of this story’, Rathbone suggests, ‘remains a 
grainy, flash-lit midnight photograph of Nkrumah and his closest political colleagues 
wearing northern smocks and jaunty “Prison Graduate caps” happily clustered 
around a flagpole flying the new flag of their only just independent country… Very 
much less well-known beyond Ghana’s borders is what appears to be a losers’ 
account; this is a much grimmer, considerably less romantic story of rapidly 
worsening post-colonial oppression’.9  The predominance of the first, heroic account 
in international media depictions of Ghana at and around independence Rathbone 
attributes to the tendency of ‘decades of visiting journalists and scholars… not to 
stray too far away from the country’s capital and the Atlantic shore’, the heartland of 
the CPP.
10
 
Rathbone’s account of Ghana’s independence celebrations is the only piece 
both to provide a detailed account of their nature as well as to make reference to the 
ways in which Ghana was perceived by the outside world through the media, at 
independence and more generally.  Yet the article is primarily an exposition of what 
the media missed and draws not on media sources, but on the records of the British 
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Government, the papers of the colonial Governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, and 
material from the Ghana National Archives. 
This chapter aims to complement Rathbone’s piece by analysing the nature 
and role of British press treatment of Ghana during 1957, including coverage of the 
independence celebrations in March.  It makes reference to events within the period 
1954-62 when relevant.  It draws on British newspaper articles from left- and right-
leaning papers, ‘popular’ and ‘serious’; the memoirs of journalists, editors and 
political figures; newspaper articles from three Ghanaian papers; the records of the 
British Government; and the archive of The Times. 
It is of course primarily concerned with this thesis’s core research question, 
namely: Was the process of decolonisation in Africa and Britain, on the one hand, 
and the actions and opinions of the British press, on the other, interrelated – and if 
so, how and with what effects?  Yet it speaks to Rathbone’s conclusions in important 
ways.  Regarding the nature of British media treatment of the celebrations, it 
questions the extent to which the triumphalist CPP narrative of a heroic Nkrumah 
was truly that omnipresent.  Not only was it clouded out by a self-congratulatory 
British one, but, in right-leaning papers in particular, it was always weighted with 
references to or discussion of the criticisms and concerns of opposition groups. 
In contextualising British press treatment of the celebrations, moreover, 
tracking coverage through 1957, this chapter concludes that to the extent to which 
positive commentary on the CPP and Nkrumah was evident at independence, it was 
not broadly representative of British Gold Coast/Ghana coverage as a whole, and 
thus that the triumphant podium scene was not the only image of the newly-
independent state familiar beyond Ghana’s borders during these years.  The harshly 
critical commentaries emerging in British papers five to six months following the 
celebrations were more prolific, equally self-congratulatory, and far more 
representative of British Gold Coast/Ghana coverage over the period as a whole, not 
only in terms of the nature of the articles printed in British papers, but also 
concerning the ways in which these articles were produced, and their effects. 
The moves taken by the Ghana Government against opposition groups within 
the country and against freedom of expression provided a base line which allowed 
for a highly critical commentary to emerge in the months following independence.  
Yet the speed and the character of the press attack indicated that there were also 
other, more historical, factors at play.  The public rhetoric of opposition groups 
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within Ghana, together with their tried and tested strategy for combating CPP 
influence, which included cultivating links with the right-leaning press in Britain, 
was one factor.  The tense relationship between the CPP and the British media was 
another.  Further factors included the personal and political perspectives of 
journalists; the translation to Ghana of British domestic political tensions made 
possible by the presence of expatriate officials, including ex-MPs, serving in the 
newly-independent state – and a very interested and political British press; and 
journalists’ limited understanding of the history of the country, of British 
colonialism, and of the nature or strictures of the post-colonial state.  These 
dynamics combined to explosive journalistic effect within the columns of British 
papers, whose content was inextricably woven into events inside both Ghana and 
Britain. 
During 1957, British press content fuelled tensions and divisions within 
African society, and strained Commonwealth ties.  Because British press coverage 
tended to simplify the history of British colonial rule in Africa and the strictures of 
the post-colonial state, it may also have served to mitigate feelings of loss, regret, 
weakness and decline on the part of British newspaper readers at the very moment at 
which Britain began to reflect on its imperial past and present and divest itself of its 
African empire. 
 
1. Coverage of the independence celebrations 
 
i. ‘The way of the British’:11 Characteristics of the triumphalist narrative 
 
 The most striking feature of British press coverage of Ghana’s independence 
concerned its portrayal of British imperialism, and the relationship between Ghana 
and Britain.  This was essentially a triumphalist narrative.  Yet it focused not on the 
CPP or Nkrumah.  The starring role was left to the departing colonial power.  It is 
likely that this reflected more than the British Government’s effective press 
management of the occasion, given that British officials were acutely aware of the 
importance of allaying Ghanaian fears that their independence might at some future 
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date be compromised.
12
  Rather, it owed more to the nature of the independence 
celebrations, which drew on the precedent of earlier such occasions, infused with 
British and imperial iconography;
13
 and to the interests and perspectives of visiting 
journalists covering this one-off event, who appeared to find it more interesting and 
pressing, as well as easier, to comment on familiar faces and ‘the state of Britain’ 
than to recount the history of Nkrumah and the CPP.  David Birmingham comments 
that of the six hundred journalists who travelled to Ghana to report the celebrations, 
‘most of them’ had never visited Africa before.14  Oliver Woods, The Times’s 
colonial correspondent, later hinted that even his paper’s coverage of Ghana at and 
around independence had been relatively poor.
15
  He attributed this in large part to 
the absence in the region of a European newspaper, and thus of ‘appropriate’ 
stringers, as well as to the costs of sending out special correspondents for two to four 
weeks when stories surfaced.
16
 
Three essentially self-affirming representations characterised the Anglo-
centric narrative.  One turned on the peaceful, unbloodied and consensual nature of 
Ghana’s transition to independence, which journalists conflated with the absence of a 
struggle.
17
  Another foregrounded the long process of negotiation and, as part of this, 
the ‘tutelage’ of Ghanaians by Britain.18  Also prominent was the claim that Ghana’s 
independence set Britain on the road to further distinction because it bolstered the 
Commonwealth, that organisation depicted as the embodiment of Britain’s future 
power and influence.  For British newspapers, the defining image of the celebrations 
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was not of the Ghanaian Prime Minister on the podium with his colleagues,
19
 but of 
the Duchess of Kent, Britain’s representative, pictured on the dance floor in 
Nkrumah’s arms, clothed in white chiffon, sequins and pearls,20 a vision which 
seemed to encapsulate Britain’s continued greatness, as well as the lasting affection 
of Britain for Ghana and Ghana for Britain, which they considered likely to 
characterise the independence era.  John Hall, covering the celebrations for the Mail, 
wrote that the popularity of the British in Ghana at the time was ‘overwhelming’.21  
Nkrumah’s refutation that Ghana might leave the Commonwealth at some future 
date was widely quoted in British papers on both left and right;
22
 so too were his 
comments that ‘We part from the former Imperial power…with the warmest feelings 
of friendship and goodwill’.23 
It was not that this narrative was entirely untrue.  The problem is that it 
presented only one perspective, in a pattern which would repeat itself elsewhere in 
Africa over the course of the next three years.
24
  Certainly, Ghana’s recent history 
had been far more peaceful than parallel developments elsewhere in the British 
Empire, most notably Kenya and Cyprus.
25
  Political negotiation and ‘tutelage’ in the 
form of the expansion of western-style education, and co-government from 1948 
were important characteristics of Britain’s approach to colonial governance in the 
Gold Coast.
26
  Ghana was the first sub-Saharan African country to achieve 
independence, too, meaning that Britain was essentially pioneering in that it was the 
first European colonial power to grant it.  Yet these characterisations contained 
important omissions, which reinforced a misleading impression of Ghana’s history 
that might otherwise have given British readers cause to reflect more demurely both 
on the quality of Britain’s past relationship with its colonial subjects and the true 
extent of its historical agency. 
The fact that most journalists conflated the lack of blood or violence against 
the colonial state during the 1950s with the absence of a fight for independence, 
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diminished the role of Africans, including Nkrumah and the CPP, in sparking the 
decolonisation process in the Gold Coast as well as in conditioning aspects of its 
pace and form.  The British had initially favoured the more moderate United Gold 
Coast Convention Party (UGCC), and had imprisoned Nkrumah, the man to whom 
they were eventually to transfer power.  In 1948, riots by discontented Africans had 
ignited a process of political and constitutional reform; and African support for 
Nkrumah in the 1952 General Election had influenced the future trajectory of the 
Gold Coast in no uncertain terms.  Yet few papers chose this moment to recall 
Nkrumah’s imprisonment, and no paper recounted the history of the CPP’s battle 
with the more conservative UGCC.  That this was not wholly surprising does not 
make it insignificant.  This triumphalist narrative appeared at an important moment 
when, for the first time, British newspapers gathered together for their readers the 
story of Ghana’s colonial past in order that they might move forward knowingly.  
Only the Herald’s committed and very sympathetic Basil Davidson chose to refer to 
Ghana’s independence as ‘the happy ending to a long and bitter chapter of history’.27  
Davidson, whom the British Government suspected of being a Communist 
sympathiser,
28
 was later to become one of the world’s foremost authorities on Africa, 
working tirelessly throughout his life to educate Britain and the world on Africa’s 
rich pre-colonial history and the European colonial legacy.
29
  Yet in this instance, 
even he did not elaborate. 
Africans tended to be denied anything but a generalised, secondary and rather 
oblique role in the story.  Journalists’ references to the person and to the role of 
Nkrumah were largely confined to 5-7 March, when the celebrations were at their 
height.  Journalists represented the country itself in an essentially paternalistic way, 
too, diminishing it.  The language used to describe Ghana’s position in the world 
was replete with the imagery of birth, of childhood and of growing up,
30
 belying the 
truth of the claim, stated elsewhere, that Ghana was, by virtue of its sovereignty, now 
regarded as being in a position of equality with the older, industrialised nations of 
the western world.
31
  There was a rather condescending, yet at the same time 
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burdensome argument commonplace inside British papers that Ghana was the first of 
its kind in black Africa, a precarious test-case; and that just as a naughty teenager let 
loose on the world might damage its siblings’ prospects of being granted the same 
freedoms, any inability to function as a ‘nation-state’ following the departure of the 
British would have unenviable repercussions for other African territories wishing to 
put an end to European colonial rule.
32
  Yet worryingly for Ghana, British journalists 
were keen to point out that the support the new Prime Minister had accrued was far 
from universal.  As the Guardian put it, ‘To come of age is in part a deliverance, but 
more a challenge’.33 
 
ii. ‘“We are not happy” – now the British are going’:34 Regional rivalries 
and press coverage of independence 
 
Balancing out the positive, celebratory aspect of British press treatment of 
independence, then, were notes of caution directed at Nkrumah, continually and in 
some cases stridently voiced.
35
  Concerns were centred on Kumasi, the capital of 
Ashanti, the heartland of the NLM, a party comprised of elements of the old 
intelligentsia who had been active in the UGCC from which Nkrumah’s CPP had 
split earlier in the decade, chiefs who felt their traditional status threatened by an 
increasingly centralised state dominated by a younger generation of leaders who 
owed nothing to heredity, and aggrieved cocoa farmers, mostly in Ashanti, whose 
high yields in previous years had failed to reap the expected returns under 
Nkrumah’s socialism.36  Also throwing in their lot with the NLM, were many of the 
people of the northern regions, as well as of Togoland in the east.  Despite the results 
of a plebiscite in 1956, which had signalled Togoland’s desire to join an independent 
Ghana, regional disaffection remained strong.  The latest manifestation of these 
ruptures – a threat by the NLM to boycott the independence celebrations if regional 
safeguards were not written into the constitution - the British press understood to 
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have been soothed just in the nick of time by Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial 
Secretary, who had visited the territory in January to mediate a resolution to the 
conflict.  Yet the difficulties were predicted to resurface in the independence era, and 
the jury was out on the question of whether or not Nkrumah would be able to cope 
without the ‘safety net of the British Colonial Office’.37 
At this time, both the Mail and the Express published large feature articles on 
the fears of the people of Ashanti, which pointed to some initial reasons why right-
leaning papers aired more doubts than those on the left.  One factor turned on how 
the public rhetoric of opposition groups meshed with the political stance of these 
papers.  The large Express article, entitled ‘The people who live in fear – A knife in 
the back when the British go?’,38 contained an exposition of Ashanti concerns, as 
described by John Redfern, reporting from Kumasi.  ‘What is eating these Ashanti, a 
likeable, mettlesome people with a brave past?’, the correspondent asked: ‘They 
believe the new Government wants to destroy the Ashanti unity which the new 
Constitution safeguards.  One of Nkrumah’s lieutenants sneers at “this man who 
calls himself Secretary of State” (Mr. Lennox-Boyd).  This really rouses the 
Ashanti… Ashanti citizens are convinced that Nkrumah is going all out for a 
republic….39  To the Express, a publication which referred to itself as ‘The Empire 
Newspaper’,40 this opposition narrative sat well.  Beaverbrook, its proprietor, took an 
active interest in the paper’s editorial stance, and used it to promote his personal 
interests.
41
  He had financial concerns in Africa, such as in Northern Rhodesia, 
where he owned shares in the copper mining industry.
42
  The view that some 
Africans preferred the representatives of the British Empire to leaders such as 
Nkrumah was particularly vindicating for a paper with a stance such as this.  The 
Ashantis’ apparent regard for the protection offered by the British Secretary of State, 
the Queen and the Commonwealth, was flattering and seemed genuine.  Redfern’s 
reference to the Ashanti as ‘a mettlesome people with a brave past’ meshed nicely 
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with traditional English views on magnificent warrior races and their relative 
quiescence in Empire.
43
 
A second, interrelated factor concerned the efforts of opposition groups to 
cultivate links with the British right-leaning press.  This was not an approach without 
its precedents.  Ever since its formation in 1954, following the CPP’s second 
electoral victory and therefore lacking an initial parliamentary presence, the NLM 
had turned to vociferous public criticism of Nkrumah’s government as well as to 
‘extra-parliamentary activity’, including a ‘propaganda campaign’ in London, to air 
and advance its case.
44
  According to Rathbone, the NLM campaign sought to 
portray the CPP as despotic, and was supported by ‘elements in London who were 
either apprehensive about the dissolution of the colonial empire in general or about 
the imminence of the Gold Coast’s independence in particular’.45  They included ‘the 
boards of companies like the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation and partisans of empire 
in the Conservative party in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords’.46  
Since 1954, Oxford-educated Kofi Busia, the Party’s leader, had cleverly plied these 
groups both with outspoken criticisms of Nkrumah’s government and with praise for 
the British.
47
  His efforts appear to have been fruitful.  Birmingham goes so far as to 
suggest that sections of the British establishment and media felt ‘duped’ when their 
predictions of a federalist victory in the 1956 elections proved wrong, ‘and so they 
fuelled a campaign of denigration against Nkrumah’, which included portraying the 
CPP leader as a threat to democracy as well as broadcasting ‘the words rather than 
the deeds of the opposition’ to the West.48 
At independence, the left-leaning press also printed the substance of the 
Opposition’s attacks on the CPP, broadsheets such as the Guardian and the Observer 
often reproducing its words in news reports.  Yet they did so in a less conspicuous 
way.  When they commented, their tone was mostly cautionary as opposed to 
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censorious, and their features tended to focus instead on issues such as the economy, 
development and the nature of Nkrumah’s policies for the independence era.49 
Some might argue that an overly optimistic or forgiving stance on 
independent Africa’s new leadership lay behind the left-leaning press’s cautionary 
content on this and similar issues.
50
  Yet in the case of Africa, and Ghana in 
particular, explaining the practical issues behind the comparative absence of a left-
leaning press narrative at this stage seems to be as significant as explaining its 
nature.  The Herald and the News Chronicle, both left-leaning popular papers but 
‘financially weak’, were limited in their coverage, ‘only occasionally sending staff 
writers to the African continent’.51  The Mirror, financially the strongest of the 
British left-leaning populars and the best equipped to cover events in Ghana by 
virtue of its links to West African journalism through Cecil King,
52
 found itself 
restrained by the same connections as it trod tentatively to safeguard a future for the 
Group in changing times.
53
  The editorial policy of the Ghana Daily Graphic, a 
Mirror Group publication, had originally been that of ‘constructive criticism’ of the 
Ghana Government.
54
  Yet this ‘became and more and more difficult as the CPP 
consolidated its position and began to move against dissent’.55 
Although this might be taken as evidence of the accuracy of the right-leaning 
press’s claims regarding the limits of Nkrumah’s appeal, and therefore also of the 
relative insignificance of other factors affecting the nature of its articles, the situation 
appeared to be more complex.  In West Africa, The Mirror Group could not be 
regarded as a purely disinterested commentator, but one whose fortunes were 
intimately tied to the course of political and constitutional change;
56
 and, historically, 
it had been inclined to confront the CPP for this reason.  The dearth of critical 
comment in the Mirror on Nkrumah at independence reflected the fact that the CPP 
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had won the latest instalment of a ‘press war’, a term the British Government used to 
refer to these sorts of relations,
57
 and thus the realities of power on the ground, as 
much as, if not more than, the character of Nkrumah’s rule. 
The large feature article which appeared in the Mail just before the 
celebrations represented a continuation of the efforts of opposition groups to exploit 
the British right-leaning press.  The report told of ‘a dramatic last-minute appeal… 
made to the British people through the Daily Mail by Sir Agyeman Prempeh, Ruler 
of the Ashanti nation’.58  Hall had been ‘summoned’ to ‘an urgent meeting’ in 
Kumasi by the Ashantehene, who spoke of his fears for the future.  “I am sorely 
troubled”, the Ashantehene explained: “Three days ago Ashanti elders appealed to 
her Majesty’s Government through the Secretary of State for the Colonies to help the 
Ashanti people before it is too late.  We have heard only silence…  It is possible that 
Mr. Lennox-Boyd has not heard.  Thinking that may be possible it is my hope that a 
message through the Daily Mail will be able to help us by explaining our worries to 
the British people.  Through you I want to speak to the British people as an old and 
good friend.”  The ruler was keen to cultivate a sympathetic audience in Hall, and his 
efforts found expression within the pages of the Mail.  This contrasted very much 
with Nkrumah’s approach towards the foreign media.  According to Hall, ‘in spite of 
many requests’, the Prime Minister declined to see newspapermen until after 
independence.
59
  From the beginning of the fifties, his Party had had strained 
relations with British newspapers.  In August 1957, George Padmore, reporting from 
London for the Ghana Evening News, the paper of the CPP, accused ‘certain British 
imperialist newspapers’ of having over the years ‘consistently opposed the right of 
self-government and independence of the coloured races of Asia and Africa’, 
including Ghana,
60
 and memories of this remained raw. 
Particular hatred was reserved for the proprietors, editors and correspondents 
of Ghana’s own ‘White Press’, the Graphic and the Ashanti Times, the latter the 
brain-child of Major-General Sir Edward Spears, the Chairman of Ashanti 
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Goldfields, a powerful mining company.
61
  All of these papers had arrived in West 
Africa at the end of the forties and the beginning of the fifties, just as the 
decolonisation process was beginning, and Africans generally believed that they 
spoke for metropolitan financial interests.
62
  They also sensed a political connection.  
There was no official link between the White Press and the Colonial Office, but the 
latter had been ‘helpful’ at the moment the Mirror Group was considering entry; and 
prior to that, it had also been of the view that a newspaper or set of newspapers 
might prove useful in counterbalancing the vituperous African nationalist press 
during these important years.
63
  British papers were believed to be part and parcel of 
the same game: suspected efforts to deny Ghana its hard-won freedom.  Initially, this 
argument was advantageous in a practical sense for the CPP in addition to its being 
genuinely felt.  Judging from the content of the Ghana Evening News over these 
weeks, it featured in Nkrumah’s efforts to consolidate his domestic political 
popularity.  If the British press and the NLM were in cahoots, then having contempt 
for one entailed having contempt for the other. 
 
2. Coverage of independent Ghana 
 
i. The slippery slope: April to July, 1957 
 
 During the spring and summer of 1957, British press coverage of Ghana was 
not extensive.  Yet, to the extent that press content exhibited one discernible pattern, 
the majority of articles, if often small, served to provide an insidious running 
commentary on Nkrumah’s internal policies.  This was a story of a sequence of 
moves which journalists on the right tended to regard both as an affront to the British 
as well as a turn to something akin to benign authoritarianism.  The public rhetoric of 
opposition groups within Ghana, together with the political perspectives of British 
commentators, remained important factors behind their exposition.  That this was not 
simply a case of journalists’ perceptive or even premonitory detailing of what is 
sometimes referred to as Ghana’s ‘slide to dictatorship’, is suggested by the fact that 
those of the government’s moves which were arguably more indicative of 
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authoritarian tendencies, such as Nkrumah’s appointment of regional commissioners 
accountable to the Ghana Government,
64
 failed to attract the same degree of 
publicity, or none at all.  The tendency of some British papers to latch on to 
examples of Nkrumah’s behaviour they regarded as a slur on the British, and then to 
extrapolate conclusions concerning incipient authoritarianism, and this at a very 
early stage, suggested that the nature of press content owed more to the resurfacing 
of latent tensions and concerns as well as to established patterns of reporting than it 
did to observable behaviour. 
In April, the Express published a small report to the effect that Ghana had 
told Britain that it ‘does not want to be’ in honours lists for royal awards.65  The 
following month, again in a small article, the paper told its readers that Nkrumah had 
moved into Christianborg Castle in Accra, adding that this was the ‘former residence 
of the Governor-General’.66  In June, the Mail reported that Ghana had banned the 
Queen’s message to Commonwealth youth.67  The article drew on the content of an 
open letter Busia had sent to Ghana’s newspapers, in which he had reportedly 
protested against the ban.  It explained that the leader had said there had been ‘other 
“studied attacks on the Queen’s position by the Ghana Government since 
independence” and instanced “the indecent haste to abolish honours bestowed by the 
Queen”’.68 
The following week, both the Mail and the Express gave prominence to the 
comments of Joe Appiah, a leading member of the NLM and husband of the 
daughter of a British Labour peer,
69
 who had recently spoken at a rally accusing the 
CPP of “acts of sedition and treason against Her Majesty the Queen”.70  Appiah’s 
attack had centred on the ban on the Queen’s message and on ‘God save the Queen’ 
being played with the Ghana national anthem, as well as to ‘Nkrumah’s decision to 
set up a 20ft. bronze statue of himself in Accra, to establish a workers’ brigade, State 
farms, and to relegate the Governor-General to an inferior residence’.71  Appiah 
reportedly accused the CPP of following ‘Communist theory’ at ‘developing in the 
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leader of the party the cult of the personality’, and positioned the NLM as the party 
which would “rise up in arms if necessary against a Government which by its own 
actions would have proved itself disloyal to the Queen”.72 
The day Nkrumah arrived in London for the June meeting of Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers (the 18
th
), the Telegraph published an editorial which summarised 
events thus far.  It was one of the first opinion pieces.  The author thought that 
Nkrumah’s presence at the conference was ‘a signal demonstration of Ghana’s new 
status and his own enhanced importance’, but that ‘less impressive assertions of both 
of these factors have come from Accra in a disconcerting spate since independence 
day’.73  All of the examples the Telegraph cited to support this argument concerned 
the relationship between Ghana and Britain or questions of symbolism, most of 
which concerned the Queen.  Given the nature of the triumphalist narrative which 
had appeared in British papers at independence, these later comments reveal 
continuities in thought that continue to point to a reading of the significance of press 
content which foregrounds journalists’ existing frames and perspectives. 
Even at a very early stage, this sort of coverage was having an impact in 
Ghana, where latent tensions and concerns were also resurfacing.  Commenting in 
May on Nkrumah’s decision to move into Christianborg Castle, Kofi Baako, 
Ghana’s Minister without Portfolio, was reported to have accused the British right-
leaning press of desiring to curtail Ghana’s hard won freedom, the sentiment 
Padmore would reiterate in August.
74
  “It is obvious from the comments of such 
papers as the Daily Express, which has never supported our struggle for 
independence…”, Baako had reportedly argued, “that they would have wished our 
country only to be a glorified colonial territory.  We are not prepared for that”.75 
At the time of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference, Nkrumah 
wrote an article for the London Daily Sketch in which he strove to dampen criticism 
of his government by promoting understanding of the moves which he had made 
since independence.
76
  He explained that the decision to put his head on the coinage 
was a symbolic move to show the people of his country ‘that they are now really 
independent’.  The statue, the decision to place his likeness on the independence 
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stamps and his move to the castle were likewise described as symbolic steps.  ‘To 
my people’, he explained, the castle is ‘the seat of government.  The Governors have 
lived there for centuries.  Now it is logical that their Prime Minister should live 
there’.  He then reassured Sketch readers that the future Governor-General would be 
housed ‘with great dignity and suitability’, that youth camps were part of a scheme 
to tackle vast unemployment and were ‘certainly not (a form of) Nazism or Fascism’, 
and ended with a tribute to the Commonwealth.  ‘We are proud to be in the 
Commonwealth’, he wrote, and ‘I hope to ask (the Queen)… to honour us, as soon 
as she has time, with a visit’. 
This last proposition was received with some enthusiasm by the Mirror.
77
  
Yet across the press as a whole, the efforts Nkrumah had made to promote 
understanding of his Government’s recent moves fell on deaf ears.  Again, the 
picture the press painted was therefore one-sided.  In addition to the nature of the 
perspectives of large sections of the British press, the strength of the NLM 
campaign, and the history of tension between the CPP and the British media, these 
omissions reflected the extent of the obstacles British journalists and editors 
confronted at this great moment of historical change to understanding the nature or 
strictures of the post-colonial state.  Davidson’s seminal work on this would not 
appear until 1992.
78
  To journalists’ difficulties might be added African politicians’ 
own failure fully to understand, and thus to communicate, their own actions as torch-
bearers in a new era. 
As Rathbone reminds us, African nationalist politics had a two-pronged 
agenda, which consisted partly of the “forced expulsion of colonial overrule”, but - 
crucially - also of the “commitment to ushering in a new kind of state”.79  While the 
development agenda was arguably the chief preoccupation of the new state,
80
 so too 
was the consolidation of the governing party’s own authority, which included a 
‘legitimation imperative’ that concerned itself in part with issues of symbolism 
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directed to demarcating the new state from its colonial predecessor.
81
  Those of 
Nkrumah’s actions British journalists believed were indicative of authoritarian 
tendencies – the beginnings of a ‘personality cult’ – were in part imperatives or 
strategies of rule in many ways specific to post-colonial states.  They cannot be 
viewed simply as African versions of Stalinist or Hitlerist policies, as the frequency 
with which journalists deployed the terms ‘fascism’, ‘Nazism’ and ‘communism’ to 
describe Nkrumah’s symbolic moves suggested to readers. 
They were also the product of Ghana’s colonial heritage in other, seemingly 
rather contradictory, ways.  Stamps and statues bearing the likeness of the country’s 
leaders, and the decision of those leaders to live in grand residences such as the 
castle, were not innovations.  Birmingham thinks that one of the most harmful 
legacies of colonialism in Africa was ‘the material lifestyle of its white rulers’.82  
Historical precedent was significant.  As Cooper has observed, ‘historical 
(sequences)… brought into being states that had all the trappings recognized around 
the world as “sovereignty.”  But the particular characteristics of those states were 
consequences of the sequence, not merely the sovereignty.’83  The emphasis the 
majority of British journalists placed on independence as the moment at which 
responsibilities, and thus blame, shifted hands, foregrounded sovereignty over 
sequence.
84
  Lacking the interpretive frames used or built by historians such as 
Rathbone and Cooper, journalists tended to decipher Nkrumah’s moves through the 
lens of their own anxieties and concerns, using both the language handed them by 
the Ghana Opposition and the only frames they knew for interpreting actions such as 
those which were under scrutiny.  The year 1957 was, after all, little over a decade 
following the end of the Second World War, in which depictions of Hitler’s 
Germany and Stalin’s Russia had set some strong and resounding precedents. 
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ii. ‘High hand in Ghana’:85 August to September, 1957 
 
In August, critical commentators thought they saw their worst fears realised, 
when news reached them of the Ghana Government’s decision to deport two Muslim 
leaders from the largely Muslim north, Alhaji Amadu Baba and Alhaji Osman 
Lardan,
86
 as well as the Sierra Leone-born deputy editor of the Ghana Daily 
Graphic, Bankole Timothy, on the grounds that their presence was ‘not conducive to 
the public good’. 
The actions of the Ghana Government in proposing deportations provided a 
base line for British press reporting of the country.  These were of greater 
seriousness than Nkrumah’s previous symbolic moves, and therefore, arguably, 
warranted critical coverage.  Yet just as decisive remained the historically-rooted 
press-related factors, concerning existing tensions, political perspectives and the 
NLM. 
Two further dynamics were important in informing British newspaper 
content during this later period.  The first was not entirely separate because it centred 
on the press itself, but it concerned fresh action taken by the Ghana Government 
against specific correspondents and papers as well as its attacks on press freedom 
more generally.  This began with the proposed deportation of Timothy, but 
snowballed to include other incidents and undeniably hit a nerve across the press as a 
whole.  The second main factor, which surfaced a little later, concerned the ways in 
which long-standing British domestic political rivalries impinged upon the Ghanaian 
scene through the medium of the British press, and thereby served to taint the image 
of that country. 
British journalists took up the first theme - attacks on the press - 
immediately.  The Express’s John Redfern, present in Accra when news of the 
proposed deportations broke, was one of the first to report with an article entitled 
‘An Empire Premier kicks out his critics’.87  The journalist explained that all three 
men had either criticised the Ghana Government or had been involved in leading 
opposition groups within the country.  Redfern, ‘a canny Derbyshire man’,88 with a 
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strong faith, known to his colleagues as ‘The Bishop’, was not well-disposed to 
Nkrumah.
89
  The two men went back a long way.  According to Christopher 
Munnion, a Telegraph correspondent, Redfern had met and interviewed the CPP 
leader in 1948, and had found him ‘a complicated character… extremely charming 
one minute and coldly ruthless the next’.90  Timothy, an out-spoken yet by all 
accounts a respected journalist, had written a highly critical article on 22 June (1957) 
entitled ‘What Next, Kwame?’, which had taken the new Prime Minister to task for 
his development of what Timothy claimed was a personality cult.
91
  He may also 
have attracted disdain for having previously worked at the London Daily Express,
92
 
as well as for having binding links to the ‘White Press’, the Graphic, in Ghana.  
These historical dynamics may also have informed the Express’s response to the 
news of the deportation. 
The situation rapidly deteriorated.  On the 1
st
, the acting chairman of the 
Commonwealth Press Union, Lord Burnham, sent a cable to Nkrumah, ‘drawing 
attention to the grave concern that would be felt throughout the Commonwealth if 
any country appeared, for whatever reason, to endanger the freedom of the Press in 
this way’, and asking him to ‘reconsider the whole matter’.93  The Ghana 
Government stood its ground, in a manner which recalled its earlier confrontational 
dealings with British papers.  The following day, Redfern recounted part of an 
interview he had conducted with Krobo Edusei, Ghana’s Minister of 
Communications,
94
 who was to become a notorious figure in the British press in the 
months to come.  Edusei was a straight-talker, who appeared rough, head-strong and 
volatile to British journalists.  He was from a humble background, in some contrast 
to men such as Busia.  The press soon dubbed him ‘Crowbar’.95  “There are more 
deportations coming”, Edusei told Redfern: “You British have deported plenty of 
people in your time.  Now we are doing it”.96  The same day, the Telegraph and the 
Guardian reported that Kofi Baako, now Ghana’s Minister of Information and 
Broadcasting, had held a defiant press conference at which he told pressmen that 
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while ‘the liberty of the press was maintained’, the Government would ‘in turn, 
expect the press to respect its authority’.97  The signs looked ominous, and were the 
subject of acute concern within the pages of British papers. 
The day following the departure of Timothy for Freetown, Sierra Leone,
98
 the 
Telegraph published a highly critical editorial entitled ‘High hand in Ghana’.99  
‘Deportation of editors has never been a convincing sign of democratic rule’, it 
began: ‘…Dr Nkrumah will only have himself to blame if people in this country 
begin to ask: “Is the Prime Minister of Ghana a dictator after all?”’100  Left-leaning 
papers also voiced concerns.  The next day, the News Chronicle printed an editorial 
entitled ‘Mr. Timothy’ in which it claimed that ‘The whole affair smacks 
unpleasantly of the sort of abuses rife in South Africa’.101  The Observer worried that 
Nkrumah’s failure to rescind his decision ‘would not only harm the standing of his 
own Government, but would injure the wider cause of colonial freedom he 
represents’.102  Here, too, important press-related and extraneous factors affected the 
nature of British newspaper coverage, meshing with and sometimes guiding 
interpretation of events on the ground.  Timothy was an occasional reporter for the 
News Chronicle and had also contributed articles to the Observer.  If nothing else, 
these links allowed for a more personal and prolific commentary on the case.  The 
two Alhajis received no such treatment.  In the case of the Telegraph, the paper’s 
reference to Nkrumah’s fulfilling certain expectations pointed to the continued 
significance of pre-existing interpretive frames to the production of coverage, and 
thus also to the importance of the NLM’s long-standing propaganda campaign. 
True to form, the Mirror was noticeably silent on the issue.  Commenting on 
Timothy’s proposed deportation, on 31 July the UK High Commissioner to Ghana 
told the Commonwealth Relations Office that ‘Daily Graphic management are 
naturally much concerned over possibility that this might be first step in a campaign 
by Government to close them down’.103  In reply, the CRO commented that the 
Mirror, ‘who have been in contact with us… seem to think that sacrifice of Timothy 
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may be necessary to enable “Daily Graphic” to continue publication’, and were as a 
result ‘deliberately treating the whole matter quietly’.104 
Attacks by and on the British press soon began to move beyond the issue of 
Timothy.  On the 5
th
, an article in the Express reported that the Ghana Evening News 
had criticised it for ‘(distorting) the news’ of the deportation order by claiming that 
the three men were being asked to leave because they were ‘critics’.105  This attack 
(by the Ghana Evening News) displayed continuity with earlier attacks on the 
Express, just as the Express’s attack on Nkrumah’s treatment of Timothy displayed 
continuity with its earlier narratives, and should be interpreted in the light of these 
pre-existing tensions.  Relations were hostile.  Three members of the Ghana Cabinet 
whom Redfern had subsequently tried to approach had reportedly refused to answer 
any questions.
106
 
The following week, coverage centred on Kumasi, where Baba and Lardan 
were appealing against their proposed deportations.  Geoffrey Bing, QC, a British 
man who acted as constitutional adviser to Nkrumah, led for the Ghana Government.  
Mr Justice Smith, also a British man, presided over the court as judge.  Ian Colvin, 
special correspondent for the Telegraph, reported that outside the courtroom in 
Kumasi demonstrations by ‘Moslems and National Liberation Opposition 
supporters’ were ‘thousands’-strong and verging on violence.107  Opposition groups 
appeared to be taking advantage of the court hearing and the press presence which it 
invited, to air their continued concerns about the position of regions and minorities 
in an independent Ghana.  On the 10
th
, the Ashantehene received Colvin in his 
palace ‘to repeat and affirm that the Ashanti people have no intention of surrendering 
to totalitarian rule’.108  Once again, pre-existing interpretative frames informed 
coverage.  In an accompanying editorial, the Telegraph accused Nkrumah of failing 
to allay the fears expressed by Busia, and by the chiefs of Ashanti and of the 
Northern Territories, ‘that his rule would be dictatorial’.109 
When the court announced its ruling the following week, Colvin decided to 
make a pointed reference in his work to the role played by the British throughout the 
proceedings, a decision that would have important ramifications.  According to 
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Munnion, one of his colleagues, these criticisms did not reflect the train of events on 
the ground as much as the extent of Colvin’s personal antipathy towards Bing.  
Colvin had met Bing on the plane flying out to Accra just days before, and had taken 
‘an instant dislike’ to the Q.C., whom he regarded as “an assiduous, perspiring and 
ingratiating figure”.110  Colvin was no wall-flower.  Winston Churchill reportedly 
told him that he had been the man who had started the Second World War.
111
  The 
journalist’s network of contacts in pre-war Germany had provided him with 
information that Hitler was planning to attack Poland; and Colvin dutifully informed 
Neville Chamberlain.
112
 
The judge discharged the injunction on the understanding that the parties 
would not be deported pending an investigation into their claims for citizenship.  
They were subsequently transported to a jail in Accra.  In his article, Colvin 
foregrounded the concerns voiced by NLM supporters gathered outside the 
courtroom, which cleverly played on British sensitivities.  “British judgement bad”, 
a ‘toga-clad Moslem’ had reportedly told the journalist, ‘tapping his face to signify a 
blind eye in Mr Justice Smith.  “Give us back our Gold Coast.  Down with Ghana,” 
shouted another.  It was British legal officers who had defeated the injunction, and a 
British police officer who drove the two Moslems out of Ashanti.  To their followers 
it appears that the British are furthering sinister designs on the part of the 
government Convention People’s party.’113 
Express coverage followed a similar pattern, homing in on Bing, former 
‘Socialist’ MP for Hornchurch.114  ‘Bewildered Ashanti citizens, watching a British 
lawyer do Nkrumah’s work, hold Britain to blame.  They shout reproaches, like: 
“British justice is untrue!”.  Mr. Bing has said that he hopes eventually to return to 
the House of Commons.  The British people should never receive him back in British 
public life’.115  Through the medium of British papers, British domestic political 
rivalries, and even personal vendettas, the second new theme affecting the 
production of a negative commentary on Ghana, impinged upon the Ghanaian 
political scene, adversely affecting coverage of the country.  According to the right-
leaning press, Bing was disliked within Conservative circles in Britain for his ‘legal 
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ingenuity’, which had, it claimed, added to the burdens of Conservative governments 
in preceding years.
116
 
The Ghana Government sprang into action immediately in response to these 
criticisms, illustrating the continued unease with which it regarded British press 
content.  On the 18
th
, Bing suggested in court that the case concerning the two 
Muslims be adjourned ‘until the Daily Express and some other newspapers had made 
“necessary corrections”’.117  According to Redfern, Bing had said that ‘the Express 
article singled out for attack people concerned in the case, including himself’ and 
‘(as) the judge, senior Crown counsel and he were English, such reports might bring 
hardship to their careers’.118  The following day, Redfern was brought in for 
questioning by Mr David Graeme Carruthers, Assistant Commissioner of Police ‘and 
C.I.D. boss’, who probed him on the issue of authorship of the editorial.119 
Colvin also received a warning.  On the 18
th
, the journalist was told that Bing 
was contemplating proceedings against him for alleged contempt of court.
120
  Two 
days later, at the same time the bail applications were denied, the Supreme Court 
granted an application for leave to issue writs of attachment against the editor of the 
Ashanti Pioneer, a pro-Opposition daily paper published in Kumasi, against the 
directors of the Pioneer’s publishers, and against Colvin.121  Two articles in the 
Pioneer were alleged to have constituted contempt of court, one of which had 
reproduced the Express editorial on Bing,
122
 in a manner which recalled long-
standing Opposition/British right-leaning press relations.  Action was being taken 
against Colvin because the proprietors of the Telegraph were outside the jurisdiction 
of the court.
123
 
The motivations which lay behind the contempt of court proceedings appear 
to have been multiple.  Right-leaning papers tended to underscore the role played by 
Bing in bringing proceedings, they believed, for ‘personal’ reasons.  This was the 
argument the Telegraph was to advance in court.  There certainly seemed to be some 
truth behind this claim, indicating that the British protagonists in this story played a 
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significant role in fuelling the negative publicity given Ghana in the British press at 
this time.  Even Bing, though strenuously denying it at the time, later admitted that 
he ‘probably gave too much weight to the feelings of the British members of the 
Judiciary and among the civil servants and police who looked to the Government to 
defend them against attacks which might prejudice their future employment once 
they had left Ghanaian service’.124  Bing would later argue that British press 
criticism of British officials active in Ghana, in articles ‘syndicated… throughout the 
Commonwealth’, did ‘damage’ to ‘the conception of a Commonwealth Civil 
Service’.125  If civil servants were ‘not only to be saddled with the whole 
responsibility for the policy of the state they served’, he explained, ‘but also, if that 
state’s policy did not suite (sic) some British newspaper, have the secrets of their 
families, down to the marital vagaries of their great-grandfathers, published for all to 
read’, as would happen later on to Bing, ‘then of course such recruitment would be 
largely inhibited if not entirely prevented’.126 
A second important factor behind the bringing of contempt of court 
proceedings was the issue of British press content allegedly fuelling tensions within 
Ghana, a dynamic which Nkrumah and the Ghana Evening News, held to be 
central.
127
  On 19 August, in his telegram which mentioned Justice Smith’s anger, 
the UK High Commissioner to Ghana also informed the CRO that the Ghana 
Government’s decision to take proceedings against Colvin ‘is, I understand, 
influenced by their strong resentment at critical comment in United Kingdom press 
on deportations.  Some of it has been reproduced in opposition newspapers here and 
this is apparently regarded by the Government as liable to prejudice pending Court 
proceedings on citizenship’ for the two Muslims.128 
Again, deeply-rooted CPP/British press antagonism was also significant, and 
fed into this.  ‘Ministers’ attitude towards such comment’, the High Commissioner 
added, ‘is coloured by their view that certain sections of the United Kingdom press, 
after having tried to influence public opinion against the transfer of power, are 
misrepresenting events in Ghana to suggest that Ghana has proved unfit for self-
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government’.129  In December 1957, in a memorandum in which he reflected on 
these months, Oliver Woods told his editor at The Times, that ‘Ghanaians believe’ 
that Colvin and another Telegraph correspondent were ‘sent out with deliberate 
instructions to run Ghana down in order to prove that the Daily Telegraph had been 
right all along in opposing self-government’.130  It is difficult to assess the truth 
behind this claim.  There seemed to be an element of paranoia fuelling these 
Ghanaian fears.  British press coverage of the Gold Coast under British rule had not 
been extensive at all,
131
 even though individual articles had undoubtedly been of the 
critical nature that Woods believed had fed Ghanaian fears of a British press 
campaign.  Woods himself was unsure of the Telegraph’s motivations, but was 
certain that Colvin and his colleague had written ‘a lot of hysterical nonsense 
between them’.132 
In British papers, the case against Colvin and the Pioneer subsequently 
eclipsed the case of the two Muslims.  Yet not before the Ghana Government rushed 
through a special Deportation Bill to ‘deal with’ the two men.  Despite facing strong 
opposition from the NLM, the bill passed, and on the 23
rd
, the two men were 
deported to Nigeria.  In the week which followed, criticisms of Ghana appearing in 
the British press intensified still further, in editorials with titles such as ‘Time to 
retreat’,133 ‘Wrong route’,134 ‘Fear takes over’,135 and ‘Joyful Ghana turns sullen and 
uneasy – Premier Nkrumah’s appeal slips as the taste of independence goes sour’.136  
Numerous reports of opposition criticism of Nkrumah’s government reinforced this 
narrative.  Headlines in the right-leaning press included ‘“A black day for 
democracy” says Ghana M.P.’,137 ‘“Dictator Nkrumah” charge by rival party’,138 
‘Nkrumah told: It’s a police State’,139 and ‘“Trend” to dictatorship – Ghana charge 
by Dr. Busia’.140  ‘If in fact totalitarianism is creeping up on Ghana’, the Guardian’s 
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James Morris observed, ‘at least it will not come unheralded.  The most readily 
bandied word here to-day is undoubtedly “dictatorship” and all the pessimists of the 
Opposition are doing their best to make our flesh creep…  The Opposition, though 
pitiably impotent in the Assembly, is certainly exploiting the situation with skill’.141 
The Guardian and the Observer stood out among British papers as offering 
their readers articles which interrogated the motivations of the Opposition, and 
which put the Ghana Government’s case.  One further exception was the News 
Chronicle, which, at the end of August, also raised a point in Nkrumah’s defence; 
namely, the hypocrisy of some British papers in condemning acts of which Britain, 
too, it claimed, had been guilty not long ago in its own colonies, such as deportation 
without trial.
142
  This weighting was significant.  It continued to demonstrate the 
extent to which British papers supplied British readers with a particular type of 
selective narrative. 
Colonial precedent would later form the core of Bing’s exposition of the 
events of the summer of 1957, particularly the deportations.
143
  ‘British Colonial 
history is a long record of such deportations’, Bing would explain: ‘Occasionally 
they received publicity, as for example when Archbishop Makarios was sent to the 
Seychelles Islands, but never, so far as I can recall, condemnation from the Daily 
Express.  The truth is that, in the eyes not only of the Daily Express but of other 
British newspapers as well, Ghana had committed the unpardonable crime of 
behaving, when independent, as independent and had acted in her own territory in 
exactly the same way as the British Colonial authorities would have done if they had 
remained in charge’.144  Bing thought that one of the reasons why such a negative 
commentary on Ghana emerged at this time was that British journalists, amongst 
others, ‘had no idea of how Colonial Government had been’ and were thus unable to 
understand that the actions they condemned as tyrannical were ‘in fact… the 
following by an independent government of past Colonial precedent’.145  Bing’s 
decision to pursue this line of argument was probably motivated by a desire to 
distance himself from the deportations and the contempt of court proceedings.  Yet 
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there was undoubtedly a general truth behind his assertions, both as they applied to 
Ghana, and more broadly. 
In explaining Nkrumah’s decision in 1958 to introduce a Preventive 
Detention Act, for instance, Birmingham highlights the value to the Prime Minister 
of ‘the certainties of the colonial system’ over and above ‘the democratic system of 
British justice’ when faced with perceived ‘dissidents, enemies and even subversive 
plotters’,146 the latter arguably also itself partly the product of the colonial era.  
Opposition, coloured by ethnicity and regionalism, was fomented by colonial rule.  
Diverse peoples were brought together within one border the position of which was 
determined by the colonial power.  And groups were played off against others as a 
strategy of rule. 
 
iii. ‘Ghana – the anxious weeks’:147 September to October, 1957 
 
On 9 September, the contempt of court case opened in the Supreme Court in 
Accra, and again, British domestic politics hung over the Ghana scene, affecting the 
volume and nature of British press coverage of the trial.  In the right-leaning press, 
news reports focused once again on Bing, now Attorney-General, leading the case 
for the Ghana Government.  If right-leaning papers were predisposed to opposing the 
actions the Ghanaian authorities had taken against Colvin by virtue of their shared 
plight, the very fact that Bing was heading the defence undoubtedly fuelled their 
fury.  On the 13
th
, Henry Fairlie wrote a scathing piece for the Mail on Bing, 
‘Nkrumah’s right-hand man, the influence behind the latest Ghana moves’.148  Fairlie 
accused Bing of being a communist, shrewd and overly legalistic.
149
 
Christopher Shawcross, QC, heading the defence, was also the subject of 
much press attention, but of the opposite kind.  Journalists saluted Shawcross for 
taking Bing to task on what he alleged were unjustifiable motivations for bringing 
Colvin and the Pioneer to trial.
150
  Shawcross’s accusation that Bing had perpetrated 
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‘a monstrous outrage upon the tender and infant freedom of Ghana’ by abusing his 
position of authority for personal reasons was widely quoted in British papers.
151
  
The press also gave prominence to Shawcross’s contention that the matter was 
beyond the jurisdiction of the court, given that it was not usual for a contempt charge 
to be heard in a court other than that against which the contempt was alleged to have 
been made.
152
  This last point was the eventual reason why, on the 12
th
, the judge 
ruled that proceedings against Colvin and the Pioneer had been brought to the wrong 
court. 
On the 13
th
, Colvin, on the way to Nigeria, was stopped at the airport in 
Accra and forbidden to leave Ghana while the Government decided how to 
proceed.
153
  He was eventually permitted to leave on the understanding that he would 
return for a further hearing.  Meanwhile, Shawcross, who had flown to Nigeria 
successfully on the 13
th
, was forbidden to re-enter the country.  British press 
coverage, though consistently high during these weeks, peaked again at this news.
154
  
Some British journalists believed Bing had been the brains behind the move, and he 
was again the subject of a feature article, this time in the Express, which described 
the ex-MP as ‘amazing’, ‘enigmatic’, ‘tall’, ‘plump’, and ‘communist’, with ‘slant-
eyed, almost Mandarin features’,155 every reader’s dream pin-up.  To make matters 
worse, at this time the Telegraph told its readers that Colvin and the paper had filed 
writs ‘claiming injunctions and seeking damages’ against Nkrumah, Adjei (Minister 
of Justice), Bing (Attorney-General) and Collens (Commissioner of Police).
156
 
All British papers gave prominence to news of the banning of Shawcross as 
well as to reports that the British Government had contacted the Ghana Government 
with an expression of ‘concern’ at the turn of events.157  The British Government 
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was in fact very reluctant at this time to issue any declarations which the Ghana 
Government might construe as critical.
158
  British ministers were acutely aware of 
the necessity of avoiding giving the impression that Britain did not regard the 
country as truly independent.
159
  The fact that the British Government did express 
concern at events is part testament to the weight of the public and political pressure it 
found itself subject to at home.  Yet appeasing British newspapers was never 
uppermost in its mind.  Its chief concern remained safeguarding Commonwealth ties.  
Some British officials believed that in criticising Ghana so severely, British papers 
were furthering the cause of those groups within Ghana ‘who say that the 
Commonwealth is nothing more than a mud-slinging organisation and that Ghana 
would be well-advised to leave it’.160 
On the 18
th
, Shawcross attempted to re-enter Ghana in defiance of the ban, 
his efforts attracting much publicity.
161
  Some British officials suspected that 
Shawcross was courting the media to further his own ends and those of his clients.
162
  
At this time, the UK High Commissioner to Ghana commented that Shawcross ‘has 
turned the case into a political affair’.163  The High Commissioner thought that the 
QC ‘appears not to have known when to stop’, and that ‘by allowing the conduct of 
Colvin’s case to appear to be degenerating into a personal vendetta against the 
Ghana Government he has given colour to the belief of the latter that they had here 
an example of a settled policy on the part of the Daily Telegraph to denigrate a 
newly independent Commonwealth country’.164  Shawcross’s attempt to re-enter 
Ghana appeared to be part and parcel of this campaign of insubordination, the High 
Commissioner thought, and courting the press, a tactical ploy on Shawcross’s part.  
British journalists certainly had advance notice of Shawcross’s plans, and were 
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present at Accra Airport in large numbers when he arrived.  He remained 
approximately thirty minutes in Ghana before being sent back to Nigeria. 
The British press was livid.  The Express interpreted the move both as a 
vindication of colonialism, and as an opportunity for Bing to bow out of public 
service once and for all.
165
  The Mail agreed: British guidance was needed now more 
than ever before.
166
  ‘At this stage it is imperative that Britain’s influence be 
sustained at the highest level’, it argued: ‘Dr. Nkrumah is obviously in even greater 
need today of authoritative and friendly counsel than he was before 
independence’.167 
The Mirror, hitherto rather restrained in its coverage, voiced its concern 
directly for the first time.  In an editorial on the 19
th, entitled ‘Ghana: The anxious 
weeks’, the paper expressed its ‘regret that the going is not smoother for this 
vigorous new nation’ and its ‘anxiety to see Ghana flourish as a democratic 
Commonwealth country’ lest its actions ‘turn back the clock in Africa for 50 grim 
years’.168  Accompanying the editorial was a cartoon by Vicky depicting a small 
child labelled ‘Ghana’ toddling from light into darkness behind the figure of 
Nkrumah holding a book entitled ‘Freedom and justice’, his head bowed.169 
Only the Herald made an effort to put the Ghana Government’s case.  On the 
same day as the above editorials appeared, an article by Basil Davidson cautioned 
Herald readers against ‘(getting) Ghana wrong’.170  In it, Davidson explained that 
Nkrumah’s ‘strong line on certain key issues – such as the authority of the central 
government over Ghana’s different regions’ was part of his efforts to ‘weld’ ‘various 
peoples…into a single nation’.  He also attributed Nkrumah’s recent moves, firstly, 
to lack of experience and self-confidence, which had affected his ability to run strong 
government and democracy ‘in the same harness’, and secondly, to error, and to the 
Government’s tendency to persist in error by virtue of the fact that any admission of 
guilt would damage its new-found authority.  Davidson was keen to quash popular 
misconceptions rife in Britain, taking time to explain to his readers that Ghana was 
not new to democracy, but that ‘the peoples of Ghana have had a tribal system, from 
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time immemorial, that was highly democratic in structure’.  ‘They’re going through a 
difficult patch’, he concluded: ‘but they will come out of it all right’.171 
Again, arguments such as these tended to be clouded out across the press as a 
whole by a predominance of reports on Ghana’s slide to dictatorship, on the 
continued need for British guidance and intervention, and in some cases, on what 
was believed to be Ghana’s complete ‘failure’ just six months after its inception.  On 
the same day as Davidson’s article appeared, in a summary of recent UK press 
comment, the CRO communicated to the UK High Commission in Accra that ‘no 
comment favourable to the Nkrumah Government has come our way’.172  The 
negative coverage was undoubtedly having an impact in Ghana, where the Ghana 
Evening News again took the British ‘capitalist imperialist press’ to task for its 
reporting of the country since independence in an editorial entitled ‘British press 
goes mad’, a piece which was subsequently reprinted, apparently at ‘popular 
request’.173 
Colvin returned to London from Lagos, Nigeria, on the 19
th
, the Telegraph 
having concluded that the ban on the re-entry to Ghana of his legal representative 
freed the journalist from any legal or moral obligation to return to the country.
174
  
Shawcross eventually followed suit.  Following their departure from West Africa, 
British press treatment of events in Ghana focused on the Ghana Government’s 
efforts to explain their actions as well as on additional political moves taken by the 
latter that British journalists regarded as further proof of mounting authoritarianism.  
These two trends often appeared indistinguishable because the manner in which the 
Government justified its past and present behaviour continued to be taken as 
evidence of tyranny.  Unfortunately, Nkrumah was not in Accra at this time, but in 
Half Assini, a village near his birthplace, resting.
175
  The new Prime Minister found 
the scale of ‘world interest in the affairs of Ghana’ oppressive, his experience of 
which he likened to ‘living under a spotlight’.176  In his absence, Edusei, now 
Minister of the Interior, was one of the men tasked with dealing with the foreign 
press, and as the Guardian’s James Morris observed on the 6th of September, ‘almost 
nothing can do more harm to Ghana’s promising reputation than a press conference 
                                                          
171
 Ibid. 
172
 CRO to Accra, 19 September 1957, fol. 104, DO 35/6188. 
173
 Ghana Evening News, 19 September 1957, p. 2.  The article was reprinted on 30 September 1957. 
174
 Telegraph, 20 September 1957, fp. 
175
 Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom (London, 1973), p. 113. 
176
 Ibid. 
67 
 
by Edusei’.  ‘His manner is at once rough and facetious’, Morris thought, ‘his syntax 
confusing, his remarks almost sometimes unbelievable in their naivety or brashness’.  
They provided ready copy for correspondents in search of sensation.  On the 20
th
, the 
Mail explained that Edusei had told a cocktail party in Accra that special courts were 
to be set up to try political offenders.
177
  “If I want to get rid of anybody, I’ll do it 
and nobody’s going to stop me”, the News Chronicle’s Frank Barber reported Edusei 
as having told the gathering.
178
 
Nkrumah restored some degree of calm upon his return from the coast with a 
speech on the 24
th
 in which he explained the Government’s recent moves reportedly 
with reference to Ghana’s ‘tribal, feudal, and other’ difficulties, and in which he 
announced that the charges against Colvin were to be dropped.  Robert Jackson, a 
UN administrator working on the Volta project,
179
 had, according to an internal 
memorandum circulated at The Times, been the main influence behind this move, 
flying up to see the Prime Minister at his retreat and persuading him that ‘things 
were in danger of going over the edge with the outside world’, thereby jeopardising 
the confidence of foreign investors.
180
  Following Nkrumah’s speech, the CRO sent a 
private message to the Ghanaian Prime Minister congratulating him on his 
‘statemanship’, and ‘(assuring) (him) of our anxiety here at all times scrupulously to 
avoid any interference in your domestic affairs’.181  The Telegraph subsequently 
withdrew the writs it had filed against Nkrumah and his fellow ministers. 
Some journalists hailed Nkrumah’s moves as a welcome return to sanity, but 
most reserved judgement as to whether this signified a meaningful turn-around.
182
  
Both Shawcross and Colvin were subsequently declared prohibited immigrants, a 
decision which unleashed a further wave of criticism.
183
  Another Telegraph 
correspondent, George Evans, was banned ‘by mistake’ and then admitted to Ghana 
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on the 27
th
.
184
  And through it all, Edusei’s comments continued to attract a lot of 
page space.  On the 28
th
, coverage peaked once again with claims drawn from an 
article printed in the Pioneer that the Minister had told a party rally outside Accra 
that he ‘(loved) power’ and that he was ‘going to use it sternly and strongly, no 
matter what people may say about me’.185  Baako later denied that Edusei had made 
such a speech and attributed the genesis of these words to an over-zealous, vengeful 
Opposition.
186
 
Yet Edusei continued to attract negative publicity throughout these weeks for 
other unfortunate statements such as ‘I have no ambition to be a dictator’, ‘The 
Premier – Kwame Nkrumah – is not a dictator, so why should I be one?’187  Across 
the British press as a whole, Edusei was widely dubbed Nkrumah’s strong-arm man, 
and was consistently criticised and mocked.
188
  Even the left-leaning News Chronicle 
referred to him as ‘Ghana’s little Caesar’, and the Herald as a ‘dictator’.189  Munnion 
recalls that Edusei had, by this time, taken to giving press interviews from ‘a 
massive gold-plated bed he had ordered from Harrods’,190 and this probably did not 
help.  Members of the British Government seemed certain that Edusei was the ‘key’ 
to the continuing bad press and that ‘we could start getting a better press for Ghana 
if, for any period of seven consecutive days, Edusei could remain silent and no other 
news bearing any appearance of dictatorialism were received from Accra’.191  The 
British Government was obviously fearful that the negative publicity would persist.  
In a personal minute written on 26 September, Macmillan asked the CRO to ‘do all 
you can to dissuade the British Press and others from attacking the Government of 
Ghana’.192  ‘They are, after all, very new at the job’, he added: ‘Two generations ago 
                                                          
184
 Express, 27 September 1957, p. 2; Mail, 27 September 1957, fp; Mirror, 27 September 1957, p. 
24; Telegraph, 27 September 1957, fp; Guardian, 27 September 1957, fp. 
185
 Mail, 28 September 1957, fp; Mirror, 28 September 1957, p. 3; Guardian, 28 September 1957, p. 
10. 
186
 Telegraph, 28 September 1957, fp; Mail, 28 September 1957, p. 2. 
187
 News Chronicle, 1 October 1957, p. 2; Telegraph, 1 October 1957, p. 15; Guardian, 1 October 
1957, p. 11. 
188
 New Chronicle, 6 September 1957, p. 2; Mail, 30 September 1957, p. 2; News Chronicle, 30 
September 1957, p. 2; Express, 1 October 1957, p. 11; Mail, 1 October 1957, p. 2; Express, 4 
October 1957, fp; News Chronicle, 4 October 1957, fp; News Chronicle, 8 October 1957, p. 6. 
189
 News Chronicle, 7 October 1957, p. 5; Herald, 21 September 1957, fp. 
190
 Munnion, Banana Sunday, p. 85. 
191
 Snelling to Maclennan, 1 October 1957, fol. 162, DO 35/6189. 
192
 Personal minute by Macmillan sent to Alport, 26 September 1957, fol. 173, DO 35/6189. 
69 
 
they were savages: now they are supposed to be trained in the niceties of 
constitutional Government.  We really must give them a chance’.193 
Yet while the Ghana Government did undoubtedly take steps against 
opposition groups at this time and against freedom of expression, the Government’s 
actions are insufficient alone to account for the wealth of coverage on Ghana, and 
most particularly its nature, for which historical press-related factors were also key 
determinants.  If the British press therefore ensured that its readers were kept 
continually informed of Nkrumah’s increasingly authoritarian actions, this was, it 
seems, as much by luck as good judgment.  The relationship of the British press to 
the local, post-colonial tale it documented, moreover, was nothing short of 
conjoined.  British journalists were involved in ‘making’ history as well as in 
reporting it. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has analysed the role of British press coverage of Ghana during 
1957.  Its conclusions support Rathbone’s argument both that international media 
treatment of the independence celebrations in March was essentially ‘triumphalist’, 
and that the ‘pomp and partying’ obscured some ‘messy politics’.  Yet it diverges 
from his views in two main respects.  Firstly, it questions the extent to which the 
triumphalist CPP narrative of a heroic Nkrumah dominated British coverage of 
independence.  Not only was it clouded out by a self-congratulatory British one, but, 
in right-leaning papers in particular, it was always weighted with references to the 
concerns of opposition groups. 
Secondly, in contextualising British press treatment of the celebrations, this 
chapter concludes that to the extent to which positive commentary on the CPP and 
Nkrumah was present at independence, it was not broadly representative of British 
Gold Coast/Ghana coverage as a whole, and thus for outsiders, certainly in Britain, 
the image of Nkrumah on the podium with his colleagues was not the only narrative 
of Ghana available to them through the media.  Rathbone’s argument that the ‘losers’ 
account’ (the ‘grimmer, considerably less romantic story of rapidly worsening post-
colonial oppression’) is ‘very much less well-known beyond Ghana’s borders’ than 
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the podium scene seems unsustainable as regards British press coverage of 1957.  
The claim that ‘a southern version was… necessarily that which was most often 
heard by decades of visiting journalists and scholars who have tended not to stray 
too far away from the Atlantic shore’ also seems untenable in the context of the 
British press experience.  The production and the nature of coverage were 
fundamentally interlinked.  Yet not in this way, for the means of production allowed 
for the airing of northern experiences and perspectives just as much as, if not more 
than, those emanating from the southern heartland of the CPP. 
Between August and October 1957, the moves taken by the Ghana 
Government against opposition groups within the country and against freedom of 
expression, provided a base line which allowed for a highly critical commentary on 
Ghana to emerge within the pages of British papers.  Yet other, more historical, 
factors were also significant, and bleeding into this.  They included the nature of the 
public rhetoric of opposition groups within the country, their efforts to cultivate links 
with the British right-leaning press, the fraught relationship between the governing 
CPP and British newspapers, and the former’s relatively poor or unsuccessful public 
relations efforts.  Further factors included the political perspectives of British editors 
and correspondents, the translation to Ghana of British domestic political tensions 
and rivalries, and British journalists’ limited understanding both of the nature of 
British colonial rule in Africa and of the strictures of the post-colonial state. 
British press coverage of Ghana during 1957 had a number of significant 
consequences.  Some members of the Ghana Government feared that in publicising, 
and often supporting, opposition views, British newspapers fuelled tensions and 
divisions within the country, and in doing so made it harder to govern.  Others saw 
British press content as promoting the interests of a (white) capitalist (imperialist) 
class, or viewed it as part of a cynical and destructive journalistic campaign to justify 
past and present perspectives on empire and decolonisation in Africa.  Expatriates 
such as Bing believed that British press treatment of independent Ghana was 
undermining the future of the Commonwealth Civil Service.  The British 
Government feared the implications of British press content for the future of the 
Commonwealth in other ways, some officials worrying that it was furthering the 
cause of those groups within Ghana that maintained that the newly-independent state 
had no friend in Britain. 
71 
 
Press content may also have mitigated potential feelings of loss, weakness 
and decline on the part of British newspaper readers at the end of empire.  There 
were a number of elements to this, but one important aspect was that over the period 
as a whole (1957-60), British readers were presented with a simplified or distorted 
picture both of the history of British colonial rule in Africa and of the actions and 
decisions of post-colonial African, and white settler, states.  Simplification was not 
universal.  Yet, in general, press content was remarkable for the ways in which it 
succeeded both in distancing Britain from unsavoury developments, and in 
presenting the nation as the champion of savoury ones.  No better illustration of this 
came than in 1959, when two cases of alleged colonial brutality at Hola in Kenya 
and in Nyasaland hit the headlines simultaneously.  
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Chapter 2 
Colonial violence in Kenya and Nyasaland as necessity, white settler 
phenomenon, or aberration; versus the centrality of Africa’s desire for 
freedom: The Hola massacre and the Nyasaland State of Emergency, 
1959 
 
‘Perhaps the most important single date in the story of Britain’s withdrawal 
from Africa’ is how the historian Philip Murphy describes 3 March 1959.1  It was on 
that day that eleven Mau Mau detainees were beaten to death by their guards at a 
remote rehabilitation camp called Hola, in Kenya, and a State of Emergency was 
declared in the British protectorate of Nyasaland.  Kenya was emerging from a near-
decade long Emergency itself at this time, called in response to African violence and 
pressure for an end to British colonial rule.
2
  By 1959, the Kenya Government had 
won the fighting war, but remained engaged in a battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
the ‘Mau Mau’ men and women who had fought against it.  The deaths of the 
detainees occurred within the context of the government’s efforts to speed up the 
process of the ‘rehabilitation’ of the Mau Mau ‘hard-core’.  In Nyasaland, the 
Governor, Sir Robert Armitage, justified the declaration of the Emergency in similar 
terms to Kenya’s own.  On the 3rd, he referred to growing African agitation and 
violence in the territory, activities which the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, 
informed the House of Commons had included a ‘plot’ to murder Europeans.3 
A number of long-standing grievances informed nationalist activity in 
Nyasaland.  These included land hunger, intrusive agricultural ordinances, racial 
discrimination, disenfranchisement and a lack of political representation.
4
  There was 
also strong a desire to see the demise of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
or Nyasaland’s extrication from it.  The British Government had formed the 
Federation in 1953 partly in deference to white settler calls for an amalgamation of 
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Southern and Northern Rhodesia; partly in order to contain South African expansion; 
and partly for more idealistic reasons concerning notions of racial co-operation and 
mixed community.  Yet it had done so against the expressed wishes of the majority 
of the population of the region, particularly of Nyasaland, a territory with 
comparatively few white settlers.  Nyasaland had been included on account of its 
poverty and the scale of its debt, a situation the British Government had hoped 
partnership would alleviate; but there was also a further perceived advantage: the 
inclusion of Nyasaland would help to ensure a steady supply of African labour to the 
agricultural and mining industries of its two bigger neighbours.
5
  Seven years on, and 
despite repeated promises of political, social and economic reform and development, 
most Africans still drew few tangible benefits from Federation and, worse still, 
regarded the structure as an instrument of oppression with which the powerful white 
community of Southern Rhodesia imposed its will on the African population of the 
region through coercion and strong-arm tactics 
A great deal of uncertainty surrounded the question of the future of the 
Federation.  From an African perspective, the situation looked bleak.  The British 
Government had scheduled a review of the federal constitution for 1960, and in 
1958, ‘independence’ for the Federation, called for by Roy Welensky, the Federal 
Premier, was still on the cards.  The British Government soon backtracked on this 
idea.  Yet publicly it continued to give the structure its support, right up to and right 
through 1960.
6
  It was partly because of this that nationalist activity, guided chiefly 
by the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC), ballooned during 1958, leading to, and 
in turn energised by, the return of Hastings Banda to the protectorate in the summer 
to head the organisation.
7
  Rising nationalist activity, consequently, fuelled European 
anxieties, which culminated in the declaration of the State of Emergency.  In the 
event, no Europeans died.  Yet in the space of a week following the 3
rd
, the ‘security 
forces’ killed forty-eight Africans.8  The authorities arrested and detained over a 
thousand more, including Banda.
9
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The British Government, soon faced with a barrage of questions and 
criticisms within Parliament, was forced to concede the need for a commission of 
inquiry to assess the circumstances behind the declaration of the Emergency and the 
deaths and detentions which followed.  This was subsequently headed by Sir Patrick 
Devlin, a High Court judge.  A coroner’s inquest into the Hola deaths was also 
appointed, under W.H. Goudie, a senior resident magistrate, which was followed by 
a disciplinary tribunal for some of the men whose actions the inquest had cast 
aspersions on, and the appointment of a commission of inquiry into the future of 
Kenya detention camps.  The reports provided uncomfortable reading for the British 
Government.  When the Devlin Report was circulated in July, for example, 
Macmillan considered it ‘dynamite’, fearing that it ‘may well blow this government 
out of office’.10 
Two main arguments characterise the historiography on the British 
dimension to the events of 1959.  One concerns the British Government and British 
colonial policy.  The events of 3 March, and their legacy, are said to have played an 
important role in prompting the British Government to re-evaluate aspects of its 
approach to African affairs:
11
 chiefly, the pace and timing of constitutional advance, 
but also its character, to some extent, as regards officials’ growing appreciation of 
the nature, full extent and significance of African political objectives.  The second 
focus concerns British public opinion and the British Government.  The public and 
Parliament are said to have been shocked by the revelations of brutality and 
misconduct.
12
  This, it is argued, impacted the Government in the lead-up to the 
general election in October,
13
 causing it to mount considerable damage limitation 
exercises in anticipation of Devlin’s report and the Hola judgements.14 
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British public outcry, both anticipated and real, is identified as a factor 
behind the Government’s decision to set up the Devlin Inquiry and the Hola inquest 
and tribunal;
15
 and its growing aversion to the use of violence as a means of control 
in the colonies.
16
  But the historiography draws few explicit connections between 
British public opinion and British colonial policy during this year.  The Government 
is said to have been concerned about ‘middle opinion’ in general,17 which is thought 
to have informed Macmillan’s decision to embark on the 1960 ‘wind of change’ 
tour.
18
  Yet these trends to a more ‘progressive’ colonial policy are generally thought 
to have been long underway;
19
 and given impetus during 1959 as much by the direct 
effect of the events on British politicians as by mediating forces such as public 
opinion.  Members of the Government are said to have been shocked by the 
revelations of brutality and impressed by the scale of African discontent in the 
Federation, (which Devlin’s report later set out in some detail).20  We might, at this 
point, also recall the views of Sandbrook, Howe, Owen and Goldsworthy, who have 
argued much more explicitly that British low politics and public opinion bore very 
little affective relation to the decolonisation process as a whole - even, Sandbrook 
claims, during 1959.
21
 
There have only been two studies of the role of the British press during this 
year.  One is Lewis’s chapter on popular press coverage of Kenya during the 
1950s.
22
  The other is Lewis and Murphy’s piece on relations between the British 
press and the Colonial Office during 1959.
23
  Both studies indicate that British 
public, including press, opinion was far more multi-faceted than the above works, 
which focus on colonial brutality, suggest.  These two studies include a discussion of 
characteristics of coverage which include more sympathetic depictions of Africans,
24
 
more of a detachment from white settlers,
25
 and an interest in the future of Central 
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Africa.
26
  They also help us to understand some of the factors which may have 
informed British public opinion.  These included an increasing alienation from 
empire,
27
 and the Colonial Office’s efforts to manage the press,28 not only regarding 
the damning aspects of coverage, but also concerning the more progressive side, 
which Lewis and Murphy suggest that in the case of Central Africa the CO wished to 
foster.  Concerning the effects of press content, Lewis suggests that its narratives 
helped to inform Britain’s relatively peaceful decolonisation – a ground-breaking 
argument, which, as discussed in the Introduction, this thesis finds much further 
evidence of in different forms across the period and in relation to different African 
regions.  Lewis and Murphy discuss press content during 1959 in the context of CO 
policy, and describe it, in many ways, as an extension of that policy. 
This chapter analyses the nature and role of British press treatment of Kenya 
and Nyasaland during 1959, including coverage of the Hola massacre and the Devlin 
Report.  It makes reference to events within the period 1952 to 1958 when relevant.  
It aims to build on Lewis’s work and Murphy’s by identifying further roles the press 
played in relation to Kenya and Nyasaland at this time.  It does so by using 
additional sources.  The chapter draws on newspaper articles from left- and right-
leaning mainstream British papers, both ‘popular’ and ‘serious’; the memoirs of 
journalists and editors; the archive of The Times; the archive of the Manchester 
Guardian; the records of the British Government; the memoirs of British politicians; 
Hansard; and the papers and memoirs of Armitage and Welensky. 
This chapter’s core theme differs from the focus of the majority of these 
works by proposing that the British press was itself a rather conservative force on the 
topic of British misdeeds and colonial brutality during these months.  Despite this, it 
does find critical comment on Hola significantly pronounced for a time.  It suggests 
that coverage of Hola, following the massacre, was more critical overall than that on 
the Devlin Report, an assertion which contrasts with one of Lewis and Murphy’s 
emphases.  Concurrently, the chapter argues that the British press was an important 
and independent force for change on Central African affairs.  In both cases, 
Government tactics affected press coverage.  But there were also other important 
influences, which included African activism, racism, cultural or literary depictions of 
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Africa, journalists’ local experiences, the activities of Labour MPs and critics of 
empire, settler-press relations, editorial constraints, the perspectives of editors and 
journalists; and, relatedly, the press’s narratological and visual framing of events. 
In Britain, coverage continued to mitigate the possible impact of decline by 
presenting British readers with ideas compatible with the trend to decolonisation, as 
Lewis has argued; but also by depicting key aspects of Britain’s involvement in the 
process in non-negative terms.  The chapter acknowledges the possible positive 
effects of this for the British Government, in the context of that year’s election.  Yet 
it continues to describe the relationship of the British press to the Government as less 
than wholly supportive, and even less collusive.  Regarding the future of Central 
Africa, the press appeared to be one step ahead of the CO, and there is evidence to 
suggest that it informed British policy.  The chapter begins to tease out some of the 
neglected connections between British public opinion and British policy towards 
Central Africa during these months.  In Africa, it continues to describe press content 
as having induced tensions and anxieties, this time chiefly among white settlers. 
 
1. ‘Meet his challenge!’:29 Press representations of Nyasaland at the time of the 
declaration of the State of Emergency: February to April, 1959 
 
The day following the declaration of the Emergency, news of the ‘massacre 
plot’ Lennox-Boyd had referred to in the Commons dominated the headlines, 
together with reports that twenty-six Africans had died.  Left-leaning popular papers 
cast doubt on the culpability of Africans, foregrounded the subject of colonial 
brutality and implicated Britons, including Lennox-Boyd.
30
  The Mirror and the 
Herald reiterated the view of the Labour Party that in his African ‘plot’ statement to 
the Commons the Colonial Secretary had deliberately conveyed a false impression to 
the British people to justify the crack-down.
31
 
Yet, in these papers, two further themes undercut the weight of these 
accusations.  One concerned the tenor of the news reports from the field in which 
African violence figured prominently and colonial violence featured as law and order 
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enforcement.
32
  Another underscored the power of the Federal authorities, which had 
the effect of distancing Britain and even the Nyasaland Government from the 
disastrous turn of events on the ground.
33
  The Herald immediately suspected that 
Federal intrigue lay behind the declaration of the Emergency, publishing an editorial 
on Welensky on the 4
th, entitled ‘Meet his challenge’ in which the writer accused the 
Federal Premier of acting ‘to smash the Africans into subjection to his white settler 
Rhodesian Federation’ and to end ‘the protection of Africans by our Colonial 
Office’. 
Right-leaning papers were supportive of Lennox-Boyd’s plot statement and 
the Federal, colonial and British response,
34
 also in the context of numerous reports 
on African rioting, violence and sabotage emanating from the field.
35
 
The commonalities were significant.  British press coverage as a whole can 
be said to have focused on African, rather than white, action.  The majority of the 
editorials published on both Left and Right on or around 3 March, augmented by the 
reports filed from overseas, concentrated overwhelmingly on the causes of the 
African violence, the nature of Britain’s colonial policy and the Federation’s future 
prospects.
36
  Importantly, forward-looking views were not confined to the left-
leaning press.  Different papers voiced contrasting opinions on the value of the 
principle of Federation and on the origins of African opposition to it.
37
  Yet a cross-
paper consensus existed on the extent of the difficulties it now faced, centring on the 
growing power of African nationalism.  Suggestions for the future ranged from the 
need to ascertain African opinion on Federation, to the importance of reassuring 
Africans of British intentions, devising a new constitution for Nyasaland, and 
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negotiating with Banda.  Most papers also publicised and supported Labour’s calls 
for an investigation into the Emergency. 
This early coverage appeared not to be conditioned primarily, if at all, by the 
British Government’s efforts to manipulate the media response to developments, 
suggesting first, that the British press was a self-regulating force for change on 
Central Africa; and second, rather paradoxically, that it was also an important stand-
alone factor
38
 behind the mitigation of those criticisms which concerned the 
behaviour of the British and colonial governments on and around 3 March. 
Concerning the latter dynamic, the character of right-leaning popular papers’ 
coverage of Africa up to that date suggested that their supportive comments reflected 
editorial perspectives (political and cultural).  In the case of the Express, in 
particular, journalists’ pieces were informed by a belief in the inherent value of 
empire; as well as by their intimation that Nkrumah and other such ‘agitators’ had 
precipitated the ‘riots’.39 
Reports of African violence, more broadly, revealed the popular press’s quest 
for sensation.
40
  However, more than anything, they reflected the train of events on 
the ground, which drew foreign correspondents in.  Indeed, African action provided 
the foundation from which all British press coverage flowed.  In 1959 it featured far 
more prominently in British public appraisals of the process of Britain’s 
decolonisation than much imperial historiography, centred on British public 
responses to the subject of colonial violence, would seem to suggest.
41
  Reports of 
African violence over colonial violence may also have reflected the significance of 
racial stereotypes; in addition to the restrictions the Federal and Nyasaland 
governments placed on journalists’ freedom of movement and access to non-official 
sources of information.
42
 
During these weeks, the focus on Federal power directly echoed the 
arguments of Labour MPs, such as John Stonehouse, who travelled to the Federation 
during these weeks, and African nationalists.  Here too, events on the ground were 
significant.  Armitage declared the State of Emergency independently.  Yet he had 
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been subjected to Federal pressure on the issue, and Federal troops played an 
important role in the subsequent suppression of African dissent.
43
 
This latter representation did not just minimise the British or colonial 
involvement.  It was positively self-affirming for Britain.  The left-leaning popular 
press depicted the Federal Government as a body whom Britain now had to assuage 
and confront to ‘win freedom’ for Africans.  The specific dynamics of the 
decolonisation process in Central Africa, and particularly the involvement of resident 
Europeans, allowed for the conceptual separation of Britain and the British people 
from negative aspects at key moments. 
Regarding editorial comment on African nationalism and the future, 
immediate influences included the NAC actions as well as the nature of the British 
parliamentary debates occurring simultaneously.  But the British press was much 
more than a passive recipient of politicians’ views on Central African affairs.  It was 
also, arguably, more than a mere witness to African activism.  The significance of 
the political and related activities of British journalists and editors should also be 
acknowledged.  During the fifties, Federation had become a party political issue, 
with parliamentary debate playing itself out in the pages of British papers; yet at 
times also informed by the actions and arguments of journalists and editors, such as 
David Astor, the editor of the Observer, and Colin Legum, that paper’s colonial 
correspondent, both leading figures in the Africa Bureau, an organisation set up in 
1952 to advise and support Africans opposed to colonial rule and its dictates, and 
whose first campaigning issue had been Central Africa.
44
 
Some sections of the press, moreover, played a more direct role in 
conditioning the views of other papers, their efforts also bleeding into editorial 
content on Federation.  Legum recalled that, in addition to his Africa Bureau 
activities, Astor aimed specifically to ‘make the media more conscious of Africa’s 
needs and interests’.45  The editor sponsored lunches for correspondents, African 
leaders and British politicians throughout the fifties and sixties, and involved the 
editors of right-leaning papers, such as the Sunday Times, in organising this 
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venture.
46
  By 1959, partly because of the efforts of newspapermen such as Astor, 
African perspectives in Central Africa and beyond were beginning to achieve a much 
broader circulation within newspaper circles in general, and attracted a deeper 
engagement.  The views British journalists expressed in 1959 must therefore be 
viewed in a context broader than that of then-contemporary Government efforts to 
manage debate on events in the region.  Indeed, in the coming weeks and months, far 
from acting in tandem with the Colonial Office, the press not only proved 
unhelpfully divisive, sowing seeds of distrust between the British, Federal and 
colonial governments, but also adopted a campaigning role in its relations with that 
Department.
47
 
Part of the problem for the British Government was that press coverage of 
events in Nyasaland travelled back to Africa, mirroring the case of Ghana.  For while 
the above narratives had positive implications for British readers’ understanding of 
the decolonisation process, they did nothing for the psyche of the white settler 
communities of the Federation.  The Federal authorities, in particular, worried over 
journalists’ references to African action and to Congress.48  Documenting either, let 
alone highlighting or sensationalising them, was to acknowledge both the existence 
of African discontent within the region and African agency to a degree that was 
considered highly undesirable both for security purposes and for the ‘morale’ of the 
European community.
49
  Sections of white society, particularly Welensky and his 
devotees, were further antagonised by journalists’ emphasis on the machinations of 
the Federal Government.
50
 
Yet the majority of their fears centred on press comment concerning the 
future of the Federation.  Despite the British Government’s reassurances concerning 
its own intentions, Europeans knew that in the next few years the British Parliament 
would exert an important influence over the future of Central Africa.  Any 
amendments to the Federal constitution required a UK parliamentary vote;
51
 and, as 
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we shall see in this and the following two chapters, white settlers regarded the 
relationship of British press content to British public opinion as illustrative and 
constitutive.  British journalists were not only present on the ground, providing first 
news of events, but they also publicly articulated the budding, more radical, ideas of 
those on the Right in British politics to a far greater extent than was possible in the 
Commons, and thus provided a window onto the changing British political 
landscape. 
A testament to the settlers’ anxiety were the moves they took to influence the 
British press.  One involved the actions of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Committee,
52
 
an organisation formed in 1958 by a group of prominent businessmen with interests 
in the Federation to ‘promote understanding’ within Britain of events in the region.53  
During the crisis, the Committee maintained contact with British journalists and 
editors, supplying them with background information on events and querying what 
they considered to be misleading press content, occasionally supplying letters for 
publication.
54
  A further approach concerned the tendency of some sections of the 
press to denigrate Welensky personally and involved taking legal action against the 
offending papers on a case-by-case basis, as the Federal premier did in relation to the 
Herald editorial of the 4
th, ‘Meet his challenge’, for which he sued Odhams Press.55  
In Africa, the Federal and colonial governments introduced censorship and other 
press restrictions to inhibit the production and dissemination of potentially damaging 
pieces from the field – a third strategy.  And fourthly, the leaders of both 
governments spent time discussing matters with certain individual correspondents 
privately. 
Yet although their efforts were persistent and wide-ranging, they appear to 
have met with little success; pointing again both to the autonomous nature of British 
press activity on Central Africa and its rather ‘anti-Federal’ character.  The efforts of 
the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Committee were not always very well-received, as in 
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the case of the Guardian whose deputy editor often, even if politely, gave its 
members the brush off.
56
  More generally, the Committee frequently declared itself 
ineffective, as did the Federal Government.
57
  Libel action against popular left-
leaning papers such as the Herald had even less of an impact, judging by the focus 
and tone of the paper’s subsequent editorials on developments in the region.  In 
Africa, press censorship and other press restrictions not only failed to prevent the 
production of potentially damaging reports; they appear to have aggravated the 
situation, antagonising the vast majority of foreign correspondents, who responded 
by venting their emotions on the printed page and in press conferences,
58
 as they had 
done in Ghana, and would do again in South Africa.  Press freedom continued to 
represent to journalists broader freedoms, the absence of one suggesting or 
confirming the absence of the other. 
Spending time with individual correspondents was a strategy which, upon 
first examination, met with greater success, as in the case of The Times, whose 
editors and reporters, including Oliver Woods, and Rhys Meier, its Central Africa-
based stringer, were on very good terms with Welensky.
59
  Yet in general the Federal 
Prime Minister shirked overtures from British correspondents as part of his plan to 
say as little as possible to the press before the 1960 review.
60
  A number of 
journalists, particularly from papers gauged to be unsympathetic had great difficulty 
in getting a private audience with the leader.
61
  Thus it was that Welensky had 
greater success in influencing those who were more likely to support him anyway. 
Where Lennox-Boyd’s handling of the crisis in Nyasaland and colonial 
violence formed the focus of coverage, then, the predominance of other broader 
themes, such as African violence and Federal power, tended to undercut its potency, 
with the result that coverage was essentially non-negative, and sometimes self-
affirming.  This is not to say that the British Government was unconcerned by the 
critical dimension to press coverage.  Indeed, its decision to mount an inquiry into 
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the circumstances surrounding the declaration of the Emergency was informed by its 
fears surrounding public and parliamentary censure on the matter.
62
 
Nevertheless, the primary significance of newspaper coverage as a whole in 
the first month of the Emergency seemed to lie elsewhere; that is, with the press 
commentary on African nationalism, Federation and white settlers.  The impact of 
this dimension to coverage is most readily discernible amongst settler communities.  
However, there is also evidence to suggest that the decision of the British 
Government, privately, during these weeks, to appoint the Monckton Commission to 
travel to the Federation to gauge opinion in advance of the Federal constitutional 
review, was motivated by a perceived need to address British public opinion on 
Federation.  Given that the Commission, which reported its uncomfortable findings 
to the British Government in October 1960, was the chief surface factor which 
sounded the death-knell of the Federation,
63
 this is not insignificant. 
Most studies of British policy which discuss the setting up of the 
Commission underscore the importance of the Government’s own assessment of the 
situation on the ground and its plans to pursue a colonial policy more in tune with 
the times.  Hyam discusses the perceived importance of ‘buying time’ in a crisis 
situation, but he also suggests that the Commission’s critical findings were ‘no 
doubt’ what Macmillan had intended.64  For Larry Butler, the decision reflected the 
aim of ‘(establishing) clear British control over the situation in Central Africa’.65  
For Philip Hemming, it was designed ‘to put Africa on the political agenda’.66   More 
broadly, and over the period as a whole, imperial histories tend to portray the 
changing, more ‘progressive’, nature of British colonial policy during 1959 as the 
decisive influence behind decision-making during these months, even in regard to 
the tricky situation of Central Africa (and constitutional developments therein).  Yet 
there is evidence to suggest that, in the case of the Federation, the British 
Government was far less inured to change.
67
  The potential still existed for ‘external’ 
forces, including public opinion, to affect policy. 
When, in March, Lord Home, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, wrote on the topic to Lord Perth, Minister of State at the Colonial Office, 
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he explained that a Commission would ‘take Federation affairs out of party politics 
here over the period of our General Election and between now and 1960’.68  Home 
also considered that ‘an impartial and objective inquiry would lead the public to a 
fair and objective view and do much to restore confidence’, given that ‘ignorance of 
the purpose of Federation is widespread both here and in Africa’.69  This was not 
mere acquiescence.  The goal was to save the structure; and transforming British 
opinion in favour of Federation was regarded as an important element to this.  Yet 
the Government proved largely unsuccessful on all fronts.  In this and the following 
two chapters, the thesis strives to illuminate some of the ways in which the British 
press, public and Parliament helped to set the agenda for British policy towards the 
Federation during these months, a dynamic which the historiography does not 
accentuate, and which meshed with settlers’ fears.  The evidence it presents also 
suggests that CO and CRO attitudes to Central African affairs were not always very 
clearly delineated. 
 
2. ‘Hope in Kenya’:70 Coverage of the colony at the time of the Hola massacre 
and the subsequent inquest: February to April 
 
The Hola massacre, which occurred on the same day as the declaration of the 
Emergency in Nyasaland, received far less press treatment.  Readers first learned of 
the incident in tiny press agency reports of between thirty and sixty words, which 
simply documented the Kenya Government’s initial press statement.71  The press 
reported that ten Mau Mau detainees had died after drinking water from a water cart, 
and that an inquest was to be held.  The following week, the Kenya Government 
released a further statement, which read that the deaths ‘may have been due to 
violence’.  This information appeared in four of the papers under discussion.72  No 
editorial or other comment pieces were published.  The Times, Telegraph, Mail, 
Express, and Guardian reported the inquest into the Hola deaths.  Yet they did so 
with varying degrees of analysis, and none offered comment. 
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This dearth of press coverage was attributable, in part, to the actions of the 
Kenya Government in attempting to conceal the true cause of the deaths,
73
 as well as 
to the way in which it rather surreptitiously released the relevant information and 
took control of the situation by immediately launching an inquest.
74
  Yet these 
moves should also be viewed as continuations of a much longer history both of 
government efforts to manage media coverage of the colony, and of British cultural 
engagement with Kenya, whose enduring practical and ideological effects were also 
relevant in explaining the absence of coverage.  To this should be added further 
press-related and contextual factors. 
Critical news on Kenya did appear in the press during the first four months of 
1959.  In addition to Hola, ‘negative’ articles, from the British Government’s 
perspective, concerned the intention of the African-elected members of the Kenya 
Legislative Council to boycott the Queen Mother’s impending visit to the colony;75 
the political and economic challenges facing Kenya;
76
 Lennox-Boyd’s refusal to hold 
an independent inquiry into conditions in Kenya detention camps and prisons;
77
 and 
the travails of Captain Law, an ex-army officer, who had been imprisoned in Nairobi 
the previous year, and had made allegations against the colonial government of 
cruelty to Africans.
78
 
The emergence of potentially damaging pieces on Kenya reflected a number 
of important dynamics.  One concerned the efforts of Labour MPs to foreground 
African or colonial issues in Parliament because parliamentary debates were almost 
always reported in the press, even if only in a perfunctory fashion.  Another reflected 
the efforts of whistle-blowers, such as Law, to turn to the media to get their voices 
heard, and therefore also the British and Kenya governments’ abject failure to satisfy 
the concerns of such men.  A third concerned the efforts of African politicians both 
to stand their ground in ongoing political negotiations with the British 
Government,
79
 and to identify opportunities for public demonstrations of African 
resistance to colonial rule.  The Government was unlikely to have been the only 
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intended recipient of these efforts.  The advantages of appealing to the British public 
and Parliament, often through the press, were not lost on Kenyans, and could be 
compared to the efforts of the NLM in Ghana in its relations with right-leaning 
papers from 1954, and the Malawi Congress Party in staging timely protests in 
Nyasaland during Macmillan’s Africa tour (1960).80 
In 1959 the activities of Kenyan political leaders included a planned boycott 
of what would be a highly publicised royal tour, but in previous months and years 
public resistance had taken other forms.  During 1958, imprisoned African leaders 
had made attempts to communicate their criticisms and concerns to the British public 
and its parliament by writing letters to members of the Opposition and encouraging 
their distribution in the media.
81
  In addition, African leaders such as Tom Mboya, 
the leader of the Nairobi People’s Congress Party, had begun to form friendships 
with individual journalists, such as Legum, through whom they channelled prison 
letters and other such communications to a wider public.
82
  The Kenya intelligence 
and security services suspected that the relationship was very close and that Legum 
had even been involved in the reproduction of prison letters then disseminated.
83
 
The Observer’s particular commitment to covering events in Kenya in 1959 
should be viewed as a continuation of its investment up to that date because this had 
resulted in numerous connections, leads and a particular expertise that ran like a 
thread through its coverage.  The Observer’s dedication to reporting Kenya, and 
white settler colonies in general, stemmed from its Africa Bureau links as well as 
from the specific interests of Astor and Legum, both of whom were passionately 
interested in questions of race, inequality and injustice.  Among Astor’s mentors had 
been Adam von Trott, an anti-Nazi activist killed following an abortive plot to 
assassinate Hitler; the author George Orwell; and the Reverend Michael Scott, the 
champion of the Hereros and of South West Africa at the United Nations.
84
  Legum, 
a South African exile with Jewish, Lithuanian roots, a former member of the 
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National Executive of the South African Labour Party, and former editor of the 
South African Labour weekly ‘Forward’, appeared driven throughout his life by his 
earliest encounters with poverty, inequality and their effects – conditions which he 
aimed to alleviate partly through journalistic activity in Britain following Malan’s 
victory at the polls in 1948.
85
 
Yet despite the efforts of Labour MPs, whistle-blowers, African nationalists 
and the Observer to foster critical debate on Kenya and to bring evidence of wrong-
doing to light, numerous obstacles prevented the majority of British papers from 
printing potentially damaging pieces on Kenya during these months.  None had 
British representatives stationed in the colony or any other full-time correspondents 
that head offices had carefully selected and appointed.  This meant that British 
papers were heavily reliant for information or stories on travelling politicians, news 
agencies such as Reuters, or stringers, and this restricted their coverage in important 
ways.  Stringers, for instance, tended to be either prominent members of the white 
settler community who worked full-time elsewhere often in a very different capacity, 
or professional journalists employed by one of the settler papers, such as the East 
African Standard or the Kenya Weekly News.
86
  The stringer system had numerous 
deficiencies most of which concerned writers’ dual commitments, which affected 
their freedom of movement, and possibly also expression. 
Compounding journalists’ difficulties in the case of Kenya was the legacy, 
and continued efforts, of the British and Kenya governments actively to manage 
British press content.  One cannot overemphasise the extent to which the press’s 
engagement with Kenya differed from its engagement with other British territories in 
Africa – even other white settler colonies, such as Southern Rhodesia.  Kenya was at 
war and was still fully under British rule.  The British Government was heavily 
committed to winning the war, and to this end had begun intensive engagement with 
the press on the matter little over five years following the end of wartime censorship, 
whose restrictions and associated culture it was therefore in a position to exploit 
more easily. 
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Propaganda and other press restrictions had played an important part in the 
colonial government’s efforts to defeat Mau Mau during the Emergency which, 
though easing, was still in force.
87
  Officially, journalists were not permitted to visit 
the prisons or detention camps,
88
 although tours were sometimes organised, and one 
individual journalist gained special access.
89
  A public relations expert appointed by 
the Kenya Government briefed British journalists in London throughout the 
Emergency, providing speedy, ‘factual’ accounts of key events and a continuous 
flow of good news.
90
  The British Government also played a part in leaking positive 
stories to the press.
91
  It encouraged self-censorship on certain matters such as the 
publication of prison letters, by indicating privately to British editors that their 
contents were of a dubious nature and from questionable sources.
92
  Early on in the 
Emergency it had also sent lurid information on Mau Mau oathing ceremonies to 
editors, not for publication, but intended to generate a culture of trust between the 
Government and the press and encourage supportive and undemonstrative coverage 
of the war.
93
  The Government also discredited whistle-blowers who had approached 
the press, and resisted calls for independent inquiries.
94
  Instead, it encouraged the 
colonial authorities to launch internal investigations into the matters these men had 
raised, which rarely produced convictions, but whose findings provided ready 
ammunition in Parliament. 
A further possible factor inhibiting British press coverage of Kenya was the 
threat of libel action from British colonial officials.  In 1958, the Observer had 
published a letter from five of the inmates of Lokitaung prison, which had contained 
allegations of ill-treatment and brutality.
95
  The camp commandant, Charles Ryland, 
sued the paper for £2,000 in damages (which he won).
96
  The British Government 
had also heavily censured sections of the British press for publishing the allegations.  
By 1959, there was a feeling within the Government that these moves had 
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discouraged the press’s publication of further letters.97  At the beginning of 1959, the 
publication by The Times of a very small article on conditions at Ryland’s camp as 
described by inmates in a further letter, produced a flurry of internal correspondence 
at the paper when Ryland lodged a complaint.
98
  The Observer was discussed.  The 
Times’s solicitors advised that Ryland would almost certainly win any libel action he 
might take, and the paper settled out of court.  The Observer also seems to have been 
shaken by the Lokitaung affair.  When Legum received a letter from prisoners at 
Mariira shortly after, Astor immediately consulted the Colonial Office for advice on 
publication.
99
 
These factors combined to ensure that ‘negative’ issues attracted minimal 
coverage in general.  Yet they also had practical and ideological implications which 
were relevant in the specific case of Hola.  Firstly, government restrictions on access 
to camps prevented British journalists in a working sense from investigating these 
sorts of breaking stories.  Hanging over journalists’ heads was also the possibility of 
receiving a stern rebuke from the British Government for any coverage deemed too 
negative and possible libel action from colonial officials who were implicated. 
Secondly, there was an ideological dimension to government efforts whose 
effects deserve scrutiny.  As British journalists were subject to a variety of different 
influences, partly by virtue of their position as members of the public, these must be 
considered in conjunction with the probable effects of literary and other depictions of 
Kenya, which David Maughan-Brown and John Lonsdale have examined in detail.
100
  
Carruthers thinks that the Government’s propaganda efforts which denigrated Mau 
Mau had greater success than those concerning the defence of colonial officials 
implicated in brutalities – because, in the case of the former, she argues, the 
Government’s representations went with the grain of popular opinion.101  Yet while 
the deaths at Hola are associated in the historiography with the issue of colonial 
violence, and could therefore be thought to have registered deeply, the two dynamics 
Carruthers mentions may not always have been readily distinguishable in journalists’ 
minds, a factor which might have worked in the Government’s favour when it came 
                                                          
97
 Letter from Amery to Baring, 5 March 1959, fol. 22, CO 822/1269. 
98
 LIT/Ryland, Charles, TNL Archive. 
99
 Letter from Astor to Lennox-Boyd, 4 July 1958, fol. 7, CO 822/1705. 
100
 David Maughan-Brown, Land, Freedom and Fiction: History and Ideology in Kenya (London, 
1985); John Lonsdale, ‘Mau Maus of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya’, The 
Journal of African History 31: 3 (1990), pp. 393-421. 
101
 Carruthers, Winning Hearts, pp. 179-81. 
93 
 
to coverage of the massacre, and which readers’ interpretations may also have 
mirrored.  In the small articles on Hola which appeared during these first few weeks, 
as well as in the inquest-related coverage, readers learnt that the men who had died 
were from the inner core of the hard-core of Mau Mau; and had lost their lives, 
moreover, at the hands of African (as opposed to European) warders.  Most papers 
seemed content to follow the inquest and await Goudie’s judgement. 
Instead, the majority of stories on Kenya published in the press at the time of 
the massacre and the inquest painted a picture of hope, change and political progress.  
This image was conditioned by a combination of cultural and political factors in 
addition to further governmental ones.  Cushioning the deaths at one end was the 
royal tour.  The Telegraph, Times, Guardian, Herald and Express all covered the 
Queen Mother’s triumphant visit in February, and the apparent ‘flop’ that was the 
boycott.
102
  Journalists foregrounded the Queen Mother’s popularity, the multi-racial 
nature of her reception, and Kenya’s peaceful atmosphere; depictions which recalled 
the press’s portrayal of the Duchess of Kent’s presence at the Ghana independence 
celebrations. 
At the other end (April) were reports in the press that political tensions in the 
colony showed signs of easing owing to an initiative by Michael Blundell, Kenya’s 
Minister for Agriculture, who resigned his post in order to head a new ‘multi-racial’ 
political grouping: the New Kenya Group.  Greeting Blundell’s move were headlines 
such as ‘Hope in Kenya’, ‘Moderation in Kenya’, and ‘A courageous attempt’.103  
While some commentators such as Legum cautioned against expecting too much too 
soon, the overall picture the press presented was positive.  This reflected the 
changing nature of the political scene in Kenya, as well as the extent of the bleakness 
and the trauma of its recent past, two important considerations which made critical 
comment appear particularly untimely.  Yet the positive coverage might also have 
been influenced by the continued efforts of the British and Kenya governments as 
well as Blundell to promote stories such as these.
104
  Three weeks earlier, the Mail 
had published a five-page ‘Progress Report’ on the colony entitled ‘This Striking 
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Success’.105  It began with a ‘special message’ from Lennox-Boyd, and looked as if 
it had been sponsored by the Colonial Office. 
 
3. ‘No redeeming feature’?:106 Editorial treatment of the findings of the Hola 
inquest and the disciplinary tribunal: May to July 
 
The publication by the British and Kenya governments of two White Papers 
on Hola (one in June; one in July) changed the situation somewhat.  The story 
shifted its locus away from Kenya to Westminster, where the Labour Party was 
gearing up for a fight, where British correspondents were present in large numbers, 
and where journalism was not subject to the same kinds of constraints as in the 
colony.  With the publication of these two reports, moreover, journalists found 
themselves commenting for the very first time on evidence of brutality revealed in 
documents endorsed by the British Government.  This affected the Government’s 
ability to place a positive gloss on their contents.  Nevertheless, coverage was neither 
entirely nor consistently critical.  Continued governmental, as well as 
historiographically neglected contextual, cultural and press-related factors, continued 
‘positively’ to affect the nature of coverage, fluctuating in prominence throughout 
the summer, and finally triumphing, somewhat in the nature of breaking waves. 
In Mombasa, on 6 May, Goudie summed up his findings at the conclusion of 
the inquest into the Hola deaths.  The magistrate announced that he had found 
incontrovertible evidence that the eleven men had died as a result of shock and 
bleeding caused by violence.  Yet he also spoke of his inability to apportion blame 
largely because of what he considered to be the highly unreliable and conflicting 
nature of the evidence he had heard.  Coverage the following day was not extensive, 
and comment even less so, reflecting the relative lack of press interest to date, as 
well as the fact that the locus of the story was the Kenyan coast, where, as previously 
discussed, the British press presence was minimal.  The nature of the news reports 
which did appear reflected the complexity of the evidence the magistrate had been 
presented with,
107
 narratives which can be traced back to the trickery of staff and 
prisoners at the camp and which can be viewed at least in part as a continuation of 
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the efforts of members of the colonial service to influence the outside world’s 
reading of events in the colony.
108
  Added to this, were the effects of the British and 
Kenya governments’ efforts to divert attention away from the past to the future at the 
time of the release of Goudie’s findings, when they announced a full-scale inquiry 
into the future of the four remaining detention camps, including Hola, news which 
featured in the majority of articles that day and in at least one paper’s headline.109 
The two editorials which appeared that day communicated very clear 
messages, however, and both were highly critical.  The Guardian considered the 
upcoming inquiry into the future of Kenya camps insufficient and recommended the 
colonial government instead seek ‘expert guidance’ on the policy, organisation and 
staffing of its ‘whole prison service’.110  The Times’ editorial, entitled ‘No redeeming 
feature’, foregrounded the Cowan Plan111 as a cause of the deaths and laid emphasis 
on the fact that the Kenya Government had backed it.
112
  It castigated the Kenya 
authorities for their false press statement in early March, and it called on ‘higher 
authority’ to take up where Goudie had left off and ‘name the persons who must bear 
the blame’.  Both papers mentioned mitigating factors raised in passing in the 
Report, such as the status of those who had died (‘degraded and fanatical ruffians’).  
Yet the overall message conveyed was negative, a characteristic that was particularly 
significant in the case of The Times, a centre-Right publication. 
Indeed, one of the most notable features of broadsheet coverage during these 
months was the unanimity of its regret both for the deaths and for key aspects of the 
British and Kenya governments’ handling of events, qualities which both reflected 
and reinforced those Conservative anxieties on African or colonial affairs which are 
thought to have lain behind the trend to decolonisation.
113
  The anxieties expressed in 
The Times appear to have arisen not only independently, but in flagrant disregard, of 
the explanations provided by the British and Kenya governments, given that Lennox-
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Boyd and Evelyn Baring, the Governor of Kenya, were in touch with the paper 
throughout these months, continually explaining their thoughts and actions to men 
such as Oliver Woods.
114
  This press resistance is a dynamic which the 
historiography on Hola has not addressed because it has tended to foreground above 
all else the nature and the extent of the Government’s damage limitation strategy 
during these weeks as documented in Colonial Office files.  In this particular case, 
the critical opinions expressed in The Times also appear to have arisen independently 
of the arguments of the Opposition, given first, that the paper appears to have had far 
less contact behind the scenes with Labour and the Liberals,
115
 and second, that 
Parliament discussed the matter the same day. 
In fact, the editorial informed the conversation in the Commons at one point.  
Labour MP Kenneth Robinson mentioned ‘No redeeming feature’ on the 7th as an 
indication of the extent of the shock the deaths had caused in Britain.
116
  Discussion 
was short.  Proceedings consisted, in essence, of Lennox-Boyd’s answers to previous 
Labour calls for a statement on the inquest’s findings, followed by a number of 
Labour replies. 
Critical coverage continued, particularly in the left-leaning press, boosted by 
these Labour interventions.  The following day (the 8
th
), the Mirror published an 
editorial which called on the Colonial Secretary to ensure that those involved in the 
killings be named and prosecuted,
117
 echoing the substance of Labour’s argument.  
News reports in the Mirror and the Herald foregrounded Barbara Castle’s plea for a 
standard of justice in Kenya comparable to that practised in Britain,
118
 and Kenneth 
Robinson’s claim that the deaths might not have occurred had the British 
Government heeded Labour’s earlier calls for a judicial inquiry into all Kenya 
camps.
119
  These popular press reports appeared to be the product of different papers’ 
political leanings more than any other factor.  Indeed, the degree to which their 
content mirrored parliamentary proceedings during these months is striking.  On the 
Left, papers followed Labour’s lead.  Press content, at the ‘popular’ level, was 
notable during the summer for its partisan nature, which, as previously discussed, 
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tended for a variety of reasons not to be as pronounced in 1959 for Kenya as for 
other African territories.  This reflected and reinforced the reintroduction of political 
partisanship into ‘popular’ metropolitan debate on Kenya, which, combined with the 
intensification of Conservative anxieties on colonial affairs, as reflected in and 
reinforced by the content of papers such as The Times, presented Macmillan with 
some cause for concern.
120
 
Yet coverage was by no means solely negative in May, reflecting the 
continued significance of governmental, ideological and contextual factors relevant 
in the case of Kenya.  The day following the debate, right-leaning papers, in addition 
to the Guardian, chose to headline Lennox-Boyd’s reference to the remedial 
measures being pursued by the British and Kenya governments,
121
 indicating that 
aspects of the damage limitation strategy were proving effective.  The Telegraph 
published a highly supportive editorial, which approved of these remedial measures, 
and which reminded its readers both of the ‘evil’ that was Mau Mau and of what it 
considered to be the ‘extraordinary success’ of the Kenya Government’s 
rehabilitation policy ‘as a whole’.122  Two weeks later, the Kenya Government 
organised a carefully choreographed press tour of Hola for visiting journalists, which 
received favourable treatment in the Telegraph, the Herald and even the Observer.
123
  
The British Government was also aided during these later weeks, first, by the 
absence from the country of Lennox-Boyd, the focus of the Opposition’s ire,124 and 
second, by the fact that Parliament adjourned for the Easter break for two weeks 
from 15 May, the day on which Labour tabled a censure motion on Hola.
125
  The 
previous day, the Colonial Under-Secretary, Julian Amery, had told the Commons 
that the Attorney-General of Kenya had decided that there was insufficient evidence 
to warrant the framing of criminal charges against identified individuals.  Instead, on 
5 June, the Government announced the composition of an internal tribunal, headed 
by D.W. Conroy, to inquire into disciplinary charges against the Camp Commandant 
(M.G. Sullivan) and his deputy (A.C. Coutts). 
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From 10 June, however, coverage peaked once again, following the 
publication of Goudie’s findings, together with a list of the charges against Sullivan 
and Coutts.  In future weeks, these documents would undoubtedly facilitate a more 
critical turn in Parliament and the press because they enabled the exploration of 
certain key issues that no one in authority had explained in detail until then – 
including the nature of the Cowan Plan.  In the short term, however, following the 
release of the Report, coverage was not initially too hostile, suggesting that it was the 
combination of the White Papers and Labour efforts that was the key dynamic.  The 
content of the majority of the news reports which appeared on the 11
th
 were on the 
negative side, but mostly explanatory, and in this way mirrored earlier coverage of 
the magistrate’s statement in court.126  Murphy notes that Macmillan was relieved by 
‘what he regarded as the sensible press reaction’.127 
Editorial coverage was split.  On the brighter side was the Express, which 
thought that although the inquiry ‘has not led to criminal charges’, ‘the Hola affair 
has been brought under the full glare of the democratic process’ and that this act bore 
out Britain’s ‘civilised’ virtues.128  In this way, press coverage itself helped to 
provide a sense of accountability that soothed any nagging doubts about Britain’s 
own integrity, a theme which recalled journalists’ critique of Nkrumah’s Ghana 
during the Shawcross debacle.  Other papers were more disapproving.  The 
Guardian and The Times worried over the issues that were still open to question, 
such as the degree of responsibility of the Superintendent of Prisons, the Minister of 
Defence, the Kenya Government at large, and even the Colonial Secretary.
129
 
This latter point formed the focus of discussion on 16 June, when MPs 
debated the Labour censure motion in the Commons.  Labour MP Sir Frank Soskice, 
a former Attorney-General, began proceedings with a speech that lasted an hour.  
Soskice concentrated his attack not on lower-level officers, but on ‘the responsibility 
of the Kenya Administration and the attitude of the Secretary of State himself to 
what has occurred’.130  He focused on the Cowan Plan: its formulation, its approval, 
and - in particular - the way in which its contents were relayed (or not) by senior 
colonial officials to officers at Hola camp.  Lennox-Boyd chose to devote the 
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majority of his reply to the ‘background of the Mau Mau problem’, which he 
explained in some detail.
131
  The Labour censure motion was defeated by 314 votes 
to 255, a Government majority of 59.  Macmillan confided to his diary that the 
debate had gone off ‘as well as could be expected’, but that it had been ‘an anxious 
day’.132 
Some of the reports of the parliamentary proceedings which appeared over 
the following two days were positive from the perspective of the Government.  
These included an editorial in the Express, entitled ‘A great rescue’,133 and two news 
reports called ‘The big Hola censure debate fades out quietly - Lennox-Boyd hits 
back’ and ‘Lennox-Boyd fights back – He puts deaths in perspective’ published in 
the Mail and the Express respectively.
134
  Yet the majority of coverage was negative.  
The left-leaning populars backed Labour’s calls both for a full public inquiry and for 
Lennox-Boyd’s resignation or dismissal in editorials entitled ‘Whitewash won’t do’ 
and ‘Save Britain’s good name’.135  On the Right, The Times retained its critical 
stance,
136
 again in direct contravention of the Conservative Party’s efforts and 
arguments.  Significantly, the paper was impressed by the content of Soskice’s 
speech, which it thought ‘vigorous and penetrating’ and full of truths concerning the 
drafting and implementation of the Cowan Plan, illustrating the importance of the 
Labour Party’s efforts during these months to flag up certain of Goudie’s findings.  
The Telegraph was markedly more critical following the debate, influenced by what 
it considered to be the deficiency of the Colonial Secretary’s rebuttal.137  Although 
this staunchly right-leaning paper thought that Lennox-Boyd could ‘on present 
evidence’ ignore calls to resign, significantly, it suggested that ‘heed might be paid 
to them in Nairobi’.  These press narratives again mirrored Conservative anxieties 
behind the scenes as opposed to the Government’s public posture.  The extent to 
which these anxieties centred on the issue of brutality,
138
 over and above the more 
general issue of ministerial and administrative misconduct, is, however, not as clear-
cut; and this analysis would favour the latter interpretation. 
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Following the debate, no reports on Hola appeared for a month, when two 
further events occurred which drew attention back to Kenya.  On 23 July the 
Government published the findings of the disciplinary tribunal headed by Conroy, 
which was then followed by an announcement from the Colonial Secretary that 
Sullivan was to retire compulsorily without loss of gratuity and that J.H. Lewis, the 
Kenya Commissioner of Prisons, due to retire shortly, had requested permission to 
retire as soon as possible.  A further parliamentary debate followed on 27 July.  
Importantly, the findings of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry were published 
on the same day as those of the tribunal; and a debate on Nyasaland followed hot on 
the heels of the debate on Kenya.  This did much to distract.  On the 24
th
, most 
papers headlined the news that the ‘camp chief’ (Sullivan) was to be ‘sacked’.139  
Yet the articles were small and tended not to appear on the front pages, which were 
instead dominated by the first news of Devlin’s findings.  There was also no editorial 
comment on Kenya that day, the exception being a piece in the Guardian, which 
addressed Hola and Devlin in a combined manner, and which stated that calls for the 
Colonial Secretary’s resignation would be ‘misplaced’.140 
On the 28
th
, the day following the Hola debate, coverage in the populars 
again reflected papers’ political allegiances, and thus appeared critical in the case of 
the Mirror and the Herald,
141
 but supportive in the case of the Mail and the 
Express.
142
  And untrue to form, no left-leaning papers devoted editorial space to 
Hola that day.  Nor did any of the right-leaning ‘serious’ papers, whose stance had 
been notably critical until that moment.  The legendary and highly censorious 
interventions of Barbara Castle and the Conservative Party’s own Enoch Powell thus 
attracted minimal page space, and may therefore have featured less in British popular 
understanding of the end of empire in Kenya than some historians have assumed.
143
  
This dearth of coverage, affected by an ongoing printing dispute which had caused 
many papers to reduce their page count,
144
 appeared to reflect the content of the 
White Paper; the success of Government tactics in timing its publication to coincide 
with the publication of the Devlin Report; and the Government’s efforts to confine 
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parliamentary discussion on Africa to a short, specified period.  In the case of the 
debate, the dearth of coverage may also have reflected the comparatively poor 
performance of the hitherto trail-blazing Labour Party that day, whose members had 
introduced the topic late in the evening and in such a way that it could not be put to a 
vote.
145
  Parliament soon adjourned for the summer recess, and coverage of Hola 
trickled off. 
 
4. ‘Matters of opinion’:146 Editorial treatment of the ‘Devlin Report’: July 
 
The Government published the findings of the Devlin Report on the same 
day as the second White Paper on Hola (23 July), and on the 28
th
 the Report was 
debated in the Commons.  During this week, the conduct of British ministers and 
colonial officials formed the focus of press coverage of Central Africa to a much 
greater extent than previously, and some of it was highly critical, but in general, less 
critical than Cabinet ministers had feared.  At the same time, coverage continued to 
display ‘progressive’ views on future-related developments.  While, in the case of 
ministerial misconduct, these characteristics resulted, in part, from the Government’s 
efforts to manipulate the media response to developments, press content as a whole 
continued to reflect a profusion of other influences. 
Among Devlin’s conclusions were that Africans had not planned a wholesale 
‘massacre’ of Europeans; the State of Emergency had been justified given that a 
crisis had existed at the beginning of March and the Governor had believed this to be 
the case; the Federal Government had played no direct role in this; Congress had 
discussed murdering Europeans at that time; Banda had not been involved in this; the 
African leader had not been as astute as he could have been concerning the probable 
effects of the public’s interpretation of his speeches; African opposition to 
Federation was widespread; and during the Emergency, some members of the 
security forces had acted brutally.  There was also the ‘police state’ reference on 
page one.
147
 
Once again, negative comment on ministerial conduct appeared in the left-
leaning popular press.  The day following the publication of the report, summaries of 
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Devlin’s findings which appeared in the Mirror and the Herald focused on the 
murder plot ‘that never was’, the ‘police state’ charge, the brutality of the security 
forces, and the relative innocence of Banda.
148
  The Mirror called for Lennox-
Boyd’s resignation, or failing that, dismissal.149  The Herald thought that ‘the report 
cries aloud that we must get rid of the men in government who have done these 
dreadful things’.150 
The picture painted by the left-leaning serious press was more equivocal.  
The Guardian and the Observer presented weighted summaries of Devlin’s findings, 
including the judge’s assertion that the State of Emergency had been justified.151  
The Guardian even chose to pursue this matter in its editorial, arguing that although 
some aspects of Devlin’s findings were ‘serious blows to the Government’s 
prestige’, there was ‘little comfort in the report for the friends of the Nyasaland 
African Congress’.152  Both papers devoted the majority of their editorial space to the 
bigger picture, the future of the protectorate and of the Federation, further exploring 
the causes of the current crisis, detailing political and constitutional changes in the 
offing and recommending new policy initiatives such as a steady and continuous 
policy of release of detainees,
153
 the provision of full democratic constitutions to 
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and the importance of countenancing both of the 
protectorates’ eventual secession from the union.154  The Observer declared that ‘All 
policy must flow from a recognition of the strength of the African Congress and of 
the Africans’ “almost universal” opposition to Federation’.155  The emphasis both 
papers placed on ‘broad’ issues such as these, in some ways served to detract 
attention away from those of Devlin’s criticisms which concerned the British and 
colonial governments’ handling of the Emergency, including the subject of colonial 
violence.  To some extent, this focus reflected the efforts of the Opposition to use the 
present crisis as a means of delving into Central African affairs more broadly.  Yet it 
was much more pronounced in the case of the left-leaning serious press because in 
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Parliament the Labour Party was equally concerned with assigning blame to Lennox-
Boyd. 
The factors which affected the nature of Guardian and Observer coverage 
can in some ways be seen as representative of the influences that conditioned the 
response of the press as a whole.  The emphasis the Guardian, in particular, placed 
on the justification of the Emergency must have reflected at least in part the nature of 
the judge’s report, a surprisingly understudied factor that lay behind the relative 
absence of press criticism on certain matters.
156
  It is significant that Devlin 
subsequently regretted including the ‘police state’ term.157  That the Guardian was 
not more critical of the British and colonial governments may also have owed 
something to the success of the British Government’s damage limitation strategy in 
the lead-up to the Report’s publication – a factor which previous studies have 
underscored.
158
  Government efforts involved obtaining advance copies of the report 
with which to plan;
159
 placing pressure on Devlin to delete Appendix I, a summary 
of the report’s conclusions, in order to deprive journalists of easy access to criticisms 
shorn of context;
160
 assembling a meeting of ministers and other officials at 
Chequers on the weekend of 18-19 July to put together a firm rebuttal of the judge’s 
most devastating conclusions in the form of a ‘despatch’ from Armitage, which was 
then published alongside the judge’s report;161 and leaking the content of the Report 
and the Despatch to the press before their release presumably to remove both 
gradually from the realm of ‘news’.162  Cabinet ministers also held private meetings 
with newspaper editors.
163
 
Yet it may be dangerous to infer too much from these Government efforts.  
Journalists at both papers took an independent and comprehensive approach to 
reading and composing analyses of the two documents.  The editor of the Guardian 
annotated the entire Report before planning and writing his piece, and chose not to 
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annotate much of the despatch.
164
  The Observer re-printed much of Devlin’s text in 
full (almost a third of it, which took up ten full newspaper pages).
165
  Moreover, the 
emphasis both papers placed on the future of the protectorate, the political and 
constitutional changes in the offing, and the importance of either releasing detainees 
or allowing Nyasaland the eventual right to secede from the union did not appear to 
have been the product of any Government intervention at all.  This was in contrast to 
Kenya, where a focus on context and the brighter, promised future undoubtedly had.  
These points did not form part of the Governor’s despatch, and it is unlikely that 
Colonial Office officials mentioned them in confidence to journalists behind the 
scenes, given firstly that British journalists appeared not to have a lot of self-restraint 
when it came to keeping certain matters (and their sources of information) under 
wraps; and secondly, the extent of Lord Perth’s guardedness on the matter of 
detainees and the right of secession when pressured on these two issues during a 
private lunch with correspondents and editors in May.
166
 
Subsequent discussions at the CO revealed the balance of power as 
perceived.  When officials discussed the prospect of organising a trip to Africa for 
Astor, whose paper they felt mattered, a sense of cautious optimism pervaded its 
messages twinned with a generous dollop of realism.
167
  ‘I do not for a moment think 
that a visit to Africa by Mr Astor would radically change his paper’s line’, one 
official wrote in June (1959), ‘but it would I think lead to some greater accuracy in 
presentation, and a better editorial sense of what African problems are.  It might lead 
to much more, you never know, but I would not count on this’.168  Lewis and 
Murphy also explain that during the summer, the Colonial Office was exploring the 
idea of an overture to Banda as a result of a private intervention from one of its 
“inner circle” of journalists, Donald McLachlan, the deputy editor of the 
Telegraph.
169
 
These press ideas ran counter to a number of the Government’s publicly 
professed policies even if they did, as Murphy suggests, mesh with the private 
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sympathies or ideas of individuals within government, as well as coincide with the 
future direction of Colonial Office policy.
170
  The British Government wished to 
continue to pursue a moderate line.  Yet, at the same time, it displayed a consistent 
awareness of the significance of aggravating factors, including the British public and 
parliamentary context to developments in the Federation.  At the Colonial Office, 
W.L. Gorell Barnes, commenting on Welensky’s reluctance to support the Monckton 
Commission, told Lord Perth in May that he ‘has got to be made to understand that 
opinion in this country is such that we are going to have quite a job to hold the 
Federation together and that, without a good deal of help from him in this sort of 
way we may fail’.171 
Right-leaning papers were almost wholly supportive of the British and 
colonial governments’ handling of immediate events.  True, news reports in the Mail 
and The Times documented the critical aspects as much as (or more than) the 
positives.
172
  Yet the summaries of Devlin’s findings which appeared in the 
Telegraph and the Express concentrated very much on the claim that a crisis had 
existed at the beginning of March, that the Governor had been justified in calling a 
state of emergency, and that in their meetings in the bush the Congress Party had 
indeed discussed violence against Europeans.
173
  Editorials across the right-leaning 
press as a whole echoed this latter supportive focus.
174
  However, they were far less 
vocal on matters concerning the future.  Many right-leaning papers refused to be 
drawn on the ‘bigger’ issues concerning the future of the region, most probably 
because of the extent to which Federation remained a party political issue.  Although 
they had voiced strong opinions at the start of the year concerning the changing 
trajectory of events on the African continent, in July Africa was in the parliamentary 
spotlight perhaps more consistently than ever before and in the intervening period a 
general election had been announced and set for October.  Only The Times 
commented.  The editor, extremely nonplussed by the Report’s critical analysis of 
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‘recent events’, suggested that those of its passages which dealt with the growth of 
African nationalism were ‘reflective and true’.175 
The nature of the editorials appearing in the right-leaning press at this time 
reflected the content of the Governor’s despatch.  Yet they also drew on Devlin’s 
Report, the nature of which continued to be an important factor behind the absence 
of critical comment on certain issues.  Colin Baker has argued that holes and 
inconsistencies existed in the Report, which enabled supporters of both governments 
to attack the judge’s critical claims as ‘matters of opinion’,176 the title of The Times’s 
editorial.  These holes Baker tracks back to the timing pressures Devlin and his team 
faced, which in turn can be traced to the actions of the British Government during 
the summer, and their inadvertent consequences, because it desired to present and 
debate the Report before the end of the summer session and relayed this information 
continually to the Commission.
177
 
On broader issues, such as the extent and nature of African opposition to 
Federation, as on the Left, right-leaning papers such as The Times appeared to be 
performing a more independent role – in this case by continuing publicly to 
articulate the anxieties of those on the Right in British politics to a far greater extent 
than was possible for any leading member of the Conservative Government.  
Macmillan probably had press responses to ministerial behaviour (as opposed to 
future policy) in mind when, on the 24
th
, he studied press comment on the Report 
and decided to congratulate all those involved in the framing of the rebuttal for the 
part they had played in “a well conducted exercise”.178 
A week later, at the time of the Commons debate on the Devlin Report (28 
July), most papers retained their existing stance.  The left-leaning populars were still 
gunning for Lennox-Boyd’s resignation.179  They also reiterated calls for the British 
Government to deal with leaders of the Africans’ choosing.180  The left-leaning 
serious press continued to present weighted appraisals of the Emergency and thus the 
British and Nyasaland governments’ handling of it, again particularly in the 
Guardian, with its special feature article on ‘The deaths at Nkata Bay’, where the 
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greatest loss of life had occurred, sub-headed ‘A tragedy of misunderstanding’.181  
This section of the press also continued to put forward numerous suggestions for the 
region’s future – a subject it continued to foreground in editorials.182  The Guardian 
expressed concerns over the British Government’s continued hostility towards 
Banda, whom Devlin depicted as “a frank and honest man”.183  The Observer 
suggested bringing Banda and his colleagues to Britain for negotiations as free 
men.
184
 
The right-leaning press still displayed strong support for the British and 
Nyasaland governments’ actions on and around 3 March.  It also continued to 
concentrate on those of Devlin’s comments which concerned the immediate 
background to the Emergency, the Express and the Telegraph standing out in this 
regard.
185
  Despite this, the content of some papers such as The Times continued to 
indicate the changing nature of centre-Right opinion on broader issues.  In an 
editorial on the day of the debate The Times conceded that given the dangers of 
African discontent within the protectorate, ‘it may… be necessary to fix a time-table 
for (political and constitutional) advance’.186  It also advocated ‘a progressive return 
of those in detention to normal life’, and while it supported Nyasaland’s inclusion in 
the Federation, it indicated that ‘it would be neither desirable nor in the long run 
practical politics that it should be dragged along… in the state of mind depicted in 
the Devlin report’. 
Few fresh influences appear to have affected press coverage of the Devlin 
Report and related issues at this later stage - in marked contrast to journalists’ 
evolving responses to Hola.  As previously suggested, the end of July may have been 
considered too close to the upcoming election for many right-leaning papers to 
permit serious consideration of the arguments of the Opposition; and the same could 
be said of papers on the Left in their attitude to the Conservative Party.  There was 
also the nature of the Devlin Report itself, whose content was in many ways defined 
by the questions one asked of it, as well as cross-paper dissatisfaction with the 
quality of the Commons debate on the 28
th
, which may otherwise have swayed 
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opinion.
187
  Back in June, Soskice’s incisive appraisal of the Hola evidence had 
influenced papers such as The Times.  Yet there was no similar quality attack from 
Labour on Devlin in July.  Some journalists attributed this to the Party’s fears of 
saying something they might later regret were they to win the forthcoming general 
election and assume a position of responsibility for Central Africa.  Others thought 
that MPs were tired following the Hola debate the previous night, which had 
continued into the early hours.  Yet perhaps the most significant factor behind the 
absence of a strong Labour ‘impact’ in the Commons at this stage seems to be the 
fact that both Parties continued to talk at cross purposes to an extent that was not true 
of the discussions on Hola, both sides defiantly exploring those aspects of Devlin’s 
Report that concerned them, and this was reflected in coverage. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, British press treatment of Kenya and Nyasaland during 1959 served 
to mask or lessen the prominence of criticisms circulating within Britain concerning 
British or colonial misdeeds and brutality, with positive implications for British 
readers as well as for the British Government.  Importantly, coverage concentrated 
on more than the issue of colonial violence.  Future-oriented themes were 
particularly prominent in the case of Central Africa.  Additional themes included 
African violence, African nationalism, the suspected machinations of white settlers, 
Britain’s role as ‘protector’ of the Africans, her colonial policy, and Federation. 
In all instances, the content was born of more than the Government’s media 
management efforts.  It was instead press-generated in the sense that coverage 
represented the fusion of many stimuli, interests and ideas – cultural, political, 
internal, external, in Africa as well as in Britain – through which British journalists 
negotiated paths.  The British press might itself therefore be characterised both as a 
rather conservative force on the issue of colonial violence during these months, and 
as an important and independent force for change on Central African affairs. 
The nature of these press narratives might cause us to question the extent to 
which 3 March 1959 signalled the ‘moral’ end of the British Empire in Africa –188 at 
least in popular perceptions.  They also suggest that the articulation of major, 
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prominent criticisms of the British and colonial governments’ handling of local 
events was not a pre-requisite for the expression of ‘progressive’ views on 
decolonisation.  Of these two subjects, the latter was really the fundamental one.  
The presence of these broad themes in press narratives, moreover, over and above 
the narrower issue of colonial violence, points to the importance of reassessing the 
distinction which is often drawn between the nature of British public appraisals of 
events in Central Africa during 1959 and those of the British Government. 
This chapter offers one explanation for the apparent dichotomy between the 
scale of public interest in events in Africa during the summer of 1959 and the re-
election of the Conservative Party in October that turns on more than the question of 
the British Government’s damage limitation exercises.  Because it draws a 
distinction between the press’s coverage of the violence on the one hand, and its 
visions of the future on the other, the chapter’s conclusions are also consistent with 
the view that during this year, and to the extent that the British press influenced the 
British Government, new initiatives were necessary. 
Yet, as we shall see in Chapter Three, this should not be taken to signify that 
from 1959 the Government wholeheartedly supported African aspirations in white 
settler colonies, for this reason or for any other.  Of these two case studies – Kenya 
and the Federation - British policy towards the latter, in particular, remained rather 
conservative.  The Government held out the hope of pursuing a middle road, only to 
be frustrated in its efforts; and, in this, British newspaper content was one perpetual 
aggravating factor. 
During 1959, white settlers had picked up on British press treatment of the 
Nyasaland Emergency and its fall-out and had begun to ponder that coverage’s 
potential significance for the Federation’s constitutional prospects.  Despite the 
Conservatives’ victory in the general election in October (1959), these concerns only 
intensified in the following weeks and months, peaking the next time in February 
1960, when British journalists, accompanying Macmillan on his ‘wind of change’ 
Africa tour, landed en masse.  
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Chapter 3 
African nationalism, white settler intransigence, and Britain’s future 
influence: Harold Macmillan’s ‘Wind of Change’ tour, January-
February, 1960 
 
 On 5 January 1960, Macmillan set off for Africa on a month-long tour to four 
‘Commonwealth’ countries.  Only two were Commonwealth members: Ghana and 
South Africa.  Yet the British Government also used the term to refer to those 
territories thought to be nearing full Commonwealth status: Nigeria, on the cusp of 
independence, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.  The official 
Government report of the tour stated that three factors had influenced Macmillan’s 
decision to travel to Africa.  The first of these was rounding off the Commonwealth 
tour he had undertaken in 1958 to countries outside Africa.
1
  The second was 
informing himself at first hand of the problems of Africa in the context of the ‘rising 
tide of nationalism’.  The third factor concerned ‘the specific challenge presented to 
the United Kingdom Government by the problem of constitutional advance in multi-
racial societies in Africa’.  The report stated that the Prime Minister wanted to ‘help 
focus public opinion at home on this problem and possibly…lift it to a plane above 
that of narrow party politics’. 
The historian Ronald Hyam records that in the autumn of 1959, Macmillan 
explained to Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, that Africa seemed to be the 
biggest problem “looming up for us here at home”: “We just succeeded at the 
General Election at ‘getting by’ on this.  But young people of all Parties are uneasy 
and uncertain of our moral basis.  Something must be done to lift Africa on to a more 
national plane as a problem to the solution of which we must all contribute, not out 
of spite – like the Observer and New Statesman – but by some really imaginative 
effort.”  Undertaking a journey immediately after Christmas would bring this African 
problem “into the centre of affairs”.2 
 This last consideration is one of those most frequently cited by historians of 
decolonisation, who, until recently, have associated the tour with a clear policy 
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departure on the part of the British Government.
3
  Viewed in conjunction with the 
‘wind of change’ moment, and the Government’s apparently unequivocal 
identification with African nationalism,
4
 the report’s references to public opinion at 
home and party politics look like signalling a radical break with existing policy 
towards ‘white’ Africa in the name of British attitudes and parliamentary unity on 
colonial affairs.  The Cape Town speech is deemed to have been ‘a tour de force’;5 
‘No one could deny its impact’;6 ‘Macmillan “jolted” European opinion’.7 
A number of recent works have begun to question both the degree to which 
the famous speech signalled a fundamental change in British policy, and the extent 
of its local impact.
8
  Saul Dubow maintains that the speech was ‘far more 
conciliatory to white South African interests than is usually assumed’,9 and ruffled 
few feathers within Nationalist circles.  Joanna Lewis argues that it concealed a 
fundamental continuity in the British Government’s thinking on race, which the 
character of Macmillan’s visit to Northern Rhodesia and its lack of impact on the 
ground belied.
10
  Lewis writes of the success of the Cape Town speech in Britain, but 
attributes this to clever politics, which included the ‘artful’ nature of the text and 
Macmillan’s ability to ‘(get) the (British) press to bite’.11 
The work of Lewis and Dubow has been of great importance in recalibrating 
historical understanding of Macmillan’s 1960 tour to include a reassessment of the 
central ‘wind of change’ theme.  Yet there are also some important continuities.  The 
sections of these studies which confirm existing views on the significance of the tour 
concern the Cape Town speech’s impact and reception in Britain; and the British 
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Government’s largely successful management of the rhetoric of the end of empire (if 
not quite its application). 
This chapter interrogates this last aspect.  It supports the emphasis Lewis and 
Dubow have placed on the clever, rather reactionary nature of Macmillan’s speeches.  
Yet, at the same time, it agrees with the older studies that both the Cape Town 
speech and the tour had an important role and impact that was not confined to 
Britain, but which included settler groupings.
12
  It reconciles these two perspectives 
by placing the British press at the heart of developments.   
Implicit in the argument is the view that the references to British public 
opinion and party politics in the official report of the tour were as much statements 
of intent regarding the Government’s hopes for changing public attitudes in favour of 
the status quo, as indicators of a new responsive, liberal policy that was put into 
practice during the tour.  Macmillan’s correspondence with Brook signalled a desire 
to engage with the views of papers such as the Observer and New Statesman, but not 
simply to bow to their ‘spite’.  The fact that this was a Commonwealth tour is a point 
which is often obscured in the historiography, which pivots on the ‘wind of change’ 
speech.  The focus is on the tour as an expression of partiality, rather than themes 
such as ‘co-existence’ or ‘multi-racialism’ (the protection of minority – white – 
rights) and the familial bonds of Commonwealth to which Macmillan was deeply 
committed.
13
 
This chapter de-centres the ‘wind of change’ moment.  It focuses on 
alternative British Government pronouncements made during the tour in speeches, 
propaganda and private diplomacy.  These, it argues, were largely at odds with the 
‘wind of change’ sentiment, but were both more indicative of the Government’s 
overall policy and far more prolific a feature of its public relations efforts.  The 
chapter weighs them against British press coverage and its effects.  In addition to 
British newspaper articles, the chapter draws on British Government documents; the 
diaries or memoirs of British politicians, British journalists and Macmillan’s public 
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relations adviser; the Welensky papers; the Armitage papers; the British Library 
Sound Archive; and local papers published in the Federation and in South Africa. 
Throughout the tour, diversity and difference across Africa were key official 
themes; so too was the importance of refraining from comment on the ‘internal 
affairs’ of Commonwealth member states.  Interdependence, patience, and the 
promotion of mutual understanding and respect through dialogue and through 
Commonwealth ties were concepts Macmillan strove to promote. 
Yet British newspapers recorded a very different narrative, which turned on 
an unabashed depiction of the African nationalist challenge to colonial authority as 
strong and the white settler response (intransigence) as downright dangerous or mad.  
The presence of these features in coverage reflected the continued resonance of 
ideological, political, experiential and institutional factors influencing British 
journalists, which interacted with African efforts to exploit the British presence on 
the ground as a means of advancing the nationalist cause.  The 1959 Emergency in 
Nyasaland had given nationalists more international publicity than they would 
normally attract;
14
 and there is evidence to suggest that this informed the efforts of 
activists thereafter. 
Press treatment of local events continued to work at odds with elements of 
policy, in this case by placing pressure on the British Government; selectively 
relaying Macmillan’s words to mass audiences; and presenting a rival claim to 
authorship of ‘Britain’s view’ in Africa.  It continued to have significant 
consequences, firstly, for Britain’s deteriorating relations with the governing white 
settler communities of Central (and now Southern) Africa; and secondly, for the 
British Government, for whom press content had policy implications.  Additionally, 
articles tended once again not to diminish Britain’s role, but instead to elevate it. 
 
1. Press arrangements for the tour: an exercise in damage limitation? 
 
One of the Government’s biggest fears concerned the potential for 
miscommunication or unfavourable publicity presented by the tour.  It was a very 
nervy start.  In one respect it positively took the lead.  Before setting off, Macmillan 
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decided that in Cape Town he would speak publicly on the issue of apartheid.
15
  
Apartheid had become a hot topic in Britain during the summer of 1959 due to the 
efforts of the Boycott Movement to increase British public awareness and stimulate 
action against the Union Government.
16
  Yet Macmillan’s decision to speak 
represented a response to British public opinion, which reflected the relative balance 
of power on this issue, and which augured ill, from its perspective, for the tour.  As 
is well-known, on 15 December the Prime Minister met John Maud, the British High 
Commissioner to South Africa, to discuss possible topics and themes for speeches.  
Macmillan told him that ‘there was a very strong demand in the United Kingdom 
that he should at some stage during his visit to the Union indicate that the majority of 
people in this country did not agree with the Union Government’s policy on 
apartheid’.17  The Prime Minister ‘thought that he must really try to find some phrase 
which indicated a critical approach’.18  From the end of November 1959, 
parliamentary pressure on the subject had been most acute.
19
 
Less well-documented is the specific part played by the British press.  During 
1959, papers such as the Observer, with its numerous connections to South Africa, 
through Astor, Legum, Sampson and others,
20
 had also voiced strong views.  In 
addition, British newspapers provided a means by which opponents of apartheid 
residing in South Africa were able to communicate with large audiences and to hold 
politicians to account.  Following Macmillan and Maud’s meeting, a draft of the 
speech was composed.  A week later, an ‘Open Letter’ from Albert Luthuli, the 
President of the African National Congress, and three others, appeared in the 
Observer, imploring Macmillan on his visit to the Union ‘not (to) say one single 
word that could be construed to be in praise of (apartheid)’.21  Macmillan thought it 
advisable to obtain the views of the Commonwealth Relations and Colonial Offices 
(‘the Departments’) on whether or not ‘the signatories of the letter would be satisfied 
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with the current draft of the Union speech’,22 a move which suggested that he may 
have considered going further. 
A similar point could be made regarding Central African affairs.  
Constitutional discussions with African and settler political parties were soon to 
begin in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and the Government had recently 
decided to release Banda.  This latter move was to remain a matter of private, rather 
than public, discussion during the tour.  Yet it is important for understanding the 
uneasy mind-set with which Macmillan embarked on the journey.  Historians do not 
tend to refer to British public opinion when discussing the release of Banda.  
Existing works focus on Macleod’s role in pushing for it; and on the need for the 
Monckton Commission’s work to be regarded as credible.23  Yet, as we have seen, 
the release of the detainees, including Banda, formed the subject of public, including 
press, pressure and debate throughout 1959; as well as of critical and specific 
interventions, such as during the British editors’ lunch meeting with Lord Perth; and, 
as Lewis and Murphy describe, the actions of the Telegraph correspondent, Donald 
McLachlan.
24
  The official report of the tour also bears out the significance of the 
British metropolitan context to Banda’s release.  Responding to a suggestion from 
the Nyasaland Government, part way through the tour, that Banda be restricted to the 
UK upon his release, Macmillan replied that ‘if there was any question of Dr. Banda 
being refused permission to return to Nyasaland there would be severe public 
criticism, in Parliament and the Press, in the United Kingdom…  The cry at present 
was for Dr. Banda’s release; if he were released but exiled the cry would be for his 
return to his own country.’ 25  Later that day, Macmillan repeated that ‘To release Dr. 
Banda and then exile him would be indefensible to Parliament and public opinion.’ 
26
  We might also recall, at this point, the British public and political context to the 
appointment of the Monckton Commission.
27
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Against this domestic political backdrop, and despite the ‘progressive’ nature 
of some of these recent moves, the Government continued to pursue a conservative 
line on associated issues.  From the summer of 1959, for example, in response to 
press pressure and persistent questioning from the Opposition about the two northern 
protectorates’ right to decide whether to remain in the Federal grouping or to leave, 
the Government fudged the issues and showed great reluctance to commit either 
way.
28
  Commenting in August on a remark by the Observer ‘that we would have to 
announce readiness to allow Nyasaland to secede’, Perth wrote that he had ‘great 
difficulty about this’.29  The Government held to the view that the Federation was of 
great economic benefit to Nyasaland.  It also feared triggering either a Federal or a 
Southern Rhodesian ‘tea party’,30 or driving the Rhodesians into the arms of South 
Africa.
31
  In regard to South Africa itself, Macmillan wished to avoid driving the 
country out of the Commonwealth and the Sterling area.
32
  The Government also had 
strategic concerns, such as over-flying rights, which permitted the defence of the 
High Commission territories of Basutoland and Swaziland.
33
 
What the tour would demonstrate was not only the magnitude of Macmillan’s 
efforts to carve out these ‘middle roads’, but also the extent of the constraints that 
British journalists placed on his ability to do so, partly by persisting in vocalising 
strong opinions on Federation and apartheid, but also by mediating Macmillan’s 
words to mass audiences, and by challenging his claim to sole authorship of 
‘Britain’s view’ in Africa.  British press content therefore had an indirect effect on 
the achievement of policy goals, in addition to a direct effect on Government 
thinking; and in this it recalled developments in Ghana. 
The official press arrangements for the tour suggested both that the 
Government was not ignorant of these dynamics, and that it was indeed intent on 
treading a fine line on certain subjects.  It directed most of its efforts towards 
ensuring that Macmillan’s main (policy) speeches were relayed to newspaper 
readerships accurately.  Officials thought it of ‘great importance’ for texts of the 
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Prime Minister’s speeches, or all significant passages, to be cabled back to London 
during the tour.
34
  Both the CRO and the CO, the latter in correspondence with 
Nigeria, worried over Macmillan’s tendency to depart from the texts of his speeches.  
‘We are anxious that U.K. press and official press services should be given every 
assistance over Prime Minister’s speeches’, one CO telegram stated:35 ‘Evans’, the 
Prime Minister’s public relations adviser, ‘will try to make copies of texts available 
beforehand for checking against delivery but final text usually differs substantially 
from speaker’s notes’.36  ‘For this reason no advance copies of drafts should be 
prepared for Press use, nor should any statements be issued with embargoes’, the 
CRO stated in a further message.
37
  Evidently doubtful as to the capacity of the 
different countries and territories to perform these functions unaided, officials 
thought it best for Evans to take with him ‘a portable battery-operated tape recorder 
which can be used to supplement your resources where necessary’.38 
The CRO also supported the call to bar journalists from the ‘Pan African 
Party’ in Ghana.39  The High Commission in Accra relayed that the Ghanaian 
authorities wanted correspondents and photographers to attend the function, but it 
‘(feared) embarrassment to Prime Minister when he gets to Rhodesia and Union if 
newspaper men (sic) have sent ahead misleading reports based on half-heard 
conversations between him and some of Pan-Africans’.40  The CRO agreed with the 
High Commission’s suggestion that the ‘best way of dealing with this is to exclude 
press and photographers but for Evans and Moxon to give them afterwards whatever 
account of it the two of them consider expedient’.41  Officials also decided that 
Macmillan should decline all requests from journalists for advance interviews, but 
that he ‘should be willing, as he did after his Commonwealth tour, to accept an 
invitation from the Commonwealth Correspondents’ Association to speak to them at 
a lunch meeting’;42 to take no part in interviews with individual correspondents 
during the tour ‘unless strongly advised to do so’;43 and to avoid numerous press 
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conferences, which were to be prepared for extensively and conducted ‘preferably 
late in the visit’ in each of the countries or territories.44  Policy pronouncements were 
to be delivered in a single speech, and in these speeches Macmillan’s mission was 
purely to restate the Government’s position and venture no further.45 
All in all, the nature of the Government’s discussions suggested that it 
viewed the British press as a necessary encumbrance rather than as an organisation 
with whose members it was a pleasure to do business or who it was somehow 
possible actively to co-opt.  There certainly seemed to be no plans to approach it 
directly.  Overall, this nervousness reflected the sheer scale of the task at hand on 
African affairs.  Yet, as the reference to ‘misleading reports’ of the ‘Pan-African 
Party’ indicated, it was also a sign of the Government’s understanding of press 
perspectives on African nationalism and Federation, discussed in the previous 
chapter; together with a sustained recognition, on its part, of the associated 
importance of British public opinion. 
More specific, circumstantial issues fuelled these fears, such as the nature of 
the tour and the make-up of the press party.  This was the first time a serving British 
Prime Minister had visited Africa,
46
 and papers lapped up the opportunity to send 
their most celebrated correspondents.  On few previous occasions, too, had so many 
London-based political correspondents and editors converged simultaneously on the 
same patch of ground in Africa, taking with them both a professional inclination to 
comment and a tendency to frame events in parliamentary or political perspective. 
They could not be characterised as shy, retiring types.  Munnion refers to 
Henry Fairlie, the political correspondent for the Mail, as ‘then the most celebrated 
of Fleet Street political columnists’.47  Fairlie eschewed anonymity;48 and was later 
prominent enough to put into circulation the term ‘the establishment’ to describe 
those, who, while often unelected, controlled the levers of power in British public 
life,
49
 which recalls Sampson’s interests and suggests that the war and the social 
change which it sparked affected the outlook of these men.
50
  Rene MacColl, the 
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Express’s most revered foreign correspondent, was best known for his sensational, 
uncompromising writing style.  Peregrine Worsthorne, special correspondent for the 
Telegraph, later described his approach to journalism as centring on ‘destabilising 
(and) de-legitimising all the institutions one after the other’.51  Anne Sharpley, the 
only female British correspondent on the tour, was no shrinking violet either.  As a 
woman in a predominantly man’s world, she needed to be tough.  According to Ann 
Leslie, another of Britain’s first female foreign correspondents, Sharpley advised her 
at the start of her career that there were ‘two things that as a female correspondent 
she’d need to do: “First, sleep with the resident Reuter’s correspondent and then with 
the chief of police.  That way you’ll pick up stories before anyone else”.’52 
The group was also comparatively progressive politically.  On the Right, 
some of the most prominent and respected, such as Fairlie and MacColl, were self-
professed ‘liberal’ or ‘radical’ Tories.53  Others were committed Africanists who 
knew the continent well or had connections to it.  These included Sydney Jacobson 
(Mirror), who had been born in the Transvaal,
54
 and Anthony Sampson, the 
Observer’s representative, who had lived and worked alongside Africans in Drum’s 
Johannesburg offices for four years.
55
 
The fact that the Government’s efforts to accommodate press representatives 
were less than strenuous was therefore unlikely to have reflected a belief that British 
press reporting of the tour would be either benign or of minimal significance.  On the 
contrary; the Government demonstrated the extent of its concern not only in the 
lengths it went to to ensure accurate transcription by the press of Macmillan’s main 
policy speeches, but also in its discussions on how the press might characterise the 
individual countries and territories visited.  When, on 15 December, Evans received 
a telegram from the CRO communicating the Federal authorities’ intention to 
provide ‘an aircraft free of charge’ for travel within the Federation for ‘local press’ 
representatives only,
56
 he responded with some shock and trepidation.  ‘I cannot 
think’, he wrote, ‘that the Federal authorities are so misguided as not to realise that 
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the attitude of Fleet Street to Colonial African affairs in the critical time ahead is 
going to be quite largely conditioned by the impressions taken back by these U.K. 
correspondents.  Moreover, what these people write will have a considerable 
influence on Parliament and the public.  Some of them will arrive with a strongly 
critical bias.  If the Federal authorities are wise they will do their utmost to remove 
or weaken any such bias: certainly they would be most unwise to strengthen it at the 
outset by an unhelpful attitude’.57  Feelers sent out by the Federal authorities 
regarding the racial composition of the overseas press party, set further alarm bells 
ringing.
58
  Once more, Evans cautioned against provoking the British press.  ‘I am 
not aware that there will be any black or coloured people in the overseas Press 
party’, he told the CRO, ‘but again I would emphasise that any discrimination 
against a bona fide representative of the U.K. Press would result in a tremendous row 
involving the whole U.K. Press’.59 
 
2. ‘Make it a mission for justice’:60 The British press as critic and activist 
 
Before the Government party had even reached the settler regions of Central 
and South Africa, all indications were that Evans’s instincts had been spot on.  The 
majority of editorials the day before Macmillan left Britain and during the tour’s 
early stages were impassioned and centred on three topics: the future of the 
Federation, the release of Banda, and the issue of apartheid.
61
  Judging from the 
timing and the nature of these pieces and the accompanying reports, their appearance 
reflected the efforts of the Opposition and the Tory Bow Group to raise these 
subjects in Parliament.  Yet the arguments of these two groups meshed with the 
press’s longer-term focus,62 and therefore also reflected editorial perspectives. 
Locally, British correspondents were in the hunt for a good story.  They had 
to dig deep at first.  British press treatment of the tour was initially rather positive 
from the Government’s perspective, with the exception of accounts of the poor turn-
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out for Macmillan’s reception at the airport in Accra, characterised as ‘adequate, but 
hardly overwhelming’ by Stanley Bonnett of the Daily Mail.63  The day following 
their arrival, all papers covered the cheerful welcome the ‘mammies’ gave 
Macmillan and his wife, Lady Dorothy, in the capital’s market.64  Photos of the 
Prime Minister perched on ‘a mammy chair’ held aloft by a group of African men 
running into the surf in the city’s harbour were splashed across the leader pages of 
the populars.
65
  The mood conveyed was fun and light-hearted.  This reflected the 
tour’s careful staging.  The photo of Macmillan on the mammy chair corresponded to 
one of the official Government images sent to the press during these weeks.
66
 
Yet it was not long before the Ghana segment of the tour produced stories 
which leant themselves to a more critical portrayal, and British journalists seemed 
only too willing to run with them.  Right-leaning papers, in particular, latched on to 
the kind of stories that recalled their earlier portrayal of Ghana in the period 
immediately following independence, such as those which focused on Nkrumah’s 
apparent disregard for Britain.
67
  MacColl informed Express readers that the 
Ghanaian Prime Minister had recently ‘(flayed) Britain’ at a CPP rally in Accra.68  
The Telegraph and the Express reported the failure of approximately twenty guests 
(including Nkrumah’s wife) to turn up for a state banquet held in Macmillan’s 
honour.
69
 
These negative narratives may have been informed by old regional loyalties, 
gripes or patterns of reporting, including, historically, the actions of opposition 
groups.
70
  Yet there was also a sense that they were beginning to reflect something 
new as well: both an understanding of the increasing obsolescence of empire, 
suggested by the editorial context within which they appeared (discussed below), and 
Nkrumah’s actions.  Nkrumah used the tour to initiate a number of public attacks on 
British policy, reflecting his confidence as independent Africa’s trailblazer.  The 
News Chronicle noted that the week of Macmillan’s visit marked ‘the tenth 
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anniversary of his call for “positive action” against British rule’.71  Journalists’ 
personal accounts of the tour also suggested that at this early stage they felt editorial 
pressure to produce ‘a story’,72 a further factor which led them to home in on the 
conflictual over the consensual. 
The Prime Minister’s initial welcome in colonial Nigeria received a far more 
favourable press than his airport reception in Ghana.
73
  According to British 
journalists, all the Nigerian leader did was to criticise Nkrumah and denounce 
apartheid.
74
  Yet Nigerians citizens, possibly anticipating this, had decided to take 
matters into their own hands; and British journalists were quick to lock on to their 
protests, such as at the University of Ibadan, where students staged a demonstration 
during Macmillan’s visit to the campus, shouting slogans and waving placards 
emblazoned with the words ‘Hail McNato’ and ‘Lord Malvern is an ass.  Tell him 
so’.75  The Times’s correspondent considered the encounter amusing.76  Yet the 
majority wrote it up as an unnerving or portentous spectacle.  MacColl thought the 
protest ‘(could) not be written off as just a light-hearted “rag”’.77  Bonnett told Mail 
readers that Macmillan had ‘tried to laugh his way out’, but ‘ended up grim-faced 
and angry’.78 
The presence of these negative narratives reflected first and foremost African 
efforts to exploit the British presence on the ground as a means of getting their 
voices heard.  This, in turn, reflected regional concerns, such as fears surrounding 
the French atomic tests being conducted close-by in the Sahara.  Yet they also had a 
pan-African dimension, as the placard referring to Lord Malvern, Welensky’s 
predecessor, attested to.  One member of the youth wing of the Malawi Congress 
Party later described how grateful he and his colleagues had been to these Nigerians 
who had protested on their behalf, and recounted how their efforts had inspired 
protests in Nyasaland.
79
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British press perspectives also began to conflict with many of the key 
concepts Macmillan strove publicly to promote.  As the Accra speech illustrated, 
these were that Africa was a diverse continent of races and places in which 
differences had to be respected and catered for, particularly in countries which 
lacked the relative racial ‘homogeneity’ of West Africa: the Central and Southern 
regions.
80
  In contrast, British papers reflected the tone of the demonstrators in 
emphasising that Africa was one, and that its future resided firmly with the African 
majority.  Many journalists, including those working for right-leaning papers, wrote 
that they considered the white presence in Africa a dull anachronism.  Worsthorne 
thought that Accra’s ‘quiet, restrained and undemonstrative welcome’ befitted a 
country now looking to the future unfettered by the old colonial ties.
81
  It was 
Macmillan and Dorothy, he wrote, who ‘introduced a touch of the past in such 
striking contrast to the gleaming modernity of their African hosts’.82  In Nigeria, still 
stuck in a colonial time-warp, ‘everything was so Old-World’, Barber quipped, ‘that 
Lady Dorothy looked more than ever like a visiting Girl Guide commissioner in 
mufti’.83 
If Africans were soon to triumph continent-wide, as British journalists 
believed they would, the view that it was inadvisable for Macmillan to comment on 
the internal affairs of Commonwealth member states, such as apartheid South Africa, 
therefore found no echo in British papers.  Instead, editors and correspondents were 
keen to point out that adopting a critical stance was the only way Britain might hope 
to retain the loyalty of the Africans, and thus its global power.  ‘Britain can 
confidently face the challenge of modern Africa so long as she is willing to give 
Africans a square deal’, explained the Mirror.84  Legum pursued the same point in 
relation to Kenya and the Federation.
85
  In his view, Britain’s ‘future influence’ 
depended on its ‘re-discovering’ some ‘moral strength’.  This meant supporting the 
demands of the African majority.  Pursuing two different policies in Africa – one 
which protected minority (white) rights, and one which aimed to bring about 
majority rule – was thought to be asking for trouble if not downright impossible. 
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It is not surprising that Macmillan and his entourage were irritated by the 
journalists’ presence even at this early stage.  Not all of this irritation bore a specific 
relation to the press’s presentation of policy, but at all moments it belied the myth of 
a cosy relationship and of Government control.  According to Evans, Macmillan 
vented his irritation behind the scenes before each and every press conference, 
irrespective of the line-up.
86
  Evans displayed particular concern at the journalists’ 
take on the Tema/Volta trip, an excursion the Government had hoped would 
showcase Ghana’s progress and development as well as the scale of Britain’s 
economic investment.  It had been hot, and Macmillan had had to make three 
unscheduled stops.
87
  ‘The U.K. correspondents fussed about his pallor and told each 
other that he had “Accra tummy”’, Evans recorded in his diary: ‘I did my best to 
remind them that without exception this kind of thing was said at various points 
during all tours, but a number of them ran with it hard all the same’.88 
At this stage, Evans appeared to be conducting a relatively futile exercise in 
damage limitation, which only invited ridicule from journalists.
89
  The Prime 
Minister’s personal contact with the press representatives was by all accounts more 
fruitful and engaged with weightier issues, including Britain’s Africa policy.  
Macmillan and Lady Dorothy treated British journalists to drinks regularly during 
the tour from the end of the Ghana section.
90
  Worsthorne thought that most 
journalists were ‘overawed’ by the proximity to a Prime Minister that these off-the-
record chats provided and felt ‘touched’ Macmillan wanted to share his ‘private 
musings’ with them.91  These conversations may therefore have carried considerable 
weight with British journalists. 
Significantly, too, the substance of Macmillan’s private musings sometimes 
differed substantially from his public statements.  This was particularly so in relation 
to South Africa.  In public, Macmillan underscored the importance of refraining from 
comment on the ‘internal policies’ of Commonwealth member states.  In private, he 
told British journalists that he disagreed with apartheid and that he had decided to 
speak out on the issue.  This happened early on.  Throughout the tour, and in answer 
                                                          
86
 Harold Evans, Downing Street Diary: The Macmillan Years 1957-1963 (London, 1981), pp. 87-
106. 
87
 Ibid., pp. 90-1. 
88
 Ibid., p. 91. 
89
 News Chronicle, 9 January 1960, p. 2. 
90
 Worsthorne, Tricks, p. 189. 
91
 Ibid., p. 191. 
129 
 
to the issues raised by the ‘Open Letter’ published in the Observer in December, 
Sampson received repeated reassurances about Macmillan’s intention to speak on 
apartheid.
92
  At a New Year’s Eve party in Downing Street, the Prime Minister told 
the journalist that ‘he completely agreed with the letter’.93  ‘I did not believe that he 
would dare criticise Henrik Verwoerd while he was his guest’, Sampson recalled, 
‘but his private secretary, Tim Bligh, kept assuring me through the tour that the 
speech would include paragraphs which would clearly dissociate Britain from 
apartheid.  “They’re still in”, he promised me as we travelled down the continent, 
“they’re still in”’.94 
Reassurances such as these were not for Sampson’s ears alone.  On the 11th, 
papers reported that at a press conference in Accra Macmillan had hinted that he 
intended to speak to Verwoerd privately about apartheid.
95
  A week later, readers 
were told much more categorically that it was now ‘almost certain’ that Macmillan 
would speak out ‘and very firmly’ on ‘racial topics’ during his visit to South Africa, 
not only in private ‘but in public too’.96  These later reports give no indication of 
how journalists unearthed this information, which suggests that it had been revealed 
privately to the press.  Macmillan appeared to be attempting to encourage a degree of 
patience in relation to a difficult situation in which he hoped to show that his heart 
was in the right place.  His success should not be over-emphasised.  Press criticism 
of British policy towards South Africa only intensified in the days and weeks to 
follow.  Journalists were sceptical of Macmillan’s intentions, and Government policy 
remained reactive. 
The relationship between the Government and the press was fraught at times, 
and not only concerning the conflicting opinions on what it was best for Britain to do 
in Africa.  As the plans for the tour indicated, the Government’s concern extended to 
press treatment of the countries and territories visited, and in the preceding three 
years few African countries had been as berated as Ghana.  The 1960 tour was the 
first time Nkrumah had spoken to British newspapermen in twelve months, 
testament to the depth of the gulf between them.
97
  In an article on 12 January, The 
Times (of London) summed up the ‘protest at British reports’ of the tour thus far, 
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which had appeared in an editorial in the Ghana Times.
98
  The paper was said to 
have ‘roundly (condemned) certain foreign correspondents for their reporting of Mr. 
Macmillan’s visit to Ghana’ by “refusing to see anything good in any anti-imperialist 
or the country he represents”, it quoted.  British journalists’ references to the faded 
appearance of the flags and bunting lining the streets were cited as a principal point 
of contention. 
These Ghanaian narratives recalled older fears, which point to the 
continuities in the patterns of responses to coverage as well as of reporting.  As 
before, these responses must be understood within a context broader than that of 
British press perspectives or motivations.  Certainly, much of the coverage of 
Macmillan’s visit to Ghana was ‘negative’.  Yet the Ghana Times chose not to run 
with those ‘negative’ aspects which concerned the obsolescence of empire, or indeed 
the overall ‘sweep’ of British press opinion on Central and Southern African affairs.  
Journalists’ references to the faded flags appear to have been intended to 
demonstrate this very point: the changing nature of the modern world.
99
  Judging 
from the tone of the Ghana Times’s report, these omissions reflected the legacy of 
the CPP’s past relations with the British press, as well as a certain degree of 
resentment towards the Westerners’ self-proclaimed ‘right’ (as it saw it) to comment 
on newly-independent states.  The omissions may also have continued to reflect 
practical considerations, such as the CPP’s efforts to consolidate its domestic 
political popularity by vilifying or scapegoating outsiders. 
As in 1957, the British Government’s efforts to allay Ghanaian fears fell on 
deaf ears.  The day before the publication of the Ghana Times editorial, Macmillan 
distanced himself from the reports.  At a press conference on the 10
th
, when asked by 
a Ghanaian journalist whether he had had a cool welcome, the Prime Minister replied 
that ‘the truth was the exact opposite, and he could not understand how such reports 
were written’.100  The character of the subsequent Ghana Times editorial suggested 
that the relationship between the British press and Ghana continued to have its own 
dynamic independent of the actions of the British Government.   
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3. ‘Nyasaland will be free to decide’:101 The ‘Lagos statement’ and after: The 
British press as interlocutor and perceived signifier of British public opinion 
 
Events inside the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland were soon to 
demonstrate just how disruptive the same dynamic could be in territories still 
governed from Westminster.  The Federal Government’s response to British press 
treatment of the events of 3 March 1959 and their fall-out, had provided a taster of 
this.  Yet, by January 1960, the situation was more combustible because of a 
changed local context. 
Macmillan later recalled that upon setting foot in Salisbury, his first stop in 
the region, he ‘could not help being struck by the sense of uncertainty, whether 
among Europeans or Africans’.102  In the case of the former, with which the 
Government had the most dealings, the official report of the tour attributed the 
unease to ‘the year 1960, which was to see the visit of the Monckton Commission 
and the opening of the Constitutional Review Conference’.103  Yet ‘more specific 
fears’, it thought, ‘had been aroused by reports of what the Prime Minister was 
alleged to have said at a press conference in Lagos on 13
th
 January, and of a 
television interview given by Lord Shawcross’ because ‘both seemed to imply that 
the United Kingdom Government were prepared to see the break-up of the 
Federation if African opinion in the two northern protectorates so demanded’.104  
The report noted what appeared to be ‘a general lack of confidence in the intentions 
of the United Kingdom Government towards the Federation’.105  Hitherto, ministers 
in Salisbury ‘had assumed that Britain favoured its continuation’;106 yet ‘recent 
developments had caused them to wonder whether there had been some change in 
United Kingdom policy on this’.107 
The significance Federal officials attached to the Shawcross and Lagos 
comments reflected the fact that they had occurred recently and had not been 
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discussed with members of the British Government.  However, it also revealed the 
extent to which anxieties could be stimulated by the British press and publicity.  
British newspapers and television programmes appeared to be fuelling a desire for 
hard information that British officials were either unable or unwilling to provide, and 
in doing so, fuelling tensions. 
The British Government displayed considerable concern at the possible 
effects of this, particularly in relation to Lagos.  On 15 January, the CRO sent 
Macmillan a telegram in which it informed him of British press depictions.
108
  
‘Guardian 14th January under headline “Nyasaland will be free to decide”’, the 
telegram read, ‘reports you as having told Press Conference in Lagos on 13th January 
that “There was no question of forcing Nyasaland to remain in a fully independent 
Central African Federation…” Other papers have also taken your remarks as 
implying that Nyasaland will be able to choose whether or not to stay in Federation’.  
‘This puts a meaning on your words’, it continued, ‘which goes further than what has 
been said before… eventual choice that we have contemplated up to now would be 
between dependence and independence for Federation as a whole and not a choice 
for component territories whether or not to stay in Federation’.109  The telegram 
ended with a suggestion that ‘it might be well to have a form of words ready for use’ 
as ‘you will certainly be question (sic) about this as soon as you reach Salisbury’.  
The Government’s fears concerning press misrepresentation of Macmillan’s words, 
which it had done so much to try to avert during the tour’s planning stage, appeared 
now to be reaching a climax. 
The relationship between press content, the broader metropolitan political 
context to the end of empire in Africa, and the future of the Federation, to which 
Evans had alluded back in December, was also budding with first fruits.  While the 
CRO was drafting its telegram to Macmillan, members of the Opposition were 
composing a message of their own in response to press reports arriving in London.  
In a telegram received in Salisbury on the 18
th
, (and published in the Guardian), 
Callaghan and Hilary Marquand told Macmillan that they ‘(welcomed)’ his reported 
statement in Lagos ‘that when the time comes the expressed opinion of people of 
Nyassaland (sic) and Northern Rhodesia will decide whether Federation is beneficial 
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to them’.110  Press reports of Macmillan’s remarks had supplied the necessary 
ammunition for Callaghan and Marquand to re-engage the Government on the 
topical question of the northern territories’ ‘right to decide’. 
Macmillan’s initial response to the MPs’ telegram smacked of frustration and 
displayed a hint of irritation hitherto reserved for members of the British press corps.  
‘This will, I suppose require an answer’, he wrote: ‘They will just put their telegrams 
in the Press.  Both Sir NB
111
 and Mr Evans should be consulted.  Draft reply should 
be prepared’.112  Some care went into the response.  Yet Macmillan’s reaction 
conveyed a sense that this was what was to be expected from Labour.  The 
Government devoted more energy towards quelling concerns in Africa.  Macmillan’s 
reply trailed by some three or four days his discussions with Federal ministers on the 
topic as well as his main policy speech in Salisbury, in which he strove to clear up 
the confusion caused by (as he saw it) British press reporting of his words. 
In his speech, Macmillan rounded on the press, explaining that his words had 
been ‘misunderstood or misrepresented’.113  ‘I should like to take the opportunity to 
repeat the words which I actually used’, he elaborated, ‘and having some little 
experience I now go about at these conferences with a tape recording machine and I 
quote from the record as played back by the machine’.  He did so.  He also firmly 
reiterated his support for Federation.  Sacrificing amiable relations with the press, in 
this instance, appeared to be a price Macmillan felt it necessary to pay. 
British correspondents were incensed.  Evans characterised the following day 
as ‘critical’.114  Journalists ‘resented’ the Prime Minister’s reference to being 
misinterpreted, he recorded, ‘and to the necessity to travel with a tape recorder’: 
‘They accused him of quoting himself out of context and three or four of them 
waylaid me as we left the hall, “insisting” that the whole of the transcript should be 
made available to them.  But the P.M. agreed to have another off the record talk with 
them at Government House and did it beautifully’.  Macmillan had stepped in once 
again, and by all accounts British journalists were warming to him immensely.  
Evans recorded that Rene MacColl ‘now likes Mac in a big way’.115 
                                                          
110
 Callaghan and Marquand to Macmillan, received 18 January 1960, PREM 11/3066. 
111
 Sir Norman Brook. 
112
 Macmillan, handwritten note, together with the Callaghan/Marquand telegram, undated, PREM 
11/3066. 
113
 ‘Main Policy Speech’, Salisbury, 19th January 1960, CAB 129/101, pp. 120-5, p. 124. 
114
 Evans, Downing Street Diary, p. 98. 
115
 Ibid. 
134 
 
The feeling was not mutual.  British press coverage of the Central African 
section of the tour was almost entirely negative from a British Government 
perspective, as Lewis describes in her study of the Northern Rhodesian visit,
116
 and 
the strain was showing.  Journalists scrupulously documented persistent African 
nationalist protests; the discovery of four sticks of gelignite in the Savoy Hotel, 
where Macmillan was to dine; and Lady Dorothy’s fall up the steps of Britannia, 
which had resulted in a bloodied leg.
117
  Meanwhile, press commentary continued to 
push the twin themes of African nationalism and white settler intransigence in the 
face of Macmillan’s more dulcet tones.  The press consistently irritated him.  
According to Evans, in one of his speeches in Salisbury Macmillan once ‘again 
interpolated a complaining piece about the problems of doing international business 
with every word weighed by the Press and every expression on his face recorded’.118  
He planned to get some respite in Livingstone, with a trip to the Victoria Falls, 
where he hoped to keep the press at arm’s length.119 
It is difficult to determine whether or not British journalists were used as 
scapegoats by the British Government here to quell white settler anxieties 
concerning Britain’s colonial policy.  Sampson certainly thought that this was the 
case.
120
  Yet Macmillan’s irritation appears to have been genuine, suggesting that if 
he had said what journalists said he had, this had been the result more of error than 
of intention.  Equally, it is uncertain whether correspondents deliberately misread 
Macmillan’s comments for much the same reason as Callaghan and Marquand: to 
pressure the Government on its colonial policy.  The tone of their reports up to that 
moment suggests they may well have wanted to.  What is certain is that in the 
process of decolonisation, words mattered, and the future of the Federation was a 
verbal minefield of Olympic proportions.  There was ample scope for error, 
misunderstanding and intrigue in just about equal measure, and this unsettled 
Macmillan deeply. 
Yet, significantly, however much the British Government feared 
miscommunication of Macmillan’s words, for the white communities of the 
Federation, the thrust of his remarks was not in fact the focus of concern.  In many 
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ways, this mirrored white understanding of British press coverage of the events of 
1959.  Federal ministers undoubtedly felt it important that Macmillan publicly refute 
the substance of the allegations which had appeared in the press, for they were 
causing some embarrassment.
121
  Yet they generally conceded very early on that at 
Lagos the British Prime Minister had gone no further than previous British 
Government statements.  Instead, when worries were articulated, they tended to lie, 
firstly, with the attitudinal aspect to British press treatment of Lagos, or the light the 
unanimity in press reports shed on the nature of opinion in Britain; and secondly, 
with the British Government’s response - or lack thereof initially - and what this 
indicated about the character of the relationship between the Government on the one 
hand and the British press and public on the other. 
Four days elapsed between the Lagos press conference and Macmillan’s 
public refutation of the claims appearing in the press, ample time for speculation.  
The day before the speech, in a letter to A.D. Evans, the Federal Secretary for Home 
Affairs, Welensky set out his initial views.
122
  ‘I know there’s a great deal of concern 
in the country at the moment about things generally’, he wrote, ‘Macmillan’s 
statement in Nigeria hasn’t helped.  I have seen what our High Commissioner says is 
the text of what he said, and there is really nothing that one can complain too much 
about.  The sinister side of all this is the fact that no attempt was made to get the 
correct version – if the version I have been given is the correct one – across either in 
the United Kingdom or here, and I don’t like that.  I know people talk a lot.  It’s one 
of the failings of the human race, but I must say I’m a bit disturbed by the ease with 
which people talk about getting out, not only out of the two Northern Territories, but 
out of Southern Rhodesia, because things appear to be getting a little bit difficult.  It 
makes me sour’. 
The context to the Lagos press conference is important and may have 
predisposed Welensky to viewing events in this way.  British press reports of 
Macmillan’s remarks fed into debates within the white community on the recent 
perceived shift in British public opinion towards a more liberal consensus; on the 
role of British journalists in reflecting or, indeed, constituting this; and on the 
apparent susceptibility of the governing Conservative Party to one or both of these 
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pressures by the beginning of 1960.  White settlers were aware of the British public 
context to the events of 1959, including the appointment of the Monckton 
Commission, and although the British Government continually spoke out in favour 
of Federation, it also kept the Federal and colonial governments informed of the 
relevance of British metropolitan developments (amongst other factors) to future 
policy.
123
 
As we have seen, Macmillan informed the Nyasaland Government of the 
relation between public opinion and the terms of Banda’s prospective release.  
During the tour, in meetings with the Federal and Southern Rhodesian governments, 
the Prime Minister and his entourage also continued to discuss the goals of the 
Monckton Commission in the context of British opinion.  On 19 January, for 
example, Macmillan informed the Federal Cabinet that ‘The Monckton Commission 
would help to bring it home to public opinion that the concept of Federation not only 
offered material advantage but was also right and fair.’124  Shockingly, he referred to 
– limited - political advancement for Nyasaland in the context of the Government’s 
efforts to win this desired support at home.
125
  Elsewhere, British officials discussed 
the problem of the settlers in similar terms.
126
  Historians indicate that Macmillan 
feared white settlers more than Africans at this moment; and that this was due to the 
settlers’ resistance to the Government’s plans to pursue programmes of political 
advancement or to ‘move on’ from empire.127  However, the material uncovered here 
suggests that a further factor which lay behind these fears concerned the perceived 
relation between the actions of settlers and waning British public support for 
Federation.  In January 1960, Lord Home, echoing Evans’s earlier comments, 
summed up this perspective in a telegram to Macmillan in which he told him that 
‘Welensky cannot bring himself to admit that the fate of Federation lies with the 
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United Kingdom Parliament but it is a fact which he must be made to understand.’128  
‘He believes that our Government can bulldoze the next instalment of Federal 
constitution through Parliament’, Home explained, ‘and when I have told him of the 
difficult atmosphere and doubts of the younger Conservatives he has quite plainly 
thought them excuses for lack of political decision and guts.  He must be made to 
realise that the more he takes up attitudes which seem unreasonable…, the more he 
puts himself out on a limb here and our public becomes more and more doubtful as 
to whether their Government is backing the wrong horse.  I am very uneasy about 
our Parliamentary position following the 1960 Review as largely because of their 
inept public relations Southern Rhodesia and the Federation are becoming more and 
more classed with South Africa in the public mind.’ 
The settler press was an engine for the accumulation and dissemination of 
disturbing material on these sensitive issues.  At the start of the year, newspapers 
such as the Rhodesia Herald, the Bulawayo Chronicle and the Nyasaland Times 
regularly printed summaries of British press coverage of Central African affairs, 
together with information concerning individual articles’ prominence on the page.129  
Particularly worrying pieces were sometimes borrowed from British newspapers and 
re-printed in full, often drawing heated responses from readers.
130
  Debates and 
trends in British politics were also summarised.  ‘Britons need only a vote to control 
colonial destiny’, the headline to a reader’s letter in the Rhodesia Herald read on 7 
January.
131
  ‘Federation must “sell” its case in Britain’, worried another.132  ‘If the 
British Press were prepared to print all points of view, the position would be vastly 
different’, the reader thought: ‘The attitude that the European is an ogre and the 
African a downtrodden slave is so far from the truth that every aspect of our problem 
is now so distorted in the minds of the British public that we enter 1960 with nothing 
in our favour at all… I suggest that our efforts in 1960…be directed to putting over 
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the case for Federation to the man in the street in Britain.
133
  White settler 
understanding of British press, public and parliamentary opinion could be as acute a 
source of debate and concern as British policy.  Existing studies of white settler 
cultures in the Federation tend to focus on the latter as the driving force behind the 
break-up of the notion of ‘Greater Britain’.134  Yet the presence of these sorts of 
debates suggests that there was also a low political, including press, dimension 
which deserves scrutiny. 
The fears expressed in the settler press were echoed at Federal Government 
level.  At the time of the tour, the Deputy High Commissioner in London, P.F. 
Barrett, set out in some detail in a report circulated amongst members of the Federal 
Cabinet, what he perceived to be the changing nature of opinion within Britain on 
African affairs, which he felt had been so prominent a feature of 1959.
135
  Barrett 
explained that in contrast to 1958, a widespread adverse attitude in the United 
Kingdom was now one of the Federation’s major problems.  He accepted that ‘some 
in the Federation might say that the views I am repeating are those of a minority and 
that the majority of the people in Britain know nothing and care less about our 
affairs’, but warned that he ‘(did) not think that that argument has much validity 
even if it were true’. 
Barrett believed that British newspapers were playing a part in this.  By 
‘plugging’ the inevitability of the triumph of African nationalism, he wrote, the press 
was ‘doing much to mould public opinion’, thus ‘preparing the ground for the United 
Kingdom to take an easy way out of the situation by accepting this allegedly 
foregone conclusion and disbanding the Federation, or at least changing its nature’.  
The Conservative Party is ‘no longer a party professing privilege and committed to 
supporting oligarchy’, he warned, but ‘a Party of the People’, ‘far more than ever 
before conscious of the necessity to take considerable notice of the general feelings 
of the average Briton’.  British press treatment of Central African affairs was 
believed variously to have played a part in simplifying, restricting and monopolising 
representation and debate on Federation.  In this way, the press was felt to be 
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contributing to the production of a one-sided narrative that was hampering the 
British Government’s freedom of manoeuvre on the future of its Central African 
colonies.  Macmillan’s ‘Lagos statement’ and its fall-out, fed into and fuelled these 
existing fears.  Barrett believed the solution was ‘(to remove) as far as possible the 
Federation from interference by the United Kingdom’, a statement which in 
hindsight looked portentous. 
 
4. ‘Challenge him Mac!’:136 Press activism on apartheid 
 
When the British press reached South Africa, the final stop on the tour, its 
criticism of British policy toward the Union Government returned with great force.  
Journalists’ chief concern was that Macmillan’s itinerary signalled to Africans that 
Britain condoned – or worse still, endorsed – the racial policies of the South African 
Government.  The press documented the Prime Minister’s trip to a gold mine, a 
township and a ‘Bantu university’ as well as an elaborate ceremony in which he was 
invested as a Paramount Chief.
137
  Hometowns, segregated educational institutions 
and chiefdom were all essential components of the apartheid system, which, judging 
from the tone of their reports, most correspondents found archaic, sad, and 
dangerously out of kilter with modern African realities.  Sampson summed up the 
tenor of these articles when he wrote that Macmillan had been ‘paraded’ around 
apartheid institutions ‘like a living certificate of acceptability, a walking 
guarantee’:138 ‘The more Mr. Macmillan sees of the subsidised chiefs of black South 
Africa, and the more he talks about the splendour of the gold mines, the more 
Africans are anxiously speculating as to whether he will in fact be able to see the real 
African leaders’. 
British journalists knew that Macmillan had received requests for meetings 
from the ANC and other (predominantly white) liberal political parties, because 
these groups had contacted the press; and wrote that their absence from the itinerary 
had left both an informational and a moral void.  African protests, a prominent 
feature of the tour from as far back as Nigeria, had stalled.  Prior to Macmillan’s 
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arrival, the ANC had sent out an appeal to its female followers to take to the 
streets.
139
  But the Union Government had prevented them from doing so.  Some 
correspondents took it upon themselves to atone for Macmillan’s failings by 
recording these obstructions,
140
 by meeting with Africans and by documenting some 
of the ‘realities of life’ for Africans living under apartheid.141  Yet these were not 
regarded as substitutes for the actions of a Prime Minister, and press unease and 
pressure persisted. 
Macmillan and his advisers displayed considerable concern at this, primarily 
from a metropolitan perspective.  They took actions in response, first before the 
speech, and then in the text of the speech itself, continually adding modifications,
142
 
demonstrating both the perceived importance of these views and the reactive nature 
of British policy on this issue.  Yet as in the Federation, the Government placed 
limits on the lengths to which it was willing to go, creating a shortfall, within whose 
confines the role of the British press in and after Cape Town, the subject of this 
chapter’s final section, should be understood. 
The first set of actions taken in response to British opinion turned on the 
Government’s formal, active efforts to negotiate with the Union Government a less 
restrictive tour itinerary, with room to meet non-parliamentary political parties such 
as the Liberal Party, and even the ANC.  British press treatment of the South Africa 
section of the tour was not a causal factor in this.  Yet due to the timing of some of 
the Government’s overtures, it would be unwise to ignore the role played by press 
coverage of the tour as a whole.  J.B. Johnston (in London) raised the subject on 23 
January, while Macmillan was in the Federation.
143
  The Union Government had not 
consented to Macmillan’s meeting any opposition groups, including parliamentary 
parties, and Johnston was apprehensive at the possible metropolitan political 
repercussions.  ‘Though this is not strictly for us to judge’, he wrote, ‘it seems to me 
that the Prime Minister could hardly return to the United Kingdom having to admit if 
questioned that he had not seen any Opposition leaders of any kind in the Union.  
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Certainly if he had to make any such admission, it would have to be accompanied by 
an indication that this was at the strong request of the Union Government’.  United 
Party and Progressive Party meetings were subsequently scheduled in.  Yet none 
were set for non-parliamentary political parties. 
Upon reaching South Africa, Macmillan discussed the matter with Eric 
Louw, South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, initially face-to-face (though 
fruitlessly), and then in written form.  At this time, the tour party’s preoccupation 
with the metropolitan context to the South Africa segment of the journey expanded 
to include the role of British, and other, journalists.  ‘Dr. Verwoerd has kindly 
arranged for me to meet leaders of the Parliamentary Opposition Parties, which I 
very much appreciate’, Macmillan told Louw in his letter, ‘But it is generally known 
(and was mentioned in questions – which I evaded – at my Press Conference in 
Pretoria yesterday) that the Liberal Party and the A.N.C. have both said they would 
like to meet me…  I feel therefore it would be quite impossible for me to say that I 
was for my part unwilling to see them – though of course I would not see them 
without Dr. Verwoerd’s agreement…  My difficulty is that if he should feel it 
impossible to agree… I fear I should eventually have to indicate when questioned in 
Parliament or by the Press that this was the reason’.144  In ‘knowing’ and ‘making 
known’ the fact that Macmillan had received requests for meetings from the Liberal 
Party and the ANC, the press played a part in fuelling the British Government’s fear 
of being held to account at home for shortcomings in its dealings with the National 
Party and its rivals locally.  British public, including press, comment on the South 
Africa visit caused the Government to adopt a more combative stance in its dealings 
with Verwoerd than it had thought either necessary or desirable before setting off on 
the tour. 
It could be objected that the British Government’s decision to confront the 
Union Government on the itinerary also reflected an earnest desire to meet the 
groups in question, the consequence, perhaps, of a fresh ambition to engage with 
African nationalist, and other, groups opposed to apartheid – in other words, a 
genuine desire to get in step with the ‘wind of change’.  This seems unlikely.  Even 
in his most active efforts, Macmillan’s priority appears to have rested more with the 
problems inherent in his having to ‘say that I was for my part unwilling to see them’ 
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than with the lack of contact per se.
145
  There is also no evidence that the 
Government actively sought out meetings with non-parliamentary political parties.  
On this occasion, the Government’s more ‘progressive’ foray into South Africa’s 
internal politics did not therefore appear to reflect a desire to change it. 
Its efforts were instead the direct result of British public and parliamentary 
considerations, and were intended to be cosmetic rather than profound.  The Prime 
Minister’s response to the rebuffs he received from the Union Government suggested 
much the same.  His letter to Louw drew no positive response, nor did a private talk 
he had with Verwoerd.  Macmillan seemed unperturbed.  The official report of the 
tour recorded that ‘On reflection Mr. Macmillan decided that this matter was less 
important than the content of the Cape Town speech…  He thought it more 
important, from the point of view of public opinion at home, that he should be 
uncompromising about this (race relations in the Union) in his speech than that he 
should persist in seeing representatives of the African National Congress against the 
wishes of the Union Government’.146 
The second set of actions concerned the British Government’s behind-the-
scenes communications with correspondents.  Officials made unceasing efforts to 
reassure British journalists of the racial inclinations of the British Government.  
Judging from the nature of the articles published in the press (and despite their 
promises to Verwoerd), part of their strategy involved discreetly letting it be known 
that the Prime Minister was displeased with the programme the Union Government 
had organised for him.  It also involved Macmillan’s continuing to voice privately to 
the press both his disapproval of apartheid and his intention to address the subject in 
his upcoming speech.  Macmillan dampened a certain amount of personal criticism 
this way.  Yet journalists’ demands did not abate.  Indeed, they may even have 
intensified, for the Prime Minister’s words whet the press’s appetite for a defining 
moment. 
At a garden party on 2 February, three days before the end of the tour (and 
the day before the speech), Macmillan finally met some representatives of South 
African liberal opinion, including Margaret Ballinger, the President of the Liberal 
Party, and Patrick Duncan, one of its most prominent members.  Yet Duncan and 
                                                          
145
 My italics. 
146
 ‘Note on Suggested Meetings with Representatives of African National Congress and other Parties 
not Represented in Union Parliament’, CAB 129/101, pp. 150-2, p. 152.  Parenthesis and its 
contents added.  My italics. 
143 
 
Ballinger were white, and few British correspondents seemed moved by what they 
regarded as a tardy gesture.  Worsthorne described the informal encounter a ‘display’ 
‘designed to act as a consolation prize for the failure to see the representatives of 
African opinion’.147 
Much therefore rested on the speech.  It assumed a greater significance in the 
British Government’s calculations as a result of the failure either to negotiate an 
expanded tour itinerary or to badger Verwoerd successfully into taking the blame for 
a limited one.  At the same time, it figured more prominently in the minds of British 
journalists, partly because of the nature of the itinerary, too, but also because of the 
Government’s private pledges that the speech would, as Evans let slip to 
Worsthorne, ‘make history’.148 
 
5. ‘This is our faith’:149 Macmillan’s Cape Town speech: The role of the British 
press in ‘making meaning’ 
 
Of these two factors – Macmillan’s resolve to speak out decisively against 
apartheid, and British journalists’ anticipation of a momentous statement – the 
former proved perhaps the least prominent a feature of the events which followed.  
His address is usually associated with his acceptance of the strength of African 
nationalism, his expressed desire to move with the times, and his taking a definitive 
stand on the issue of apartheid.  Certainly, Macmillan spoke of ‘the strength of… 
African national consciousness’, ‘the wind of change… blowing through this 
continent’, and the need for ‘our national policies (to) take account of it’.150  He also 
commented on race.  Macmillan informed his audience that Britain ‘(rejected) the 
idea of any inherent superiority of one race over another’.  ‘As a fellow member of 
the Commonwealth’, he famously declared, ‘it is our earnest desire to give South 
Africa our support and encouragement, but I hope you won’t mind my saying frankly 
that there are some aspects of your policies which make it impossible for us to do 
this without being false to our own deep convictions about the political destinies of 
free men’.151 
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Yet, further examination of the speech suggests that Macmillan’s position 
was more vague or ambivalent than these quotations imply.  Dubow suggests that the 
speech was far more conciliatory to white South African interests than is usually 
assumed.
152
  Although Macmillan commented on apartheid, he did so indirectly, 
using the words “internal” or “national” policies, and never ‘apartheid’, an omission 
which Dubow thinks ‘softened the key message’.153  Moreover, little in the speech 
suggested that Macmillan was concerned actively to support black South Africans in 
their fight against the system.  Macmillan referred to nationalism in Africa as 
‘national consciousness’, a choice which Lewis argues was ‘likely an act of 
diminution’.154  His acknowledgment of the strength of African nationalism, Dubow 
observes, did not extend to African nationalism in South Africa other than by 
implication.
155
  Macmillan also spoke out strongly against the international boycott 
of South African goods, which he told his listeners he ‘(deprecated)’ and 
‘(deplored)’,156 but which African leaders had called for. 
The context to these, the most ‘critical’ of Macmillan’s statements, reduced 
their salience still further, for they appeared within a frame which placed primacy on 
putting differences ‘on one subject’ into a broader historical perspective.  His 
comments on race and the Union Government’s ‘policies’ were followed by a 
lengthy eulogy on friendship, the inviolability of spheres of interest, and the 
importance of cooperation and coexistence despite differences on ‘principle’.  
‘(Differences) on one subject, important though it is’, Macmillan concluded, ‘need 
not and should not impair our capacity to co-operate with one another in furthering 
the many practical interests which we share in common…  The independent nations 
of the Commonwealth do not always agree on every subject… I hope – indeed, I am 
confident – that in another 50 years we shall look back on the differences that exist 
between us now as matters of historical interest, for as time passes and one 
generation yields to another, human problems change and fade…’.157 
Importantly, British journalists tended not to highlight Macmillan’s 
ambiguity.  In fact, many went out of their way to argue that the speech signified the 
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‘end to a long period of official evasions’, and the ‘end of ambiguity’.158  Most 
journalists described the address as signifying Macmillan’s clear, principled 
denunciation of apartheid, in articles with headlines such as ‘Toast of Africans – 
Macmillan’s speech stirs a continent’;159 ‘Plain speech in Cape Town – Mr. 
Macmillan on human rights – No support for racialism – “Destinies of free men”’;160 
and ‘Britain to Africa: This is our faith’.161  Even Sampson, commenting in the 
Observer on the Sunday, hailed the speech ‘astonishing’ and a ‘milestone’.162  The 
British press, as interlocutors or mediators, had contributed to lifting a rather paltry 
attack on apartheid to a ‘higher plane’, more in keeping with the initial 
historiographical assessment of the significance of the speech prior to the re-
evaluations undertaken by Lewis and Dubow. 
Macmillan’s PR efforts had very likely played a role in this.  Yet the 
journalists involved were by no means averse to criticising the British Government, 
and, judging by the nature of their reports of the tour as a whole, they were well 
aware of Macmillan’s way with words.  At every stage, given a choice, they 
favoured adopting a sceptical stance over an approving one.  Some, like Sampson, 
also cared personally and passionately about Africa and the cause for which black 
South Africans fought.  The primary cause of the journalists’ unanimity in praise for 
the address appears to be that they evaluated it purely on the basis of the calls which 
they had made beforehand for Macmillan to make public the fact that Britain did not 
endorse South Africa’s racial policies.  This Macmillan had very largely done by 
rejecting ‘the idea of any inherent superiority of one race over another’, and by 
stating that supporting South Africa would entail Britain’s sacrificing its ‘deep 
convictions about the political destinies of free men to which in our own territories 
we are trying to give effect’.163 
Journalists’ desire for Macmillan to state Britain’s racial or moral stance 
appeared greater than any yearning for a substantive change in Anglo-South African 
relations.  Thus, the limits of the press’s vision for South Africa was also a 
significant factor, ironically, behind its lauding of Macmillan’s denunciation of 
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apartheid.  ‘Speaking out’ could be a matter of degree, and did not imply either 
action or support for the alternatives.  The priority was to give Britain a facelift in 
Africa.  British journalists wrote that the speech was for African ears.  The reality 
was that Africans were rather nonplussed.
164
  Later, thoughts turned more 
conclusively to the issue of effecting meaningful change on the ground, in papers 
other than the Herald and the Guardian, the only papers to have been critical of the 
speech from the outset.
165
  Yet in the meantime, the British press had played an 
important role in producing for mass consumption a ‘black and white’ version of a 
much ‘greyer’ speech. 
This troubled Macmillan and his advisers.  David Hunt, Under-Secretary at 
the CRO, one of the authors of the speech, later insisted that he could not understand 
why the reference to the ‘wind of change’ had received such prominent treatment.166  
‘As nobody had paid any attention to the phrase in Accra I thought I might as well 
use it again and had put it in with only a minor variation’, he recalled: ‘But I had 
certainly never imagined that it would be seized on as the key phrase of the speech, 
nor intended it to be that… the phrase in its context is morally entirely neutral.  All 
Macmillan did was to remind his hearers that certain changes were taking place in 
Africa.  It is for this reason that I have always been surprised at the vigour of the 
reaction in the newspapers’.  Hunt surmised that ‘it may have had something to do 
with the fact that the phrase went very conveniently into a headline’. 
Macmillan also later referred to it as ‘unfortunate, although perhaps 
inevitable, that the British Press singled out certain phrases like “wind of change” as 
headlines or accentuated certain passages which were likely to cause the most hostile 
comment in South Africa, without giving some of the balancing phrases and tributes 
to the history of Dutch and British alike in building up such a great structure of 
economic strength by individual effort and devotion’.167  By highlighting specific 
words and phrases, and thereby producing a distilled and partial version of a fuller 
and more measured speech, the British press contributed to frustrating the British 
Government’s attempts to adopt a more ‘middle of the road’ public policy towards 
apartheid South Africa.  The following month, in a television broadcast, Macmillan 
explained to viewers that although he had recently spoken of ‘the wind of change 
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that was blowing through Africa… that’s not the same thing as a howling tempest 
which will blow away the whole of the new developing civilization.  We must, at all 
costs, avoid that.’168 
The British press reports and editorials had a certain amount of impact inside 
South Africa, which the speech did not; mirroring the patterns of press reporting and 
its effects in Central Africa.  Dubow explains that Macmillan’s words initially 
ruffled few feathers within Nationalist circles.  Hunt recalled that during the speech 
he had witnessed ‘no reaction’ from the audience at the paragraph dealing with the 
‘wind of change’.169  Although he thought that Macmillan’s address had ‘rattled’ 
Verwoerd, he disagreed with some journalists that the South African Premier’s reply 
had been ‘poor’.170  Sampson recorded that the House had first ‘applauded’ the 
speech; that Verwoerd had then ‘politely agreed to differ’; and that in the lobby 
afterwards the MPs had been ‘enthusiastic about the oratory’: ‘they seemed flattered 
to hear South Africa involved in this great historical survey’.171  Worsthorne, too, 
witnessed no divisive fall-out.  He characterised the general feeling in the lobby 
afterwards as anti-climactic:
172
 ‘The long-awaited thunderbolt had come and gone 
and nobody felt much the worse for it’.173  ‘That Britain disapproved of apartheid 
came as no surprise.  What had caused anxiety was the fear that Britain might be 
preparing to do something about it’, he added astutely: ‘The Nationalist response in 
short was one of relief’.174 
In stark contrast to descriptions of Nationalist reactions to the speech in its 
immediate aftermath, were accounts of the response during the following few days 
and weeks.  Many believed that British press reports had contributed to this eventual 
‘coming home’.  However, this was not because of what they ‘explained’ or 
‘revealed’ of the text of the speech, as journalists at the time alluded to, rather 
derogatively.  South Africans knew that Macmillan had been critical, but they had 
also heard his reassurances.
175
  Instead, as in the Federation, the significance of 
newspaper articles lay more with what they signified of ‘general opinion’ in Britain. 
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Macmillan recalled that ‘it was not until the news came of the reception of 
the speech in Britain and throughout the world that criticism combined with a good 
deal of self-pity and resentment began to develop’,176 and commentary in some 
sections of the South African press appear to confirm this view.  An editorial in the 
Cape Times on the 5
th, entitled ‘Isolated’, characterised ‘the reactions to Mr. 
Macmillan’s speech’ as ‘almost as significant as the speech itself’: ‘Throughout the 
Western world the speech has been taken as stating the Western way of life in the 
African context’.177  The Rand Daily Mail agreed.  ‘Apart from the immediate 
impact of Mr. Macmillan’s speech…’, the editor reflected, ‘the speech has also had a 
delayed effect which may be even more profound’.178  ‘The general approval that has 
greeted Mr. Macmillan’s speech overseas’, he continued, ‘indicates that if the West 
has to choose between the good will of South Africa and that of the other African 
countries or the smaller powers of the Far East, it will be ready, however gradually, 
to turn its back on this country and its unpopular policies’. 
British press comment, in conjunction with other international responses, 
resonated to a degree that Macmillan’s speech had not.  This was because, in their 
unanimity and in their words of praise for the British Prime Minister, British 
journalists demonstrated the extent of South Africa’s isolation in ways Macmillan’s 
speech could merely describe.  The press continued to hamper the British 
Government’s efforts to maintain equable relations with the South African 
Government.  It did this by signing Britain up to a more radical stance than 
Macmillan had perhaps intended, and which became the focus of international 
acclaim, but also by fuelling fears within white South African society of British 
attitudes and intentions. 
Dubow has linked the speech to the subsequent efforts of the Union 
Government to strengthen the system of apartheid as well as to Verwoerd’s success 
in rallying support for a republic.
179
  Yet if newspaper coverage had played a role in 
amplifying the speech’s import inside South Africa, there is a possibility that it was 
not the address itself, but the British press and other responses to it, which 
contributed to the series of ‘shocks’ to follow, including the Sharpeville massacre, 
the subject of Chapter Five; the establishment of a republic; and South Africa’s 
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decision not to renew its application for Commonwealth membership.  Thus 
although the press appeared to be on the side of the Africans, and had also in a sense 
‘saved Britain’s skin’ in its depictions of Macmillan’s speech, with positive effects 
for British readers,
180
 in the long run it may inadvertently have contributed to 
worsening the situation for black South Africans. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter emphasises the British Government’s failure effectively to 
manage the rhetoric of the end of empire in Africa, particularly in its relations with 
white settler communities.  It underscores the reactionary nature of much of 
Macmillan’s language, which Lewis and Dubow have identified.  Yet, in some 
contrast to their pieces, it also argues that the Africa tour had an important role and 
impact that was not confined to Britain; and it places the British press at the heart of 
these developments. 
Throughout the tour, diversity and difference across Africa were key official 
themes.  The achievement of co-existence or ‘multi-racialism’, interdependence, 
patience, and the promotion of mutual understanding and respect through dialogue 
and through Commonwealth ties were concepts Macmillan strove to promote.  Yet 
British journalists, partly as interlocutors, partly as critics and activists, and partly as 
perceived signifiers of British public opinion, consistently frustrated the British 
Government’s ability to impose its narrative on the politics of the imperial endgame, 
with important consequences. 
Press content had implications for British policy, and, as part of this, 
contributed to damaging Britain’s relations with the governing white settler 
communities of Central and South Africa.  It also continued to ensure that British 
readers were plied with ideas compatible with the trend to decolonisation.  And not 
only that: it presented Britain as the champion of freedom, including in its own 
empire, and in some contravention of Macmillan’s statements.  Newspaper coverage 
continued to reflect more than the Government’s public relations efforts, but also 
personal, ideological and institutional factors influencing British journalists, which 
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interacted with African efforts to exploit the British presence locally as a means of 
advancing the nationalist cause.  
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Chapter 4 
‘The paladins of Fleet Street’:1 The ‘Blantyre riot’, Nyasaland, January, 
1960 
  
‘An ugly disturbance flared up here today outside a hotel where Mr. 
Macmillan lunched with the Mayor on roast pheasant flown from Scotland’.2  So 
began a report filed from Nyasaland on 26 January 1960, by Sydney Jacobson, 
political editor of the Mirror.  Jacobson was reporting on Macmillan’s visit to 
Ryall’s Hotel in Blantyre, Nyasaland, for a luncheon held in his honour.  Macmillan 
was two weeks into his famous ‘wind of change’ tour of Africa, throughout which 
the foreign press corps was a ubiquitous presence.  Earlier that day, in anticipation of 
the Prime Minister’s arrival at the hotel, a group of fifty to eighty members of the 
youth wing of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) had gathered to call for the release 
of Banda, independence for the Protectorate, and its secession from the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
3
 
The Emergency was still very much in force at the time of Macmillan’s tour, 
and African disaffection remained strong.  Indeed, the Emergency appears merely to 
have added fuel to the fire of discontent.  African displeasure was widespread and 
deep-seated and not, as Armitage surmised, the consequence of Congress 
‘agitation’.4  New leaders soon emerged; and the MCP was born.5  Crucially, too, the 
Emergency gave life to the view, if this were needed, that Federation was indeed an 
ordeal to be resisted.  Rhodesian troops played an important part in the suppression 
of African protest, which included the killing of Africans, in addition to other brutal, 
coercive practices.
6
  The strong arm of the state was omnipresent, apparently 
unimpeachable, and continually augmented.  In addition to the increased troop 
presence, the Emergency led to further expansion of the Nyasaland police force, 
which had always had a fraught relationship with the population of the protectorate.
7
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Importantly, the police had an official coercive function as an arm of government as 
opposed to being involved purely in the prevention and the detection of crime.
8
  It 
was also officered solely by Europeans. 
At the time of the tour, there had been one ‘concession’: the authorities had 
given Africans special permission to assemble.
9
  Yet banners and placards, outlawed 
during these months, remained forbidden.  African and European police officers 
stood guard outside the hotel, with further Africans, members of the European settler 
community and local and foreign correspondents looking on;
10
 a combustible crowd, 
which amounted to some 800-1000 people.
11
 
Accounts of what happened subsequently varied widely between each group.  
Yet British journalists were in striking agreement: a loud but largely peaceful 
African protest (with banners) had descended into a riot owing to the idiocy and 
brutality of a number of the European police officers present.  ‘Police blunder starts 
battle’,12 ‘Blunder at Blantyre - British police provoke riots on Macmillan visit’,13 
‘Shaming scenes at Blantyre’,14 and ‘Vicious…Violent – then came the rain’,15 were 
some of the headlines the following day. 
Prominent claims common to all or the majority of the reports were that the 
police had caused the first incident by tearing down the demonstrators’ banners and 
by making arrests;
16
 and that European police officers had used batons, canes or 
sticks on African protesters.
17
  Jacobson told Mirror readers that he saw a European 
police officer ‘repeatedly knee African youths in the groin and another officer beat 
heads with his stick’.18  Bonnett (Daily Mail) wrote that he had seen ‘a leading 
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Blantyre policeman… deliberately, time after time, stamp on women’s bare feet’.19  
Describing the moment a series of arrests of African demonstrators had been made, 
Worsthorne (Telegraph) explained that ‘European police officers… began seizing 
Africans from the crowd indiscriminately and bundling them roughly with punches 
and whip slashes, into caged lorries’.20  MacColl (Express) thought he saw the police 
deploy ‘a large Black Maria’.21  Next to their reports, the Mail, Mirror and Herald 
published a photograph of a white police officer cradling a female African 
demonstrator in his arms, apparently having fainted.  The white settler onlookers also 
drew press attention.  Worsthorne recorded that he heard a European comment: 
“Funny little monkeys aren’t they?”. 
Not all of the articles were as incriminatory, a point to which we shall return.  
Even in the left-leaning press, journalists such as Jacobson and Walter Legge, 
stringing for the Herald, had tempered the critical core of their articles with the 
observation that most of the police had behaved with ‘patience’.22  A number of the 
articles suggested that the demonstrators had been eager to court arrest.
23
  Two 
papers went much further in putting the police case.  Sharpley’s piece for the 
Evening Standard did not mention police violence or police provocation.
24
  It 
focused instead on the violence of the demonstrators, whom the journalist referred to 
as a ‘frenzied, dancing, yelling mob’.  James Bishop’s report for The Times also laid 
emphasis on the activity of the African crowd, which, the correspondent explained, 
had ‘set up a prolonged growling cry’ and had engaged in activities explicitly 
designed to provoke the police, such as ‘knocking off policemen’s caps’.25  The 
Times and the Telegraph published photos not of the collapsed African lady, but of 
the demonstration itself. 
The reports reached Britain the following morning, where they immediately 
became the focus of discussion in Parliament.  Jo Grimond, the leader of the Liberal 
Party, asked the Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod, to consider holding an impartial 
inquiry.
26
  Newspapers soon made similar calls.  On the 28
th
, the Mirror published an 
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editorial calling on Macmillan and Macleod to end the ‘police state’ in the 
Protectorate, a reference to Devlin’s assessment of the state of colonial Nyasaland 
just six months previously.
27
  Also on the 28
th
, in an article flanked by three faceless 
silhouettes with question marks where their features should have been, the Herald 
demanded that the British Government ‘name’ the guilty officers, ‘prosecute them’, 
and ‘appoint an impartial tribunal to inquire into the Nyasaland police at once’.28  
Herald readers learned of a ‘challenge’ their paper had sent to Armitage, to this 
effect.
29
  The Mail had also contacted the Governor, this time by telephone, calling 
for an inquiry.
30
 
On 2 February, Macleod told the Commons that an inquiry was to be set up.
31
  
In view of the seriousness of the allegations made, he added, he had ‘felt it desirable 
not to rely on the ordinary Departmental form of inquiry’.  It was to be impartial.  
Callaghan responded with rare words of praise.  ‘Is the right hon. Gentleman aware’, 
he congratulated the Colonial Secretary, ‘of the striking contrast this is to the attitude 
of his predecessor, who, in relation to a much more serious matter at Hola, when 11 
Africans lost their lives, appointed only a Departmental inquiry into the 
circumstances?’32  Hola had been the subject of intense parliamentary debate the 
year before.  It was now Blantyre’s turn.  The Opposition had asked, and they had 
received.  Parliamentary criticism subsided. 
Yet this was by no means the full story.  Nor was it the end.  Ten of the 
correspondents involved flew back to Blantyre in the days which followed to be 
questioned by a High Court judge. 
This chapter pursues and develops those arguments of the preceding chapter 
which concern British press treatment of the Federation, British journalists’ main 
preoccupation in Africa during these months and years.  The particular event which 
it focuses on, which became known as ‘the Blantyre riot’, has not been analysed in 
any depth in any histories of decolonisation or nationalism.  Yet it provides an 
important prism through which we might gain further insight not only into the role of 
the British press at the end of empire, but also into more of the neglected 
characteristics of the decolonisation process at large, as Chapters One to Three have 
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begun to set out.  Here, therefore, in this chapter’s discussion of ‘the Blantyre riot’, 
the opportunity is taken not only to corroborate more fully and to develop the 
arguments of Chapter Three concerning the nature, effects of and effects on British 
press coverage of the Federation; but also explicitly to foreground this thesis’s 
subsidiary or underlying core arguments concerning further neglected aspects of 
decolonisation, which this study of the role of British newspaper coverage of Africa 
brings to light.  It draws on the same sources as the previous chapter. 
Concerning the first goal, it continues to emphasise the theme of African 
action, together with the press’s very negative depictions of white settler society.  It 
discusses the presence, even prominence, of the theme of colonial brutality, but is 
careful to contextualise and critically to assess its relevance and role.  It continues to 
underscore the multifarious nature of influences on coverage, emphasising in this 
instance the role of Africans in exploiting the British press’s local presence.  It also 
examines the continued impact of British press coverage on white settler 
communities, the power of the press in its relations with the British Government, the 
significance of its coverage to African nationalists, and its possible implications for 
British readerships.  It continues to describe the effects of coverage in terms of a 
wider nexus of perceptions and interactions, which included British parliamentary 
proceedings, specific sets of historical concerns, and assumptions regarding the 
relationship of British press content to British public opinion, and of either or both of 
these to British policy. 
In relation to the second goal, to foreground this thesis’s core subsidiary non-
press-related running themes, the chapter makes five points.  One centres on the 
significance of ordinary people and publics to developments.  A second concerns the 
sense of contingency, which, it suggests, suffused each moment.  The chapter 
therefore moves away from the themes of momentum, of planning and of 
inevitability, which often characterise the grand narratives of the experience of 
decolonisation.  A third theme concerns the British Government’s handling of the 
business of decolonisation, which it suggests was not always slick, but messy at 
times, ironical and sometimes amusing to behold.  A fourth theme turns on the view 
that African action might be repositioned at the heart of imperial histories or of 
histories of Britain’s experience of decolonisation in Africa, and also of the very 
process.  Press coverage of Africa over this period is useful in reminding us that at 
most, if not all, important moments the actions of Africans were pivotal, and that the 
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African ‘collective’ was omnipresent in British minds.  A fifth neglected 
characteristic, which runs throughout this chapter, centres on the critical significance 
of ‘imaginaries’, such as perceptions, image, hopes and fears, to historical actors 
caught up in this momentous, life-changing process.  This thesis’s focus on 
mediation brings to the fore the moments at which words and actions were ‘lost in 
translation’, why and with what effect. 
 
1. Fear and loathing in Central Africa: White settler responses to British press 
treatment of Blantyre 
 
For the white communities of the Federation, Macleod’s decision to call an 
inquiry was an anathema.  Yet these white groups directed their anger not towards 
the organisers of the demonstration, the Malawi Youth League (MYL); or indeed the 
colonial police; but rather, British journalists.  It seems that adopting this focus 
provided a useful means by which those sections of white society resistant to change 
avoided having to confront more discomforting issues, such as African agency, 
African discontent, and police brutality.  Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that the 
settlers’ focus was conscious or insincere.  White society had normalised racial rule, 
preferred to think of itself as benevolent; and, as part of Armitage’s reasoning for 
declaring the Emergency indicated, even government policy operated on the basis 
that African grievances were un-organic and imposed or cultivated by politicians and 
outsiders.  As we have seen, it also had good reason to monitor British public 
opinion. 
By the time of Macleod’s announcement on the 2nd, tensions were running 
high as a result of what was thought to be extreme British press distortion of the 
incident.  The settler press was again at the forefront of efforts to assemble and 
disseminate the disturbing news to its white readership.  ‘Wild’ was the word the 
Rhodesia Herald chose to describe the reaction of Blantyre’s white community two 
days after the press reports emerged: ‘In every hotel, shop and pub in the town the 
British Press is being condemned’.33  On the 2nd, in an article entitled ‘Blantyre is 
seething at Fleet Street’, the Nyasaland Times summed up the response from within 
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Blantyre’s European community.34  According to the writer, ‘Hundreds of 
photographs, both still and cine’, of the scene outside Ryall’s Hotel had been brought 
to the Nyasaland police ‘to counter accusations of provocation and brutality made by 
sections of the British Press, the Liberal and the Labour Parties’.  Eye-witness 
accounts of the scene had been sent to the Nyasaland police.  The Settlers and 
Residents of Nyasaland Association had sent the Federal Minister of Home Affairs a 
letter of complaint in which it had suggested that ‘when Press reports alleging police 
brutality can be laid at the door of any individual, he should be declared a prohibited 
immigrant’.  This letter had also been sent to the Governor of Nyasaland, the 
Colonial Secretary and press unions.
35
  In addition, the Nyasaland Times had itself 
received letters from concerned members of the European public, many of which it 
published in full or quoted form. 
Concern was not confined to Nyasaland.  In Salisbury, the Rhodesia Herald 
printed five photographs of a set of twenty-four of the incident taken by one of its 
correspondents, which appeared conclusively to refute the substance of the majority 
of the claims appearing in the British press.
36
  MacColl was pictured in one, 
watching the action, hand on hip, apparently sipping a gin and tonic.
37
  This image 
was subsequently sent to the Colonial Office, together with photos of the large 
African crowd heckling the police, either flanked by orderly lines of African police 
officers or wrestling, seemingly good-humouredly, with European ones.
38
  A Federal 
Film Unit captured the demonstration on camera.  Its pictures were used at the 
subsequent inquiry, reinforcing the message conveyed by the Rhodesia Herald 
photographer.
39
 
Politicians also took action.  On 5 February, the Nyasaland Times printed a 
letter its editor had received from two MPs, John Stratton (Limbe), and Frank 
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Collins (Blantyre), which they had also sent to Roy Welensky,
40
 and which 
described the steps that they were taking.
41
  These included writing to the Minister of 
External Affairs, asking him first ‘to request our High Commissioner in London to 
write to the British newspapers which have published untruthful reports drawing 
their attention to the true facts of the case and asking them to publish a retraction’; 
and second, ‘to make an official, international protest to the Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom about H.M. Secretary of State for the Colonies referring in the 
House of Commons to the incidents in Blantyre as a “riot”’.  ‘We regret the length of 
this letter’, it ended, ‘but we consider the matter to be one which may have 
repercussions affecting the future of the Federation as a whole and Nyasaland in 
particular.  We will not stand idly by while the future of our country is prejudiced by 
sensational falsehoods’. 
The general consensus in settler responses to British press treatment of the 
incident was that British journalists had been wrong to accuse the Nyasaland police 
of brutality.  They were thought to have misrepresented what had occurred.  And not 
only this.  As the editor of the Nyasaland Times put it, British correspondents had 
apparently done so wilfully, ‘disregarding facts for the sake of getting a story’.42  Yet 
there was also a further dimension, which recalled settler responses to ‘the Lagos 
statement’.  This featured in the letter from Stratton and Collins, and concerned the 
character of the relationship between the British press, the British Government and 
the future of the Federation.  The fact that Macleod had responded so swiftly to press 
claims deemed highly dubious, fuelled a sense of anxiety within the white 
community about the nature of Britain’s colonial policy and the apparent power of 
the press to push the Government in a direction it had not intended.  Just days before, 
in Salisbury, if we recall, Macmillan had defended the Federation in soaring terms.
43
 
Stratton and Collins were not the only ones to suspect that something was up 
– even before the inquiry had been called.  The Nyasaland Times also condemned 
‘the apparent readiness of the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Macleod, to accept the 
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malicious reports printed in some British newspapers’.44  ‘That he has called for a 
report at all’, the paper explained, ‘tends to discredit Nyasaland in the eyes of the 
world and gives ammunition to those who have proved themselves the ruthless 
enemies of all the law-abiding people of Nyasaland stand for’.45  A concerned reader 
wrote into the paper at the start of February to suggest that ‘in the light of recent 
events, one must seriously ask: Does the Daily Paper Rule Britannia’?46 
In a manner consistent with the fall-out following ‘the Lagos statement’, the 
white settler responses to the Blantyre incident possessed an historical significance 
broader than that of the immediate chain of events, feeding off, as well as fuelling, 
existing patterns of thought and behaviour characteristic of that group’s experience 
of the decolonisation process.  As we saw in Chapter Three, British press coverage 
of specific local events acquired an amplified significance in settler minds because it 
connected with their pre-existing fears concerning the nature of British public 
opinion, the role of the press in reflecting and/or constituting this, and the growing 
susceptibility of the governing Conservative Party to one or both of these pressures. 
There was also a cultural dimension to settler responses which deserves 
scrutiny.  On an intrinsic level, British newspaper articles informed white settler 
narratives of ‘self’ and ‘community’.  In other words, they provided material with 
which these groups defined what it was to be a white African in 1960.  Again, 
previous studies have focused on the role of British policy in informing these sorts of 
‘national’ narratives.47  Yet the British low political or ‘popular’ dimension to policy 
was also important.  Judging from the tone of settler responses to British press 
treatment of Blantyre, these narratives represented a backlash to their belief that the 
British public regarded white society as cruel-hearted, away with the fairies, and 
very, very foreign.  That there was an element of truth to journalists’ descriptions did 
not matter much.  Again, white society had normalised racial rule.  The British 
popular press, moreover, alienated potential allies by over-generalising, describing 
white society in blanket terms; and rarely, if ever, displaying an appreciation of 
white settlers’ historical circumstances, opting instead to attribute their faults to evil 
machinations.  Press content fuelled the fear and anxiety which is understood, in 
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many ways, to underlie or to define white settler cultures.
48
  Yet simultaneously, and 
rather paradoxically, it reinforced an image of settler society as supremely confident 
and in control. 
Importantly, too, as we shall see in the following chapter, and in a manner 
which recalls British press treatment of independent Ghana, British journalists 
lacked a full awareness of the nature of Britain’s colonial involvement in Central 
Africa, which aggravated relations.
49
  In most cases, this inaccuracy turned on the 
starkness or simplicity of the press’s ‘goodie’ (British)/‘baddie’ (settler) narrative.  
Yet it would be possible to cite numerous additional examples of similarly unhelpful 
representations, such as the well-intentioned argument that it was now time for the 
world to move on from empire, because this displayed no cognizance of how hard 
such a move would be for those who had settled in parts of it (in Britain’s name, 
moreover).  Such depictions proved beneficial for British readers’ understanding of 
the decolonisation process, but in Africa they generated a lot of resentment. 
The siege mentality which is said to have informed the decision of Southern 
Rhodesia’s white leadership to declare independence from Britain unilaterally in 
1965 was born of a sense of its people’s historical exclusivity, British Government 
policy, and the rise of African nationalism.
50
  Yet settler responses to British press 
treatment of the 1959 Emergency, Lagos and then Blantyre, to name three critical 
events, indicate that it would be unwise to neglect the possible additional 
significance of British press and public, as distinct from British Government, 
engagement with white settler groupings over the longue durée.  These interactions 
formed the stuff of everyday experience.  Unlike politicians, journalists did not 
mince their words.  They may thus have drummed down deeper into the psyches of 
those affected.  It is possible that the Rhodesia Herald, being supportive of ‘the old 
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Establishment’,51 also intentionally exacerbated the situation by disseminating the 
worst kinds of British press narratives.  However, the significance of this last point 
should not be overstated.  British press narratives were critical, often very personal 
and very rude, and white settlers also voiced their concerns privately. 
On a more general level, case studies such as this, then, can also begin to give 
us fresh insight into some of the neglected characteristics or dynamics of the 
decolonisation process.  For the white settler communities of Central Africa, as for 
many of the other groups examined here, the end of empire was not experienced as a 
high-level political affair, but was one in which the day-to-day actions of ordinary 
people and publics were just as important.  It is a point worth stating that even in a 
grand, global historical process such as European decolonisation, which might in 
some regions of the world be tracked back to the end of the nineteenth-century, 
futures were not conceived of as pre-ordained, even in 1960.
52
  Nor was 
decolonisation experienced as revolving solely around official Government 
committees, commissions and reports.  Historical actors approached the future 
piecemeal, often at the level of the community, with hopes and fears attached to each 
event, and thus it was considered necessary to engage at each moment, as African 
nationalists and settlers did in the case of Blantyre. 
Much imperial historiography, with its emphasis on the internal Government 
reports of 1959 and changes in policy from the autumn in particular, might lead us to 
infer that the work of the British press merely provided a means by which settlers 
‘came to know’ a progressive British colonial policy sooner than the British 
Government had planned.  Yet as this thesis has already tried to suggest, we might 
question the extent of the Government’s progressiveness at the start of 1960.  All the 
evidence cited here suggests that when it came to the Federation, British journalists 
were not merely observing and documenting events, but also contributing to 
outcomes. 
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2. The British press, British public opinion, and British policy 
 
i. Factors influencing the calling of an inquiry 
 
In the case of Blantyre, settler suspicions regarding the nature of the 
relationship between the British press and the British Government proved hugely 
accurate.  Parliament had played a crucial intermediary role in bringing pressure to 
bear, as it had over the duration of the tour as a whole. 
The British Government had received reports from Nyasaland from as early 
as 28
 
January, the day following the initial discussions in Parliament, which 
suggested that the press had grossly exaggerated what had occurred.  These included 
an official report, which Armitage had sent to the Colonial Office Press Section,
53
 
details of a preliminary police report,
54
 and a summary of the events of the 26
th
, also 
from Armitage, addressed to Brook, who was with the Prime Minister in South 
Africa.
55
  Yet the Government leant towards holding an inquiry even at this very 
early stage.  The reason given was that relying on a Governor’s report ‘wouldn’t 
begin to satisfy the House or the Country’.56  On the 28th, Macleod cabled Armitage 
to explain his predicament.  ‘I shall do everything possible to keep this incident in its 
proper proportions despite press exaggeration and political heat which has been 
generated’, he told the Governor:57 ‘I shall, however, have to satisfy the House about 
the police action generally.  There will undoubtedly be demand for general inquiry, 
which I shall resist; but I doubt if I shall be able to restrain the criticism unless I can 
say that some formal enquiry is to be undertaken’.  Even after he had received 
further information from the Governor, together with a plea not to prejudge the issue 
or to act prematurely,
58
 Macleod remained convinced of the need to hold an inquiry 
and began to prepare for an announcement to this effect.  British public and 
parliamentary opinion was perceived as acute and in many ways irresistible. 
Macleod set out his views most extensively on 1 February, the day before his 
announcement to Parliament that an inquiry was to be held, in a telegram to 
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Armitage in which he informed him of his final decision.  The perceived state of 
metropolitan opinion again featured heavily in this, as did Macleod’s acceptance that 
events in Blantyre had been exaggerated by the British press.  ‘I fully understand 
your reactions’, he wrote, ‘and I agree that B.B.C. film of this incident, which I have 
seen in full, confirms that press accounts of the demonstration were grossly 
exaggerated.  These reports have however given rise to a good deal of anxiety…  In 
view of opinion here, and the publication by the press of the names of your Police 
Officers involved in the incident, I am sure that normal departmental inquiry will not 
suffice to dispel public anxiety or to clear the names of those Police Officers who 
have been mentioned.  I have, therefore, concluded that an independent Inquiry must 
be carried out by a Judge in Nyasaland.’59 
Macleod’s telegram underscored the importance he placed on satisfying 
British public and parliamentary opinion on the events in Blantyre as characterised 
and relayed by the British press.  The decision to hold an inquiry did not appear to 
reflect the fact either that he believed the press accounts of brutality on the one hand 
or that he disbelieved the Governor’s defence on the other.  Nor did it seem to reflect 
any explicit recognition of the power and justness of the protestors’ cause or a 
concern for their welfare.  Adverse press and parliamentary comment seemed reason 
enough to act. 
Its power was likely born of more than that moment alone, mirroring the 
pattern of settler responses.  Press comment had been sorely critical, and almost 
unanimously so, but it had not been extensive.  Before the decision to call an inquiry, 
there had only been one set of questions tabled in Parliament.
60
  The experiences of 
1959, and memories of the role that British press and parliamentary pressure had 
played at that time, following the deaths of a total of over 60 Africans at the hands of 
the colonial authorities at Hola in Kenya and in Nyasaland, likely loomed large in 
officials’ minds.  The subject of police or colonial brutality was very much an open 
sore, even if, at that time, in the case of the British press, as we will recall, there had 
been a certain disjuncture at moments between Government perceptions of press 
content and the nature of newspaper articles, particularly concerning Britain or 
British responsibility.  In the parliamentary discussion on Blantyre on the 2
nd
, 
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Callaghan had mentioned Hola,
61
 and one of his colleagues had cheekily suggested 
that Devlin could be suitable to head the Blantyre inquiry.
62
  The Mirror had also 
mentioned the ‘Devlin Inquiry’ on the 28th, as had the Herald in its editorial, to 
which it had added a reference to ‘the Hola Camp scandal in Kenya’. 
It is therefore likely that memories of the events of 1959, as refracted through 
the British press and Parliament, played a part in the Colonial Secretary’s swift 
response to British press reports and parliamentary pressure on Blantyre.  Yet, again, 
this is not to suggest that the Colonial Office was, by early 1960, firmly in the 
driving seat in its relations with the British press and Parliament, or that Macleod’s 
decision to call an inquiry was merely a symptom of the British Government’s 
changed African or colonial policy by February 1960.  Firstly, Macleod’s worries 
appeared to be both real and acute.  Secondly, as we have seen, the press and 
Parliament had a long history of exerting pressure on the British Government on 
Central African affairs, some of which had previously informed policy, so there was 
also a history of relations and of a current of power, which should not be ignored.  
Thirdly, mirroring the previous section’s argument concerning the contingency of 
settler actions, we should remember that the future of the Federation was still very 
much undecided.  We now know that the Monckton Commission, which reported in 
October of that year, was the key surface factor which paved the way for the 
dissolution of the Federation.  Yet although the nature of the Commission’s findings 
may well have been predicted in early 1960, they were not known, and Government 
officials behaved accordingly. 
 
ii. The nature of the correspondence between the British press and the 
Colonial Office concerning the inquiry, February-May, 1960 
 
In the two months which followed, the nature of the correspondence between 
the Colonial Office and British newspapers further reflected the extent of press 
power.  CO responses recalled Macmillan’s irritation during the tour.  Press 
influence found expression in the Colonial Office’s desire to please and placate. 
Armitage was not with the Colonial Office on this.  He was extremely 
unhappy with Macleod’s decision to call an inquiry.  ‘I note that you consider an 
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enquiry by a judge is unavoidable’, he informed the Colonial Secretary rather curtly 
on 2 February: ‘I presume you have so decided from press statements and 
photographs so far not seen by me’.63  ‘No local and specific complaints’ had been 
made against the Nyasaland police, he reminded Macleod the following day.
64
  ‘Only 
persons known to have made critical allegations to date have been representatives of 
the press through the medium of their papers and Orton Chirwa’, the acting leader of 
the MCP.  Yet Chirwa had failed to contact the Commissioner of Police or the 
Attorney-General with a statement committed to writing.  Vera Chirwa, Orton 
Chirwa’s wife, has claimed that her husband had secretly supported the actions of the 
Youth League in assembling outside the Hotel.
65
  However, the historiographical 
consensus appears to be that he had not, in fact, sanctioned this activity,
66
 hence, 
perhaps, his reluctance to become involved in pressing specific allegations. 
It was as a consequence of this dearth of ‘local and specific complaints’ that 
Armitage was keen to secure the presence at the inquiry of British journalists and 
others who had made allegations of brutalities.
67
  Armitage asked for the assistance 
of the Colonial Office in securing their presence.
68
  In pushing this matter, he was 
likely responding to a desire within the Federation to take the British press on, once 
the decision to call an inquiry had been made.  Macleod entrusted the appointment of 
a suitable local judge to Armitage, who soon selected Frederick Southworth,
69
 a man 
the Governor had probably gauged as sympathetic to colonial perspectives.  
Southworth had had vast experience of colonial law and order enforcement, 
including from within government, in violent regions such as India during the 
Second World War, Palestine during partition; and then Tanganyika and the 
Bahamas, where he had been Acting Governor during 1952.
70
  Even at the time a 
possible inquiry was being mooted by the Colonial Office, Armitage had noted in his 
diary that if it were to go ahead, ‘we would hope people would show up the conduct 
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of certain sections of the British press’,71 and the appointment of Southworth was 
probably part of his strategy, followed by the assembling of press representatives. 
Armitage may also have had personal reasons for wishing to confront press 
representatives head-on.  He was certainly on the defensive in his relations with both 
the Colonial Office and the British public, following stints as Governor of Cyprus as 
well as of Nyasaland, both during Emergencies.  Left-leaning British newspapers 
and members of the Labour and Liberal Parties had heavily criticised his police force 
the year before in the wake of the declaration of the emergency in Nyasaland, a 
judge had dubbed the protectorate over which he presided a ‘police state’, and on the 
Left, this term had entered common, including press, parlance by the end of the 
summer of 1959.  Armitage, together with Welensky, had borne the brunt of British 
public and political ire at that time.  The thought that British journalists might pillory 
colonial Nyasaland once more, this time without anyone having been seriously hurt, 
and then escape with the goods, was too much for Armitage.  The Prime Minister’s 
visit appears to have been an occasion when ‘the public deliberately exercised 
restraint in permitting persons to assemble and to remain assembled although a 
breach of Emergency Regulation 44 was being permitted’ - particularly 
aggravating.
72
 
The Colonial Office immediately appeared more cautious.  There was 
certainly no love lost between it and Armitage, a Governor whom it did not hold in 
great esteem.  It agreed that ‘all newspapers represented, and Reuters, should be 
invited to make their correspondents available’, although it did take a week to 
communicate this to Armitage.
73
  It also undertook to effect this by contacting the 
press directly.  Yet it was not optimistic about the prospect of receiving replies, 
suggesting that some within the Colonial Office may have been accustomed to 
playing second fiddle to the press:  ‘Our feeling is that only some of those invited 
will respond’, it told Armitage.74  It felt, too, that ‘it may be necessary to offer to pay 
travelling and subsistence expenses’ out of Nyasaland public funds,75 a request to 
which Armitage subsequently agreed. 
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The decision to meet journalists’ travel expenses further reflected the extent 
of press power.  For Armitage, the concern was that if the British press did not 
participate in the inquiry, the Nyasaland Government would never be able effectively 
to refute the allegations levelled at its police force, and British press representations 
of events in Blantyre would live on.  That he was willing to meet journalists’ travel 
costs is testament to the importance he placed on challenging these representations.  
In proposing that journalists’ travel expenses be met, the Colonial Office on the other 
hand, was likely motivated by a desire to forestall parliamentary criticism on the 
matter, given the nature of the discussion on 2 February, when ministers had raised 
the matter of the inquiry’s taking evidence from ‘valuable witnesses to these 
incidents who are no longer in Nyasaland’.76  It may also have hoped to pre-empt 
newspapers’ concerns and demands, given the level of concern and irritation the 
British press party had caused Macmillan during the tour, as well as its specific 
composition, which included political editors and other such influential 
correspondents.
77
 
The mustering of the journalists would not be all plain sailing.  On 16 
February, Sir Hilton Poynton, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office, 
sent letters to the editors of the relevant papers requesting the attendance at the 
inquiry of the relevant journalists.
78
  Yet not before a good deal of correspondence, 
telephone calls, and rescheduling, was the presence of all except Fraser Wighton of 
Reuters secured.
79
  On 17 February, Doon Campbell, Reuters’ News Manager, 
informed the Colonial Office that Wighton was ‘at present a victim of acute 
muscular rheumatism’, which made it unwise for him to travel.80  Reuters may have 
been a dangerous place to work because by the 24
th
 of February, he was also 
reported to have ‘a spinal injury’.81 
Travel to Africa in 1960 was undoubtedly more difficult and expensive than 
it is today.  Yet if some organisational difficulties were to be expected, what may not 
have been so easily predicted was the extent to which the concessions needed to 
reach consensus came almost solely from the Colonial Office side.  The Evening 
Standard initially refused to send its correspondent, Anne Sharpley.  Percy Elland, 
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the Standard’s Managing Director, told Poynton that it was ‘impracticable’ for 
Sharpley to go out to Blantyre ‘in the near future’.82  The decision to adjourn the 
inquiry temporarily and to provide the newspaper with a specific date on which she 
would be required to testify appeared to enable her to travel out.
83
  Two of the 
biggest papers, The Times and the Telegraph, agreed to send their correspondents, 
Bishop and Worsthorne respectively, but were concerned to take the Government up 
on its offer of financial assistance.  In the case of The Times, financial help was a 
condition of Bishop’s travelling out.84  Worsthorne was apparently on an ‘important 
mission of enquiry’ in South Africa when the Telegraph received Poynton’s letter, 
but the editor, Colin Coote, was ‘quite ready’ that his correspondent should stop off 
in Nyasaland on the way home in early March.
85
  The date was apparently non-
negotiable.  Worsthorne’s appearance at the inquiry was subsequently also facilitated 
by the decision to extend the duration of the Commission.
86
 
Left-leaning popular papers had the strongest sets of demands, and did on 
occasion adopt a highly combative tone, which betrayed a history of tension and 
grievance.  Pointed requests concerned the issue of legal representation and the costs 
thereof.  The Herald, possibly spooked by Roy Welensky’s on-going libel case 
against it for the highly personal piece it had published on the Federal Premier on 4 
March 1959 in which it had referred to the leader as ‘this high-handed son of an 
Afrikaner mother’,87 immediately judged it necessary to secure legal representation 
for its correspondent, Walter Legge, a freelancer based in Salisbury.
88
  It asked the 
Colonial Office if the cost of flying out ‘a member of the English Bar’ would be 
borne by the Nyasaland Government.
89
  Armitage communicated that it would not.
90
  
In addition, the Herald was angry that it had not been given ample time to secure 
representation at the inquiry’s opening.  Poynton’s original letter of invitation had 
been sent on 16 February.  The inquiry opened on the 17
th.  ‘Had the Inquiry opening 
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been of a formal nature this would not have been a matter for concern’, it told the 
Colonial Office on the 18
th, ‘but since…the hearings on the 17th and 18th have been 
extensive and have allowed our name, along with those of other newspapers, to be 
called into question by the Solicitor-General without any possibility of a rejoinder by 
our representative, you will appreciate…that a very different complexion could be 
placed upon the matter’.91 
The News Chronicle had similar concerns.  It made its decision to find legal 
representation for its correspondent, Stephen Barber, ‘in view of the tone of the 
opening of the Inquiry’.92  It had had to find 400 guineas to do so and it was not best 
pleased.  ‘We feel this is a penalty for which we should not have been liable’, the 
paper complained in a letter to the Colonial Office.
93
  Someone, presumably from 
that department, underlined the word ‘penalty’, and annotated it with a question 
mark.  The nature of the correspondence between the Colonial Office and the 
representatives of the different papers exhibits a certain nervousness and 
responsiveness on the Colonial Office side, and on the press side, a certain sense of 
entitlement and, on occasion, a combativeness, which were important characteristics 
of the nature of the relationship between the British press and the British 
Government more generally during this period. 
 
iii. Factors guiding the British Government’s handling of the Commission’s 
findings 
 
a. The findings 
 
That the British press had power in its dealings with the British Government 
is further suggested by the Government’s nervy response to the damning findings of 
the inquiry, published in May (1960).  These were damaging from the perspective of 
the British press.  Southworth not only cleared the Nyasaland police of brutalities, 
but also heavily criticised British correspondents for distorting events.  He revealed 
that the ‘batons’ had been swagger sticks,94 the ‘boots’, walking shoes,95 and the 
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‘Black Marias’, a Landrover and a three-ton Bedford truck.96  Southworth concluded 
that the European police officers had not caused the first incident by tearing down 
the demonstrators’ banners, but that the tearing down of the banners had represented 
a response to the crowd’s ‘worsening behaviour’, which he attributed partly to the 
press presence itself.
97
  Concerning the manner in which some of the arrests were 
said to have been made, Southworth concluded that they had been sought after and 
that most of those who had been taken away had voluntarily stepped into the police 
vehicles.
98
  He also determined that the two police officers who were alleged to have 
used force, had acted with ‘forbearance’ and ‘restraint’, and had also been under 
intense provocation from the crowd.
99
 
The inquiry revealed that some of the demonstrators had shouted in the faces 
of the police, while others had jeered, or had deliberately defied police instructions 
by attempting to push through the police cordon, some successfully.
100
  The 
protestors had illegally displayed approximately 50 banners, emblazoned with 
provocative slogans such as “To hell with Zomba government” and “No confidence 
in Monckton”.101  The pictures taken by the Rhodesia Herald photographer depict a 
defiant group of young people intent on making their presence known and their 
voices heard.
102
  That paper likely hoped that revealing the extent of the pressure the 
police were under exonerated those of their actions the press had cast aspersions on, 
and Southworth seemed to be in agreement. 
Yet their other, unintended effect, and thus also the Commission’s, was that 
they illustrated the strength of the African nationalist challenge to colonial authority, 
in keeping with the intentions of some of the demonstrators; and, as this thesis would 
like to suggest, a further neglected dynamic of the decolonisation process.  The 
defiant actions or, in the language of the journalists, ‘frenzy’ of the demonstrators 
had been a key feature of a number of the British press reports, albeit not the one that 
was headlined or taken up by politicians or newspapers in their comment or 
campaigning columns.  This reflected the character of the demonstration, and thus 
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some of the motivations of the Africans who participated.  Thandika Mkandawire, 
one of the protestors, later argued that a significant consequence of the incident was 
that it ‘blew the myth of peaceful natives’, which white society had long-pedalled 
and of which Mkandawire kindly and cleverly suggested Britain was none the wiser, 
a factor which he thinks ‘helped inform’ Macmillan’s ‘Wind of Change’ speech.103  
Disregarding the instructions of the police or ‘taking them on’ may have been part of 
the demonstrators’ strategy from the outset, although the behaviour of particular 
officers appears also to have been important in the escalation of tensions from the 
moment at which they began to tear down the demonstrators’ banners.  The long 
history of hostility and friction between the African population of Nyasaland and the 
colonial police must also have informed events.
104
 
As the demonstration progressed, there is evidence to suggest that Africans 
exploited the foreign, including British, press presence to amplify their cause.  One 
witness told the Commission that ‘Every time a (camera) bulb went off, there were 
more shouts and demonstrations’.105  Mkandawire later told the Commission that 
‘they wanted the gentlemen of the press to “tell the world” about them’.106  The 
demonstrators appear not to have set out with the explicit intention of goading the 
police into engaging in violent acts in order to provoke international criticism on this 
specific matter.  This is where the British press’s mediation of events was critical.  
Yet it cannot be ruled out as a possible goal present in some of the protestors’ minds, 
particularly as events unfolded, and it is important to stress that the colonial violence 
the press recorded stemmed at any rate largely from African efforts to illustrate the 
depth of the chasm between white and black, as Mkandawire has alluded to, and 
which amounted to a similar thing.  Some of the newspaper reports of the 
demonstration had had African action at their very core, even if in much of the 
remainder of this story the African dimension was almost wholly eclipsed because of 
further features of that content; the ways in which some features more than others 
interlocked with the most pressing concerns of powerful groups; the nature of British 
parliamentary and editorial comment on the event; and Southworth’s approach, 
which, strikingly, dismissed African interpretations almost out of hand, at the same 
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time as privileging the agency of Europeans, particularly members of the British 
press corps, whom he almost undeniably set out to denigrate. 
Nevertheless, it seemed that the press had sensationalised or manipulated 
events to a degree.  The rather innocuous photo of the police officer cradling an 
African demonstrator in his arms after having fainted,
107
 for example, was edited and 
cut in papers such as the Herald in such a way as to eliminate all bystanders, 
including press representatives;
108
 and was positioned near leading phrases such as 
‘ugliest day of Macmillan’s tour’ and in the context of reports emphasising police 
brutality.
109
  Moreover, even if we accept that there had been much violence, papers 
such as the Mail and Express, had not, over the years, always been as sympathetic to 
African perspectives or as critical of colonial police force action. 
The indictment was stinging.  It was also highly personal.  In the section of 
the report which dealt with ‘the Value of the Testimony of the Representatives of the 
Press’, Southworth took it upon himself to describe their personalities.  Bonnett 
(Mail) and Sharpley (Standard) escaped fairly lightly by being referred to as 
emotional and impulsive, respectively.
110
  Skinner (Reynold’s News), Barber 
(Chronicle), and Fairlie (Mail) came out of it the worst.  Southworth thought that 
‘when deposing to his testimony, Mr. Skinner conveyed the impression that though 
he was present at the scene in the capacity of a newspaper correspondent he used his 
powers of observation to singularly little effect’.111  ‘Lardy-dardy’ was the word he 
used to describe Barber, who, he thought, had ‘a gift for the fine phrase which, when 
you get down to examine it, means very little’.112  Fairlie, ‘aggressively self-
confident and opinionated’, apparently ‘conveyed a compelling impression that his 
observation of what he saw on this occasion was coloured by preconception and 
predisposition; and his perception of events appeared defective’.113 
Overall, Southworth was highly dismissive of the British journalists’ 
perspectives, at which he poked fun by citing Aesop and stories of myth and legend 
from ancient Greece.  The parallel was clinched by the experience of the toe of one 
of the female protestors, Emmah Phombeya, which had, according to Bonnett been 
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trampled on intentionally by a member of the Nyasaland police force, but whose 
injuries the commissioner concluded (after examining the toe in court) were of a 
‘trivial character’.114  ‘As far as can be ascertained’, Southworth wrote approaching 
the end of his report, ‘the amount of skin lost by both police and demonstrators as a 
result of injuries received on this occasion would hardly cover an area of one square 
inch, probably no more than the area of a penny postage stamp… Contemplating the 
measure of the injuries sustained by the demonstrators, one cannot avoid the 
reflection that when the face of Helen launched a thousand ships, and brought 
Agamemnon and the great Achilles to the shores of Phrygia, it hardly achieved as 
much as Miss Phombeya’s toe when it brought the paladins of Fleet Street in the 
aerial argosies of our day across two continents to appear before your Commissioner 
in the remote highlands of middle Africa’.115 
Southworth attributed British press ‘fabrication’ to a range of factors, 
including journalists’ sloppiness or ineptitude,116 personal idiosyncrasies,117 a 
tendency to ‘over-write’,118 an over-reliance on the opinions or testimony of 
colleagues,
119
 and an inclination to ‘elide’ fact and comment in line with what he 
concluded were journalists’ preconceptions of and predispositions towards: the 
European police in Nyasaland, the use of force, and most particularly, the use of 
force by the European police in Nyasaland.
120
  The centrality of this last point to 
Southworth’s conclusions again points to the significance of the legacy of 1959 in 
informing the chain of events; in this case, not only the content of the news reports, 
but also the ways in which those news reports were approached by members of 
colonial society, of which the Judge was one. 
Southworth concluded that Bonnett was ‘clearly a very emotional 
man…somewhat highly sensitive about the use of force’,121 that Legge had ‘some 
impulse to judge the police hardly when they made use of force’,122 and that 
Jacobson, too, had ‘some inclination to react against any use of force by 
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authority’.123  Southworth thought that Worsthorne had ‘perhaps something of an 
aesthete’s dislike for the obvious vulgarity of violence, and might therefore have 
been inclined to overstate a little the measure of the violence that he saw’.124  Fairlie, 
who had not written a report, but had apparently influenced his colleague Bonnett’s 
reading of the scene, was also criticised by the judge, who cited Fairlie’s testimony 
in court to the effect that ‘in the Federation there is a too easy attitude on the part of 
the European police to the use of force’ and that ‘one must look at the action taken 
by the police in Blantyre against the background of that attitude’.125  ‘He made it 
clear’, Southworth explained, ‘that his notion of the attitude of the police in the 
Federation was formed before he came to Nyasaland’.126 
Whether ‘misrepresentation’ in this regard had been wilful or inadvertent, it 
was part testament both to the increasingly ‘liberal’ nature of the British press 
consensus on empire and independence by early 1960, which so concerned the white 
settler communities of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as well as to the gulf that now 
existed between British journalists’ conceptions of what acceptable levels of force 
were, and the views of much of the white settler community of Nyasaland, including 
its police officers.  That articles written by journalists such as MacColl, Fairlie and 
Worsthorne, who tended to be right-wing in their views, were critical of the 
Nyasaland police supports this view.  Yet, as Southworth’s conclusions point to, this 
was not purely a case of journalists’ reflecting a contemporary profusion of left-wing 
sentiment. 
What appeared, and was received by others, as a ‘liberal’ consensus that was 
anti-settler and pro-African, was also the product of personal, institutional and 
experiential factors affecting individual journalists’ and papers’ production of reports 
as well as a recognition on their part, powered by pragmatism more than anything 
else, that independence was where the future, and thus Britain’s best interests, lay.  
As we have seen, British press content embodied a fusion of many ideas, interests 
and stimuli, and as such represented an important and independent driving force for 
change on Central African affairs that was bound up with those shifts in metropolitan 
opinion, but was also partly distinct. 
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During this period, and for a number of practical, editorial and ideological 
reasons, the themes of African action, including violence, and African nationalism, 
dominated the columns of British papers, particularly from the beginning of 1959, 
following African rioting across Central Africa, in the Congo as well as in 
Nyasaland.  By early 1960, these themes were prevalent in editorial comment, too.  
Most British papers portrayed decolonisation as favourable and/or inevitable in the 
context of a rising ‘tide’ of nationalism, were increasingly united on the form it 
should take (unconditional African majority rule) and were progressively more 
disdainful of white minority efforts, particularly in Central Africa, to resist this 
process, attempts which they tended to portray as mad, archaic, immoral, 
impracticable and, most often, dangerous.  This press unanimity on the subject of 
settlers and nationalism suggests that a campaigning element, born of long-standing 
observations and interactions, influenced British journalists’ treatment of the 
demonstration in Blantyre, a consensus which was also inextricably linked to the 
local initiatives of Africans in preceding months and years. 
The press’s focus on colonial brutality in this case should not therefore be 
taken to suggest that this constituted its primary preoccupation at the end of empire, 
or indeed on this occasion either.  It is only by fully contextualising coverage of this 
event, and by examining the profusion of specific, motivating influences which 
resulted in the foregrounding of the issue of brutality in this instance that it is 
possible correctly to pinpoint journalists’ main focus, which was African action, and 
Britain’s global role. 
Editorial comment on Blantyre had not been extensive.  Nevertheless, the 
Herald editorial on the 28
th
 had alluded to the perceived centrality of Africa and the 
Africans when it called on the British Government to ‘name’ the guilty men.  ‘The 
brutal, barbarous, bullying attitude of mind must be kicked out of our colonial 
administration’, it had declared: ‘From Kenya to Nyasaland, we have had enough of 
it.  This is the sort of thing that wrecks our relations with Africa.  Need we be 
astonished that hatred boils up in the hearts of friendly coloured folk when 
boneheads are let loose to knock them around with batons?’127 
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b. The Government’s response 
 
Ministers and officials in London received advance copies of the report in the 
second week of May, and were initially unsure how best to respond.  They appeared 
not to have anticipated the degree to which Southworth would censure the British 
press.  In all probability, this was because they had taken care to frame the terms of 
reference of the Commission around the specific issue of the conduct of the police.
128
  
Armitage was the first to relay the content, before copies of the report arrived in 
London.  He was glad that his police officers had been ‘fully exonerated’.129  He was 
puzzled by the reference to the face of Helen.  He also warned the Colonial Office 
that Southworth had taken ‘a rather involved approach’ and had criticised individual 
journalists. 
On 11
 
May, after the report had arrived in London, O.H. Morris, Head of the 
Information Department at the Colonial Office, sent a telegram to Harold Evans in 
which he conveyed Macleod’s intention to seek the Chancellor’s advice on 
publication in Britain, and in which he also set out his personal views on the possible 
press reaction.
130
  Morris thought that the Herald came out the worst, together with 
Reynold’s News, but his ‘hunch’ was that they would ‘lie pretty low’.  The ‘critical 
question’ for him was the line the Mail and the Telegraph would adopt ‘in view of 
the criticisms of Mr. Fairlie and Mr. Worsthorne’.  Evans also anticipated a mixed 
reaction.  He told Morris the following day that Southworth’s assessments of 
individual journalists ‘(rang) true’, and that ‘this will be recognised by Fleet 
Street’;131 yet he also expressed the opinion that ‘the Commissioner’s approach is 
indeed somewhat involved and this might well be a point of comment and it may 
also be questioned whether it was really necessary to delve with such zest into 
assessments of the character and temperament of each of the reporters’.  With its 
references to Achilles, Aesop and Hamlet, parts of Southworth’s report read more 
like a book of proverbs than an impartial, judicial analysis of the events of the 26
th
.  
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Southworth had been a journalist,
132
 and in later years wished to return to the 
profession, applying to Worsthorne for a job at the Sunday Telegraph.
133
 
During the following week, the British Government took a number of 
decisions that were intended to reduce the possible fall-out from Fleet Street and 
Parliament on the report of the inquiry which they had set up to placate them.  The 
irony of these actions should not pass without comment, because it reveals a further 
neglected dynamic of the decolonisation process, which Lewis and Darwin have 
identified,
134
 and which is that it was sometimes rather a mess.  To these actions we 
might add further examples, such as the British Government’s willingness to pay the 
travel expenses of up to ten journalists to travel to Africa to defend or advance 
claims it believed were wholly inaccurate; the surprising extent of the Government’s 
inability to retain control of Britain’s relations with white Africa in the face of 
British journalists’ efforts to muscle in; the inclusion of references to Greek legend, 
Aesop’s fables and Shakespeare in an official Nyasaland Government report; and the 
judge’s subsequent choice of a return to a career in journalism to which end he later 
contacted one of the defendants he had found guilty of professional misconduct. 
Again, the actions the Government took did not appear to reflect the power 
and justness of the protestors’ cause, doubts surrounding police innocence, a more 
progressive colonial policy, or indeed, Southworth’s bias, except as it concerned 
British journalists.  While the Government chose not to attempt to restrict the 
circulation of the report ‘because of the references to the United Kingdom press’ or 
to select a publication date, such as a Friday, ‘on the grounds that it would minimise 
press comment’, both were possibilities freely discussed in a meeting at the House of 
Commons on 12 May, chaired by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and at 
which Morris and Evans were present.
135
  At the meeting and in further 
correspondence during that week, decisions were reached that were intended to 
prevent adverse press criticism.  These included the decision by the Colonial Office, 
in conjunction with Armitage, to refrain from issuing anything more than a formal 
Governor’s communique with the report when they released it.  This judgement 
followed from Macleod’s intimation that the reaction of the press to the report ‘could 
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be critical because they are criticised’.136  ‘I am inclined to think it will be best to let 
it speak for itself’, he told Armitage on the 10th in response to his reference to a 
possible communique.
137
 
British officials also deemed it wise to follow normal procedure for the 
publication and distribution of a report within Britain, and specifically, to avoid 
‘elevating’ it by printing it as a Command or White Paper.  This was in line with 
Macleod’s initial gut feeling, although he did seek advice.138  Morris felt that ‘the 
possibility of any considerable interest in the newspapers would be increased if 
publication were as a Command Paper… From the point of view of the Government 
of Nyasaland it would be sufficient, I think, for the report to speak for itself in an 
unobtrusive way, and I am sure that we should not want positively to seek 
publicity’.139  Evans agreed: ‘I would not elevate the report into a Command Paper 
but deal with it as a Nyasaland Government Report’.140  Those who tried to 
anticipate the parliamentary response came to much the same conclusion.  The men 
present at the meeting on the 12
th
 discussed the possibility that the Opposition might 
seek a debate on the report, in which case it should be published as a White Paper, 
but that ‘the Government should not… take the initiative in publication as a White 
Paper, since this would invite a debate’.141 
Finally, it was judged prudent to reiterate the original terms of reference of 
the commission and to emphasise its exoneration of the Nyasaland police rather than 
the references to the British press, not only in the Government’s summaries sent to 
overseas posts;
142
 but also in Macleod’s statement to the Commons upon publication.  
This statement took written as opposed to oral form, a further attempt perhaps to 
divert attention away from the findings.  ‘As the House will recall from my 
statement of 2
nd
 February’, Macleod wrote on 24 May, ‘the Commission was 
established primarily because of the allegations made against individual members of 
the Nyasaland Police after the incident at Blantyre on 26
th
 January.  I made it clear in 
                                                          
136
 Macleod to Armitage, 10 May 1960, fol. 128, CO 1015/2240.  For the trail on this, also see CO 
1015/2240: Armitage to Macleod, 4 May 1960, fol. 126; and Armitage to Macleod, 12 May 1960, 
fol. 132. 
137
 Macleod to Armitage, 10 May 1960, fol. 128, CO 1015/2240. 
138
 Ibid.  Morris to Evans, 11 May 1960, fol. 154, CO 1015/2240. 
139
 Morris to Evans, 11 May 1960, fol. 154, CO 1015/2240. 
140
 Evans to Morris, 12 May 1960, fol. 155, CO 1015/2240. 
141
 ‘Note of a Meeting at the House of Commons on Thursday the 12th of May, 1960 to discuss the 
publication of the Report of the Southworth Commission on a disturbance in Blantyre, Nyasaland, 
on 26
th
 January, 1960’, 13 May 1960, fol. 133, CO 1015/2240. 
142
 Ibid. 
185 
 
my original statement that I did not accept the allegations made against the Police 
and I am glad that the Inquiry confirms that they handled the situation calmly and 
efficiently’.143  Following receipt of the report, the Colonial Office therefore did 
everything short of direct manipulation to minimise the impact of Southworth’s 
findings with the sole aim of avoiding adverse British press and parliamentary 
comment on the matter. 
Complimentary copies of the report were posted to the relevant papers, in 
line with normal procedure, to which a number of the editors responded with letters 
of thanks.
144
  Bishop and Worsthorne claimed their travel expenses.
145
  Nyasaland 
public funds were debited accordingly.  There were no apparent repercussions for the 
British press, and no apologies, despite the fact that the report had amounted to an 
indictment of the institution.  There was also no perceivable effect on subsequent 
newspaper coverage of Central African affairs in line with Southworth’s implied 
suggestions.  Most British papers either criticised Southworth’s findings, or managed 
to extract from the report positive references to their own correspondents as well as 
information with which to lambast their competitors. 
In Britain, the storm would soon blow over, if indeed it had not done so 
already.  For the white communities of the Federation, however, it was rapidly 
brewing.  This would have implications for the foreign press presence in the weeks 
and months to follow.  On 18 June, Armitage informed the Colonial Office that two 
of his police officers were seeking permission to start proceedings for libel.
146
  
Christopher Munnion later commented that ‘the proven distortion and exaggeration 
of foreign correspondents’ was to linger in Central Africa, and ‘grow into rancorous 
loathing of journalists in the dramatic events soon to unfold’.147  Though never one 
to understate the situation, in this case Munnion may well have been right.  His 
colleague Worsthorne recalled that during the inquiry some reporters had been 
‘chucked out of Blantyre’s only decent bar’.148  ‘Than which’, the young journalist 
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observed, ‘there could be no greater mark of disfavour or indeed, for a foreign 
correspondent, sterner punishment’. 
More significant were the effects within African nationalist circles.  Joey 
Power explains that the League of Malawi Youth attracted more and more members 
as a result of Southworth’s inquiry because the proceedings had raised the 
organisation’s profile.149 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has pursued and developed those of the preceding chapter’s 
arguments which concern the nature and role of British press coverage of the 
Federation.  It has continued to highlight the presence of the theme of African action 
in newspaper coverage, together with the press’s very negative depictions of white 
settler society.  In this instance, colonial brutality was also an important theme, but 
as the analysis has tried to show, its presence should not be taken as a reflection of 
the British press’s primary focus at the end of empire, or indeed on this occasion 
either.  It has also continued to underscore the multifarious nature of influences on 
coverage, emphasising in this case the role of Africans in exploiting the British 
press’s local presence.  Additionally, it has continued to examine the important 
effects of British press coverage on white settler communities, the power of the press 
in its relations with the British Government, the significance of British newspaper 
articles to African nationalists, and their possible implications for British 
readerships.  In most cases, it has continued to describe the effects of coverage in 
terms of a wider nexus of observations and interactions, which included British 
parliamentary proceedings, specific sets of historical concerns, and assumptions 
regarding the relationship between British press content, British public opinion, and 
British colonial policy. 
It has also attempted to foreground some of this thesis’s underlying core 
arguments concerning the light its analysis of the role of the press can shed on 
further neglected characteristics of the decolonisation process.  Core themes include 
ordinary people and publics, contingency, muddle (and farce), African action, and 
the imaginary.  In particular, it has tried to make the point that British press coverage 
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of Africa over this period is useful in reminding us that at most, if not all, important 
moments African activism was pivotal, and that the African ‘collective’ was 
uppermost in British minds. 
Perhaps no better illustration of the significance of African action, and the 
ubiquity of Africans in British journalists’ imaginations, came than during the weeks 
following the Sharpeville massacre, an event which is usually framed in terms of 
white colonial action and violence, and which forms the subject of the following 
chapter.  
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Chapter 5 
African action at Sharpeville, and the intervention conundrum: South 
Africa, 1960 
 
 On Monday 21 March 1960, in Sharpeville, Vereeniging, an African 
township on the outskirts of Johannesburg, the South African police shot dead 69 
people and wounded 180 others who had congregated outside the local police station 
demanding arrest for contravention of the pass laws.
1
  In Langa, a township just 
outside Cape Town, a similar demonstration took place.  There, a further three 
protesters were killed by the police, and 50 wounded in day-long clashes between the 
security forces and African residents.
2
  Those who had assembled in both locations 
were responding to a public announcement sent out four days earlier by Robert 
Sobukwe, the President of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), for a nationwide day 
of action against the pass system.
3
  The PAC’s immediate aim was to achieve 
abolition of the pass laws and a minimum wage of £35 a month.
4
  Sobukwe’s longer-
term vision was of a campaign of ‘positive action’.5  He believed the pass protests 
would spark this off.  The ultimate aim was majority rule. The goal was 1963.
6
  Yet 
South Africa would have to wait another thirty years before this was achieved, with 
the accession of Nelson Mandela, the country’s first democratically elected leader 
(and an ANC man),
7
 to the Presidency in 1994. 
Despite the absence of political change in 1960, Sharpeville is generally 
regarded as a turning point in South African history.  It is said to have heralded an 
era of increased internal state repression, as apartheid laws were toughened and 
extended and the authorities cracked down more ruthlessly than ever before on most 
forms of dissent or defiance.
8
  It is also thought to have ushered in a new era in 
                                                          
1
 Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (Harlow, 1983), p. 210. 
2
 James Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century: A Political History – In Search of a Nation 
State (Oxford, 1999), p. 165. 
3
 Tom Lodge, Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and its Consequences (Oxford, 2011), p. 71.  
Passes restricted a person’s freedom of movement and their place of residence.  They also stated a 
person’s ethnic identity and other personal details.  It was illegal for an African not to carry his 
pass.  From 1956, this law also applied to African women. 
4
 Ibid., pp. 61-2. 
5
 Ibid. p. 62. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 African National Congress.  Led by Albert Luthuli at this time. 
8
 Nigel Worden, The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy (Chichester, 
2012), pp. 116-9; Barber, South Africa, pp. 165-6; Deborah Posel, The Making of Apartheid: 
192 
 
Africa’s liberation wars.9  Both the PAC and the ANC were stripped of many of their 
leaders, pushed underground and into exile, and those of their members who until 
then had opposed the use of violence as a strategy either on moral or on practical 
grounds, confronted by an increasingly ruthless and repressive state began to see it as 
a potentially valid and practical component of the struggle. 
Sharpeville is also regarded as a pivotal moment in South Africa’s relations 
with the outside world.
10
  The international significance given Sharpeville in the 
historiography tends to focus on the protests and demonstrations which peppered the 
globe in the days that followed, the rising fortunes of the global anti-apartheid 
movement, and for the first time substantive action at the level of high politics, with 
the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution deploring the racial policies of the 
South African Government.
11
 
International media, including British press, treatment of the massacre is 
thought to have been central to these developments, by fuelling a wave of global 
indignation against apartheid.  Prominent claims in the existing literature indicate 
that the media did this by portraying Africans as passive victims, by depicting the 
South African police and the apartheid state as brutal and repressive, and by sorely 
and unanimously condemning the system and practice of apartheid, which, as a result 
of Sharpeville, the media is said to have begun to criticise both on moral and on 
practical grounds.
12
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The most extensive study of international press treatment of Sharpeville, a 
chapter in Håkan Thörn’s Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil 
Society, is the only work to make some additional and contrasting observations such 
as on the presence in some papers of references to African violence and extremism;
13
 
and ‘certain silences’, such as the absence of comment on the desirability of full 
democracy.
14
  Yet their full significance is not explored.  Thörn makes many of the 
more common aforementioned points as well, and, taken as a whole, his discussion 
emphasises the growth of the anti-apartheid movement.  He does not draw out the 
possible significance of references to African violence for the overall role of British 
press treatment of Sharpeville, beyond the claim that, when viewed in conjunction 
with the actions of ‘moderates’, these references ‘provided a possibility to express 
support for one section of the anti-apartheid movement (the ANC), while at the same 
time repudiating those activists perceived as too militant (the PAC), thus threatening 
to disrupt the social order’.15  On the subject of silences, Thörn goes no further than 
to suggest that this reflected ‘tacit assumptions on the limits of change in South 
Africa’.16 
This chapter reassesses the nature and role of British press treatment of 
Sharpeville.  It extends the range of sources beyond those of existing studies to 
include a broader variety of newspapers, both popular and serious, left- and right-
leaning.  Additional archival sources, which have not been examined before in 
relation to media treatment of Sharpeville, include British Government and 
parliamentary records; the memoirs of journalists and politicians; the records of the 
South African Government; documentary material relating to the PAC and the South 
African Liberal Party; correspondence with Peter Younghusband, and an interview 
with Stanley Uys, both South African journalists who contributed articles to British 
papers during these weeks. 
The chapter diverges from the existing literature in three broad respects.  The 
first of these concerns the nature of press content.  The chapter agrees that the press 
criticised the South African Government and the system of apartheid strongly during 
these weeks.  Yet it argues that newspapers portrayed Sharpeville and the events 
which followed it as a story of African action, power and violence just as much as, if 
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not more than, African victimhood, and that the portrayal and the criticism were 
fundamentally interlinked.  The chapter also suggests that the press displayed 
ambiguity on the subject of direct responsibility for the deaths, and a lack of 
consensus, particularly initially, on appropriate international, including British, 
responses to the issue of white violence. 
The second broad divergence concerns the factors which influenced 
coverage.  The chapter foregrounds the significance of the actions of Africans; the 
British press’s core narratological frame for Central and Southern Africa by 1960, 
which turned on the relation between African (as opposed to white) action, violence 
and opinion and the necessity of decolonisation; and the British press’s close ties to 
South African English-language newspapers.  It also discusses the significance of the 
difficulties journalists experienced in covering unexpected events, and the limits of 
the British press’s vision for South Africa, referred to in Chapter Three on the tour. 
The third main difference concerns the effects of coverage, which, the 
chapter argues, were felt more keenly in South Africa than in Britain.  In Britain, 
press content may even have encouraged restraint or passivity; the apparent 
incongruity explained by the fact that different groups responded to different features 
of press content. 
The chapter argues that press coverage proved largely beneficial for the 
British Government during these weeks.  Yet it also continues to discuss some of the 
ways in which British newspaper articles inhibited the achievement of some British 
policy goals.  From a South African perspective, journalists’ views continued to 
belie the myth of Commonwealth solidarity, mirroring the cases of Ghana and the 
Federation.
17
  British press content also continued to foment division locally, in 
Africa, in this case by circulating opposition views in the context of stringent internal 
censorship; and thereby fuelling some of the fear and the anger which found 
expression in the Government’s further curtailment of press and other freedoms.  
British newspaper coverage continued to have more positive implications for British 
readers, partly because of the extent to which editors held British ideals up against 
the white racialism of the Afrikaner state, but mainly due to their characterisation of 
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Anglo-South African relations.  As elsewhere in Africa, the British press distanced 
Britain from its colonial past. 
 
1. Police violence, African violence, and Sharpeville as ‘storm signal’: Initial 
British press treatment of the massacre 
 
 The massacre at Sharpeville featured prominently in all British papers the 
day following the shootings.  The overall theme was death and violence.  The 
general tone was reproving.  Yet the news reports from the field were not moralising 
or straightforward, and it would have been difficult for readers to know with whom 
to identify.  On the African side, photos were given a lot of page space, and would 
have induced some horror and sympathy.  One picture appeared in all of the papers, 
showing African bodies lying on the road and on a grass verge outside the police 
station.
18
  Clothes and belongings were strewn across the ground, and the earth 
appeared to be discoloured by the blood of those who had died. 
The photos had been taken by Ian Berry,
19
 a photographer at Drum, who had 
been involved in putting together a special feature on the PAC.  Drum was one of 
only two publications with correspondents on the spot at the time of the shootings.
20
  
The other had been the Rand Daily Mail, a liberal, anti-government daily, which was 
also present by virtue of its correspondents’ links to African nationalists.21  Tom 
Hopkinson, Drum’s British-born editor, recalled that within a few hours of the 
shootings he had received five cables from overseas papers for photos, and that the 
Daily Mirror had also rung him up at home late that night.
22
  Hopkinson was well-
known in London, and contacts likely persisted.  During the forties, he had been the 
editor of London’s Picture Post.23  He had also worked as features editor of the News 
Chronicle, and had reviewed novels for the Observer.
24
  These links, between the 
British and South African English-language presses on the one hand, and the South 
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African English-language press and African nationalist organisations on the other, 
remained important to the production of coverage in the days and weeks to follow. 
Through the size, positioning and nature of quotes and other captions, police 
brutality was tentatively pushed as a theme, particularly in the left-leaning popular 
press, whose coverage of Sharpeville mirrored its treatment of white violence in 
Nyasaland.  Next to the photos of the bodies, three of the papers (the Herald, Mirror 
and Mail) chose to position a quote from Colonel Pienaar, the area police 
commander, to the effect that Africans “must learn the hard way”.25  All of the 
papers described the weaponry of the State as displayed at Sharpeville: rifles, light 
machine guns, armoured cars, Sabre jets, and Sten guns.
26
  The pass laws were 
mentioned in all of the reports.
27
  An African was quoted as saying the shootings had 
been unprovoked.
28
  Articles in the popular press were impassioned and sympathetic. 
Yet the news reports blurred the issue of direct responsibility for the deaths 
by putting the police case as well.  Articles laid as much emphasis on African 
violence as on Afrikaner, describing those who had died as having been involved in 
a ‘riot’.29  Most articles referred to the crowd as a ‘mob’, whose numbers were in the 
region of 12,000-20,000.
30
  Readers were told that the police had searched the bodies 
of the dead for ‘concealed weapons’,31 that the demonstrators had thrown stones at 
the police,
32
 and that most were members of an ‘extremist’ or ‘militant’ group (the 
PAC).
33
  These depictions were not confined to right-leaning papers.  The Herald 
article referred to African ‘riots’, of ‘the crowds (stoning) the police and (refusing) to 
disperse’, of telephone wires being ‘cut’, and of the ‘mob’ ‘(stoning) the station’.34 
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Readers learned that journalists had also been attacked.  The PAC’s relations 
with certain sections of the press evidently only went so far, and can be characterised 
as volatile at a mass level.  Although these assaults had occurred in Cape Town, not 
Sharpeville, reports were sometimes fused in such a way as to blur that distinction, 
as in the News Chronicle, whose article on Langa appeared under the large 
‘Sharpeville’ headline, reinforcing the image of African violence at Sharpeville.  The 
paper explained that two people from the Cape Times had ‘narrowly escaped death at 
the hands of the mob’, and that their driver had been ‘strangled by African rioters, 
his body mutilated, then soaked in petrol and set alight’.35  The word ‘battlefield’ 
featured prominently in many of the news reports and in some of the headlines that 
day, implying a fight; in other words, violence on both sides. 
Editorials reinforced the view that the prime responsibility for the deaths lay 
at the door of the state.  Yet on neither Left nor Right did editors debate the issue of 
who attacked whom in this instance.  Rather, they chose to present social relations 
within South Africa as a whole as being of an inherently volatile and explosive 
character, something which Sharpeville brought to the fore.  Fear of future, incipient 
African violence was a prominent ideological undercurrent informing the press’s 
representations, and recalled existing press narratives on Federation and the 
necessity of decolonisation.
36
 
On the Left, in an editorial entitled ‘The Awful Warning’, the Mirror told its 
readers that the deaths ‘lie grimly at the door of the people who wilfully deny the 
wind of change’.37  ‘Unless the South African Government sweeps away its 
abominable race laws’, the paper warned, ‘horrors like this will happen again.  
Yesterday’s tragedy could be the beginning of the revolt in South Africa’.38  The 
News Chronicle’s editorial, ‘Carnage’, warned its readers that Sharpeville ‘shows 
how close South Africa is to explosion… It can only be a matter of time before there 
are more bloody outbreaks’.39  The more conservative Times deployed the same 
combustible imagery, arguing that ‘an explosive state of affairs will continue and 
may well get worse unless the implications of the pass law system are squarely 
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faced’.40  The Telegraph reminded its readers that ‘Such a wind of change as Mr. 
Macmillan found blowing through Africa is not the same thing… as “a howling 
tempest to blow away the whole of the new developing civilisation.”  But, as to-
day’s news from the Rand too aptly illustrates, the ever-present danger is that the one 
may turn into the other’.41 
 
2. British press content, Labour pressure, and Government obduracy 
 
 The initial press treatment of the massacre had less of a transformative 
impact in Britain than previous studies have either suggested or assumed.  This is not 
to suggest that there was no public outcry; merely, that the outcry appeared not to be 
inspired by the coverage (beyond, possibly, the photos).  Indeed, the comment-based 
features of coverage may even have played a small consoling or constraining role.  
None of the editorials on the 22
nd
 commented on what they thought Britain or the 
British Government should do in response to news of the massacre.  The Telegraph 
was the only paper to remark on British action.  Yet it chose to concentrate on what 
it thought had been unhelpful to date: the British boycott of South African goods.
42
  
The press did not place the Government under editorial pressure the day following 
the shootings, as it had in the case of Nyasaland, therefore, permitting it greater 
freedom to operate as it saw fit.  Added to the dearth of comment on British policy 
was the initial ambiguity most papers displayed on the subject of direct 
responsibility for the shootings, which may also have inspired or enabled constraint. 
In Parliament, the Labour Party subjected the Government to immediate 
pressure.  Yet in doing so, it did not draw on news reports directly as it had in the 
case of the Federation.  The day following the shootings, a group of Labour back-
benchers tabled a motion challenging the Government to denounce the actions of the 
South African authorities.
43
  Gaitskell appealed to the Government to sponsor or 
contribute to a fund to help the dependents of those who had died, and later, when 
faced with Government obduracy on the motion, called on it at the very least to 
express ‘regret’ at what had happened. 
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The Government proved immovable on all fronts.  Cuthbert Alport, speaking 
on its behalf, was evasive on the issue of regret, stating that ‘civil commotion at any 
time and in any part of the world is always to be regretted’.44  On the subject of 
money for dependants, he suggested that people who took part in riots were in ‘a 
different position’ from those injured or killed while at work, an allusion to the fund 
set up to support the dependents of those who had died in the Coalbrook mining 
disaster.
45
  This doggedness reflected, first and foremost, the fact that in the case of 
South Africa the Government had its eyes and interests fixed on places other than the 
British public sphere.  Macmillan’s approach appears to have been to weather the 
storm, whilst concentrating on the issues he deemed most important: principally 
‘how to deal with the matter in the United Nations without leading to a break up of 
the Commonwealth into two opposing groups’.46  Yet the absence of editorial 
pressure from British newspapers may have helped to soothe his mind. 
The press began to speak out the following day.  Some editorials mirrored the 
sentiments of Labour MPs, in the manner of the reporting of Kenya and Nyasaland.  
Yet on the whole, opinions within, as well as between, different sections of the press 
diverged, pointing to a lesser interdependence in the case of South Africa, and 
contributing to an overall image of British public disunity on the subject.  
Notwithstanding the press’s general disapproval of apartheid, this may have 
continued to play a consoling role in relation to the Government’s sustained 
reticence. 
The News Chronicle wanted the British Government to express sympathy for 
the victims of the massacre or ‘(endanger) the gains made for British influence in 
Africa by Mr Macmillan’s tour’.47  The Herald thought the solution might lie with 
the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, who were due to meet, and who the paper 
hoped would ‘ram into (Verwoerd’s) head the need to change policies that wreck 
every principle on which the Commonwealth can exist’.48  It also wanted the British 
Government to speak up,
49
 and called for a national demonstration in the form of two 
minutes silence throughout the country in mourning for the men and women 
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‘butchered by Verwoerd’s police’ or ‘a silent demonstration in the streets when this 
man sets foot in Britain’. 
In contrast, the Telegraph thought that Sharpeville ‘makes all the more 
welcome Dr. Verwoerd’s announcement that… he intends to be present at the 
forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London’.50  The paper 
was critical of the boycotters,
51
 of the demonstrations outside South Africa House 
and of the ‘shrill interpolations of Mr. Gaitskell’, which it thought ‘would be more 
likely to confirm Dr. Verwoerd in his natural obstinacy’ than bring about the desired 
change.
52
  The Times thought that ‘smugness, thick as the fat on a turtle’ enveloped 
‘the most irresponsible critics’ of the South African Government,53 and defended 
those MPs who had refused to ‘judge in advance of the evidence’.  British papers 
were thus by no means united on a preferred course of action.  Even the most critical, 
though desiring Macmillan to speak, did not press the issue, appearing to favour 
action at the level of the man-on-the-street. 
Three days after the shootings, the Government issued a watered down 
amendment to Labour’s motion which read: that ‘This House, while recognising that 
it has no responsibility or jurisdiction over the independent countries of the 
Commonwealth, at the same time wishes to record its deep sympathy with all the 
people of South Africa at the recent tragic events which have taken place at 
Vereeniging and Langa’.54  In contrast to the original motion, which had ‘deplored 
the shootings’ and had expressed sympathy only with the families of the dead and 
injured, the Government amendment expressed sympathy ‘with all the people of 
South Africa’, black and white (presumably), and pressed the view that Britain had 
no right to interfere in the internal affairs of a Commonwealth member state. 
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3. From massacre to ‘march of change’!55: African action as the key 
characteristic of British press coverage of South Africa in the two weeks 
following the shootings 
 
It was initially difficult for the British press to stamp its mark on Sharpeville 
coverage.  There were no foreign journalists at the scene, either witnessing the 
shootings or in the immediate aftermath.  Many papers used reports filed by South 
African stringers.  Yet none of those stringers whose articles on Sharpeville appeared 
had been present at the scene until after the shootings.  Some British papers, such as 
the Mirror, used news agency reports from which to construct their accounts.  All 
reports, whether from the news agencies or from stringers, drew heavily on the 
evidence of the South African police, who held a press conference later that day. 
As fresh information came in, and as editors and journalists began exploring 
some of the issues, the picture adjusted somewhat.  The press devoted more space to 
the issue of police blame and brutality, and of the just grievances of the Africans 
who had been shot.  All papers used the evidence gathered by Ambrose Reeves, the 
Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg, who had entered Baragwanath Hospital in the 
days following the massacre to take down and collate the testimony of the survivors.  
Reeves saw British papers, which were sold in South Africa, as a means through 
which to communicate to other South Africans that which would otherwise have 
remained hushed up, given the restrictions the authorities had imposed on the local 
press printing certain information, which did not apply to material sent abroad.
56
  On 
the 25
th
, the Mirror and the Mail published interviews with Reeves,
57
 and on the 26
th
, 
the News Chronicle devoted a full front-page to an article written by Reeves himself, 
cabled from Johannesburg.
58
  In it, the clergyman described the injuries the victims 
had suffered as ‘normally only seen after a battle…bone powdered by heavy calibre 
slugs, limbs so mutilated by bullets tearing through that amputation is necessary, a 
great number of wounds inflicted from behind’. 
The following day, the Observer published exclusive material gathered by 
Drum: one of the only eye-witness accounts of the massacre written by a journalist, 
Humphrey Tyler, in which the writer not only contested the authorities’ claim that 
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the African crowd had been armed and violent, but also described the behaviour of 
the police in damning terms.
59
  One officer Tyler saw standing on top of a Saracen 
appeared to the journalist to be firing his Sten gun into the crowd, ‘swinging it 
around in a wide arc from his hip as though he were panning a movie camera’.  A 
number of journalists also made a conscious effort to put the African perspective.  
The News Chronicle and the Observer both ran articles on the passes, the Observer 
drawing on its Africa Bureau links;
60
 and the Herald published a sympathetic 
interview with Philip Kgosana, the young Cape regional secretary of the PAC, sent 
from its Cape Town stringer, Myrna Blumberg.
61
  In it, Kgosana explained that he 
“would rather die than live in South Africa as it is today”. 
Blumberg appeared to have a good relationship with Kgosana, characterised 
by mutual trust.  In his diary, Kgosana recorded that he had visited Blumberg’s 
house at Sea Point on the evening of 24 March for an interview which lasted about 
an hour.
62
  According to Randolph Vigne, a prominent member of the South African 
Liberal Party, Blumberg was a friend of the organisation.
63
  In the Cape, Liberals had 
forged a strong relationship with the leaders of the PAC.  This included Kgosana, 
who worked as a seller for Contact, a Liberal fortnightly publication, edited by 
Patrick Duncan.
64
  Journalists such as Blumberg, who had previously had material 
published in Contact,
65
 likely benefited from these close associations.  Such 
connections were widespread, and would inform British press treatment of South 
Africa in the days and weeks to follow, allowing for in-depth coverage of African 
activities, although not always to the approval or advantage of the PAC.  Indeed, 
Kgosana’s links with journalists, and the way in which he was subsequently ‘feted’ 
by the media, later earned the young leader the contempt of many of his fellow pan-
Africanists,
66
 who were part of an organisation which, though pragmatic in its use of 
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the press, was also profoundly distrustful of it.  According to J.D. Nyaose, a 
founding member of the PAC, the organisation once devised a slogan to say ‘No 
press has built us, and no press will destroy us’.67  While the NLM in Ghana and the 
MCP in Nyasaland had sought out British journalists, it is less certain that in the case 
of South Africa the initiative lay with the PAC. 
Through Reeves, Tyler, and Blumberg, then, British papers laid emphasis on 
African grievances and police brutality at Sharpeville during this week.  Yet the 
British press described the ten days following the massacre as a period of African 
violence, too, and predominantly one of African power.  This action was presented 
not as a response to the massacre, but as part of a continuum of African action of 
which the demonstration at Sharpeville had been only the beginning, as Sobukwe 
had intended.  What is sometimes lost in studies of media treatment of Sharpeville, if 
decontextualized, is the fact that the massacre marked the inception of a planned 
African campaign of civil disobedience, as opposed to its culmination, and defeat, 
and press coverage reflected this. 
For the most part, the focus was Cape Town, which became the locus of the 
struggle.  Coverage was patchy at first, owing to the fact that most visiting 
correspondents had initially flocked to Johannesburg, where Sharpeville was located, 
as the ‘imagined storm centre’.68  Again, this pointed to the difficulties inherent in 
covering unexpected events; but it also reflected a certain degree of ignorance on the 
part of the British press of the situation unfolding on the ground, a condition born 
partly, one can surmise, of their lack of a sustained physical presence.  This factor 
may also have been what drew them to English speakers and familiar South African 
publications upon arrival.  Hopkinson recalled that Sharpeville brought ‘the press of 
half the world pouring in on Johannesburg - and pouring into Drum offices as 
well’.69 
Fortunately, Cape Town was serviced well by stringers.  Some journalists 
such as the Cape Times’s Stanley Uys,70 stringing for the News Chronicle, appeared 
to be on the inside track of events, and that paper was receptive to publishing his 
material.  On the 23
rd
, an article by Uys described the mounting tension on the 
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second day of the anti-pass demonstrations.
71
  Uys explained that in Cape Town 
there had been ‘shooting, stonings, arrests – and mass absenteeism’: ‘Pan-Africanists 
are telling Africans in the townships, and even in the white suburbs, not to go to 
work anymore.’  Readers were told that employers in Cape Town estimated that 
between 60 and 80 per cent of their African staffs were absent.  The Telegraph’s 
Colin Reid, the only British correspondent resident in South Africa,
72
 reported 
further police shootings, African plans for sustained demonstrations, and ‘large-scale 
absenteeism’ in Cape Town, which ‘delayed shipping and industry’.73 
Three days later, Uys reported that 2,000 Africans led by Kgosana had 
‘massed silently’ outside a police station in Cape Town, and had ‘won a victory 
against the Pass Laws’.74  In response to pressure from the African delegation and 
Duncan, who had arrived on the scene, Colonel Terblanche, deputy police 
commissioner for the western Cape, had suspended the pass laws temporarily.
75
  The 
decision was subsequently applied nationwide.
76
 
All papers reported the temporary suspension of the pass laws, and the 
apparently extensive and mounting concern below Cabinet level.
77
  By the 28
th
, some 
journalists were asking if Verwoerd could last much longer.  Stephen Barber’s piece 
for the News Chronicle explained that South Africa was ‘on the edge of anarchy’.78  
‘If Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd can last in office much longer’, he wrote, ‘then this is an 
even stranger place than it has ever been made out to be… The Government of what 
cannot be described as anything but a slave State has frankly had to confess that it 
cannot impose its own laws’.  The Telegraph also chose to emphasise the 
significance of the Government’s suspension of the pass laws.  The paper thought 
that they ‘(constituted) the very framework of apartheid’ and were in Nationalist 
thinking at moments of crisis more necessary than ever.
79
  ‘If the Union Government 
fails to resume the enforcement of these laws’, the editorial read, ‘it will not be too 
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much to say that the tide has turned in the country’s history’.  Although a number of 
factors were thought to have played a part in this incipient turning of the tide, 
including world pressure, National Party tactics, and changes in Afrikaner opinion, 
journalists also wrote it up as a story of African achievement.  ‘It is because the 
African labour force has at last become aware of its passive strength’, the Telegraph 
claimed.
80
  The Mail underscored the importance of ‘the capacity for organised 
protest suddenly shown by the black Africans’.81 
Then came the first nationwide demonstration of African strength: the ANC’s 
national ‘Day of Mourning’ (28 March), the first event since Sharpeville to attract a 
comparable degree of publicity.  Albert Luthuli, the President of the ANC, had asked 
his supporters to stay away from work and to burn their passes in memory of those 
who had died the previous week.  Hopkinson claims that the idea had come from Nat 
Nakasa, a Drum journalist,
82
 illustrating the continued importance of the links 
between African nationalists and the press, as well as the degree to which journalists 
contributed to creating or facilitating the stories they covered.  Hopkinson passed the 
idea on to Luthuli though Cecil Eprile and Dennis Kiley.
83
  Again, the South African 
English-language press enabled the foreign press to cover the story.  The editor 
drove out with Berry that day and ‘three or four visiting journalists and cameramen 
on a tour of the townships’.84  Norman Phillips, a Canadian journalist, remembered 
going into Orlando, a township near Johannesburg, with Harold Sacks, crime 
reporter for the Rand Daily Mail.
85
 
Articles pushed African hate and African violence as themes.  Readers were 
told that the day had been filled with arson and murder.  Africans had reportedly 
burned churches and schools nationwide.  Striking Africans had stoned those who 
had chosen to ignore the strike call.  And an African policeman had been stabbed to 
death by a mob.
86
  Europeans had also been threatened.  Peter Younghusband, 
Drum’s Cape Town editor, stringing for the Mail, sent a report from Langa that day, 
from the funeral of three Africans shot by the police the previous Monday (the 21
st
).  
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He had gone in with members of the PAC and the Liberal Party, who had tasked him 
with operating a loudspeaker,
87
 which the Liberal Party had intended to be used to 
call for peaceful and orderly behaviour.
88
  He wrote that he ‘wished (he) was not 
there’.89  ‘At the graveside a relative of one of the dead men raised red-rimmed 
eyes’, he explained, ‘and seeing me, a white face among the mass of black faces on 
the other side of the grave, snarled through clenched teeth the one word: “Go.”’.90  
The leaders of the Pan-Africanists standing beside him advised him to ‘leave 
immediately’.91  In other areas, action shots of Africans burning their passes seemed 
to capture a mood of fun and frenzy.
92
  Hopkinson saw that at least one of the photos 
had been staged by an overseas cameraman encouraging specific poses.
93
 
This upsurge in African activity only seemed to increase thereafter, 
climaxing two days later, when photos of a huge crowd of 30,000 Africans marching 
from Langa and Nyanga to Cape Town city centre to demand the release of their 
leaders were plastered across the front pages.
94
  Kgosana was pictured leading the 
march.  He had missed the beginning, and had had to be given a lift by an American 
journalist, who had gone to interview him, to get to the front of the procession.
95
  
Journalists flanked the march.
96
  According to Younghusband, the procession pushed 
before it a ‘fleet’ of cars and vans containing newspapermen, cameramen, and 
newsreel photographers.
97
  At its head beside Kgosana, amongst others were 
Younghusband and Ken Mackenzie, Blumberg’s husband, who wrote a piece for the 
Spectator.
98
 During this period, a reporter for the Rand Daily Mail recalled that ‘the 
Cape Town liberals’ were ‘putting Kgosana in touch with the white establishment 
press, and later with foreign journalists, so that he could explain the nature of the 
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campaign’.99  ‘I could hardly meet all the newsmen who wanted to see me’, Kgosana 
later recalled.
100
  On the day of the march, ‘press people and other spectators 
watched from roof-tops’101 as Kgosana victoriously negotiated with Colonel 
Terblanche and General Rademeyer for a meeting with the Minister of Justice. 
Most of the articles published in British papers the day following the march 
pushed the power of African non-violence as a theme.  Yet bubbling under the 
surface of some of the narratives was an unmistakeable latent violence 
communicated to readers through descriptions of the crowd as ‘seething’, for 
instance – ‘a great black snake’.102  The titles of the editorials that day reinforced the 
view that substantive change was now more necessary than ever.  These included: 
‘At breaking point’ (Mail), ‘A change must come’ (Herald), ‘The shadows’ (News 
Chronicle), and ‘Life and reason at stake’ (Telegraph).103 
Despite the perceived need for it, however, editors had doubts as to whether 
positive changes would in fact take place.  The Government had already announced 
its plans to ban the ANC and PAC, and the day of the march marked the beginning 
of a State of Emergency.  This potentially explosive mix of African strength and 
white intransigence was not lost on editors, and recalled Sharpeville.  ‘At breaking 
point’ told Mail readers that ‘The clouds lower over South Africa.  One feels an 
ominous tension as before a savage storm.  What has been seen in other countries is 
now happening there.  The mass arrests, the state of emergency, the menacing 
demonstrations.  All this, the world rightly believes, is due to the blind stupidity of 
the National Government in persisting with apartheid in the face of reason and 
reality.  The onlooker, who sees most of the game, helplessly watches the approach 
of almost inevitable tragedy’.104 
The Herald’s ‘A change must come’ explained that ‘The South African 
Government is asking for a revolution…  There are ten million black South Africans.  
There are three million whites.  The 10 million cannot be held in subjection to unjust 
laws, ever savagely tightening.  Shooting, banning, flogging, jailing only challenge 
hatred.  To remove injustice, to abandon apartheid, to aim at government by consent 
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is the only hope in South Africa.  Even yet it is not too late.  But Dr. Verwoerd’s 
Government arrests liberals, trade union leaders, moderates, black and white – some 
of the very people whose influence is important to avoid nation-wide violence’.105 
In the ten days following the massacre, papers continued to hold the 
apartheid state responsible for clashes between black and white, and certainly this 
had implications for the portrayal of Africans, who did begin to look like victims.  
Yet the core premise upon which calls for change were based, reinforced by reports 
of the Day of Mourning and the march, was the view that it was with the Africans 
that power resided, and that there could and would be death on both sides, including 
white, if that fact were not acknowledged. 
 
4. British press content, the British Government, and the UN 
 
 Meanwhile, the UN Security Council gathered to discuss the situation.  Some 
MPs had pressured the British Government to adopt a firm stance.  On the 28
th
, 
James Callaghan, Labour’s chief spokesman on colonial affairs, had asked the 
Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, to instruct the UK delegate to support proposals 
for bringing the South African situation within its jurisdiction.
106
  Lloyd 
subsequently informed the House that the UK representative had instructions not to 
oppose discussion of the item, but that the Government still adhered to the view that, 
‘in accordance with Article 2(7) of the Charter, nothing in the Charter authorises the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State’.107  Labour greeted the announcement as a positive step, but 
also began to push for a progressive approach to a possible resolution.
108
 
The nature of the editorials on the 31
st
 indicated that the British press 
remained divided on the issue of what it was best for Britain to do.  The Herald laid 
emphasis on the importance of ‘world opinion’ or ‘world pressure’ in supporting all 
‘reasonable’ people inside South Africa ‘to bring a change’, but it did not mention 
the UN.
109
  The Mail welcomed Lloyd’s announcement, but also thought that the 
‘rule about non-interference in internal affairs is necessary and wise’ or ‘the world 
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would be in constant turmoil’.110  The paper seemed to settle on the view that 
Commonwealth leaders might have the greatest impact by exerting pressure on 
Verwoerd privately.  The News Chronicle approved of the British Government’s 
decision not to oppose discussion of the item, but said little more.
111
  The Telegraph 
favoured calm.
112
  It thought that ‘blanket indignation levelled at the whites’ or 
‘unmitigated encouragement of the blacks’ would only ‘exacerbate passions already 
at boiling point’, and could prove ‘incendiary’.  It doubted whether the Security 
Council meeting could serve any ‘constructive’ purpose, but argued that ‘on 
balance’, Britain was ‘probably correct’ not to oppose such a meeting, ‘since to have 
done so would not only have been ineffective, but would also have been taken as 
condonation of apartheid’.  In short, British press opinion on the action Britain 
should take at the UN (and elsewhere) remained divided. 
This uncertainty may have been representative of British public opinion as a 
whole.  On 7 April, the News Chronicle published the results of a Gallup Poll it had 
conducted ‘a few days after the shootings’, so, relevant for this earlier period of 
discussion.
113
  Existing historical works usually only cite certain aspects of the poll’s 
findings, such as the paper’s claim that the events at Sharpeville had dramatically 
increased British public awareness of events in South Africa (to 99%), and that 
British opinion had swung against apartheid (to 80%).
114
  Yet, importantly, the 
findings also stated that ‘there are gradations of opinion about what the British 
attitude should be’.  Although 52% of respondents favoured adopting a strong and 
outspoken stand, 48% did not know what to do or favoured inaction of various kinds 
on apartheid or South African events and issues.  The Labour Party was also less 
willing to take a strong lead, in some contrast to Central Africa. 
At the UN, Britain abstained from voting on a resolution deploring the loss of 
life in the shooting of African demonstrators and calling on the South African 
Government to abandon its racial policies in the interests of international peace.  The 
vote was 9 to 0 for the resolution.  France also abstained.  Some of the headlines that 
day suggested that the press approved of the resolution and disapproved of Britain’s 
abstention.  These included the News Chronicle’s ‘Britain silent as U.N. raps 
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Africa’, and possibly the Mirror’s ‘“Stop it!  Demand by UN’.115  Yet papers 
refrained from editorial comment on the issue.  Parliamentary criticism was greater, 
but still rather insubstantial, and the Government remained resolute.  In the 
Commons on 6 April, John Profumo, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 
summed up the Government’s reasoning thus: ‘we thought that the resolution went 
beyond the scope of the Security Council’, and ‘we did not think it was the most 
effective way of alleviating the situation’.116 
In the period following the initial request for a meeting from the African and 
Asian members (the 24
th), the British Government’s behaviour at or in relation to the 
UN had been influenced by a number of considerations.  To the extent that the 
Government had taken ‘positive’ action against the National Government, its 
overriding concern had been the importance of avoiding damaging relations with the 
newly independent nations of Africa and Asia, although its appreciation of the 
strength of British public opposition to apartheid had also played a role.
117
  
Examples of ‘positive’ action would include its decision not to oppose the UN’s 
discussion of the matter, and then abstaining from voting on the resolution as 
opposed to vetoing it.  On the inhibiting side, the Government’s priority was its 
concern that Britain itself might need to rely on Article 2(7) at some future date in its 
own African colonies, particularly Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.  Yet the rather 
equivocal character of British editorial comment might also have inspired or enabled 
constraint.  The nature of the Commons debate on the 6
th
 indicated that it may well 
have informed developments, for although one Labour MP had argued that failure to 
vote on apartheid was ‘totally unrepresentative of British and Commonwealth public 
opinion’,118 another, on the Government benches, had felt able to contend that 
‘general public opinion feels that the greatest contribution which this House can 
make towards a happy solution of these tragic and perplexing events is to exercise 
restraint and leave Her Majesty’s Government to use their own judgment as they 
think best at this delicate time’.119  Judging from the nature of press comment, this 
seems a fair assessment. 
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5. ‘The day of the whips’:120 Police brutality as the core theme of British press 
coverage of Langa and Nyanga 
 
 It was only during the following week that police brutality became the central 
theme in British newspaper coverage of events in South Africa.  Yet this was not 
because more details on Sharpeville emerged.  It stemmed from the behaviour of the 
police in Cape Town as they began to enforce new laws introduced under the State 
of Emergency.  This process had begun at the time of the march, but the violence did 
not peak until a week later: 4-6 April.  Operations prior to this included the first 
waves of the arrests of ‘moderates’, including Luthuli, Kgosana, and some white 
liberals,
121
 prompting others, such as Reeves, to flee the country;
122
 and efforts by 
the police to force strikers back to work.
123
  Indications that in Cape Town these 
activities were taking a turn for the worse included news that the authorities had 
thrown cordons around Langa and Nyanga,
124
 and that a police officer had shot a 
‘sick baby’ in the head.125 
On 5 April, reports concentrated on what was happening in Cape Town city 
centre.
126
  James O’Driscoll was there, covering events for the Telegraph.  He wrote 
that police had gone into ‘some of the main streets of Cape Town’ and had ‘attacked 
Africans, who were walking peacefully, with riding whips and rubber truncheons’, 
‘in full view of bustling shoppers’.127  The State of Emergency was biting, and 
journalists’ movements were strictly curtailed.  Yet many did manage to report 
scenes of police brutality further out, too, even in cordoned off Langa and Nyanga.  
These included Younghusband and Blumberg, who used their network of contacts 
until the telephone wires were eventually cut;
128
 and Barber, who had, according to 
his article, come across the violence ‘almost by accident’ on his way to the city 
centre from the airport.
129
  Barber sent a particularly colourful report.  Yet it was not 
unrepresentative of the accounts appearing in other papers, and drew on war-time 
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imagery.  He told his readers that in the two townships the police had launched 
“kragdadigheid” – ‘a beastly word that means precisely what the Nazis meant by 
“beastliness”’. 
The Labour Party continued to up the pressure in the Commons.  On the 
same day as these articles were published, Gaitskell urged Macmillan to agree that 
‘the overwhelming majority of the British people received with a shock of horror the 
news of the police action at Cape Town yesterday’ and to give to the South African 
Government ‘early expression of his regret about what happened’.130  Macmillan 
replied faster than he had on the 22
nd, immediately stating that ‘what has happened in 
this tragic situation is a very great source of deep regret to me’.131  The press hailed 
this as the Prime Minister’s most outspoken comment yet,132 but his words could 
hardly have concerned the South African Government any more than had Britain’s 
recent action at the UN, for it was on a par.  Macmillan also continued to urge 
caution in the name of Commonwealth unity.
133
 
The following day, Younghusband wrote a particularly striking feature for 
the Mail entitled ‘The day of the whips’, which summarised recent developments.134  
Under the ‘whips’ headline was an Illingworth cartoon showing terrified, screaming, 
running or cowering Africans being chased by policemen with truncheons and long 
whips.  In the cartoon, the Africans did look very much like victims; the police, stern 
and brutal.  ‘Horrified women’, Younghusband wrote, ‘terrified screaming children 
watch their husbands and fathers being dragged out of the mean dwellings and 
flogged with whips and beaten with long riot batons, running between the shanties, 
chased by the police lashing at them mercilessly.  Those who resist are shot down’. 
For O’Driscoll and Younghusband, amongst others, Langa and Nyanga 
represented turning points, and it was not until then that the British press depicted 
the South African police as truly brutal.  This probably reflected the fact that few 
journalists had witnessed Sharpeville.  Yet it also reflected the nature of the new 
violence; and showed how some sorts of brutality were deemed more acceptable than 
others at the end of empire.  ‘Scenes of people rioting, being shot, beaten with batons 
and generally dragged about’ is ‘bad enough’, Younghusband thinks, but ‘there was 
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something about the use of whips that took away a man’s dignity, treating him as 
any decent person would not even treat a dog, that placed an instant barrier between 
me and the government of my country at that time’.135  It was the premeditated 
nature of the violence in Cape Town which the News Chronicle chose to highlight: 
‘The apologists for the South African Government have argued that the slaughter at 
Sharpeville was the result of a mob threatening a police station.  This may be part of 
the story and panic among the outnumbered, if heavily armed, police can possibly be 
urged in mitigation.  No such plea can be offered for the punitive raids made on 
African townships near Capetown’.136 
The Times and the Telegraph, both hitherto relatively restrained in their 
criticism, became far more outspoken as a result of the raids on the townships.  In an 
editorial on 6 April entitled ‘Terrorism in Cape Town’, the Telegraph explained that 
‘this indiscriminate police brutality, conducted openly in the main streets of the 
South African capital, and extolled by Ministers in Parliament, marks a clear 
decision by Dr. Verwoerd to institute a bloody reign of terror… the price Dr. 
Verwoerd will have to pay is final, irrevocable and explicit adoption of the rule of 
force and force alone, which means in effect declaration of civil war’.137  The paper 
had previously urged caution and had emphasised the importance of keeping South 
Africa within the Commonwealth.  It now thought that apartheid ‘looks like 
becoming an emetic which may make it difficult for the Commonwealth to prevent 
South Africa from being spewed out’.138  Two days later, the paper urged serious, 
and very uncharacteristic, consideration of embarking on a sports boycott.
139
 
In its editorial of the 6
th, ‘The Coming Harvest’, The Times felt so strongly 
that it thought it had no option but to quote poetry in order to capture ‘the moral of 
the nightmare sixteen days that have passed since the revolution began in South 
Africa’.140  After citing part of Roy Campbell’s poem on ‘the Zulu girl suckling her 
child’, it asked how Verwoerd ‘and his faithful backwoodsmen’ could ‘be so mad as 
to think that they can cow a proud, fighting race into subjection’.  ‘Will nothing 
teach them that the world has left the nineteenth century behind?’, it lamented: 
‘Dingaan’s Impis were mowed down by the muskets of Pretorius at Blood River and 
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that crowning victory is kept as an annual holiday in the Union… The events of the 
last fortnight have made it certain that a Dingaan’s day of reckoning is round the 
corner.  If it is to be peaceful – as it could be – there must be a speedy change’.141 
As a consequence of Langa and Nyanga, not Sharpeville, stories of police 
brutality and African victimhood came to dominate British newspaper coverage of 
South Africa.  Yet even with the police so firmly in the spotlight, this never did 
affect the papers’ core emphasis, which was African power, and the dangers, for 
black and white, of resisting what was now a truly continent-wide process of African 
emancipation.  Against the backdrop of events in South Africa, Britain’s own recent 
changes in policy shone out like sunbeams. 
On 8 April, under the watchful gaze of Hastings Banda, the recently released 
leader of the Malawi Congress Party, sitting up in the public gallery,
142
 the 
Commons unanimously agreed to a resolution proposed by Labour’s John 
Stonehouse ‘deploring the present racialist policies’ of the South African 
Government, and ‘(urging) Her Majesty’s Government to take the opportunity at the 
forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference to bring home to the 
South African Government the strong feelings of British people on this question’.143  
It also ‘(restated)’ the ‘firm belief’ of the House ‘that peace and tranquillity in South 
Africa can only be secured in the long run on the basis of freedom and equality and a 
full respect for the inherent dignity and humanity of all men’.144  On the Government 
side, certainly this represented a departure from previous statements.  Yet, the UN, 
its most worrying fixture, had come and gone; and it continued to urge restraint.  
Stonehouse, possibly with an eye to the complexity of the situation, yet still keen to 
accrue political points, had framed the motion ‘in such a way that it would unite the 
House rather than divide it’.145  A large number of MPs left before the debate had 
finished (which was 4pm).  The Telegraph reporter noted that of the total of 630 
MPs, ‘only about 40 were in their places when the motion was put’.146  ‘Although it 
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was sponsored by a Labour member’, the correspondent added, ‘the final attendance 
of Conservatives was bigger than that on the Opposition side’.147 
 
6. Relations between the South African Government and the British and South 
African English-language presses, and the implications of the State of 
Emergency 
 
If British newspaper articles had little transformative impact on the British 
Government, the same cannot be said of their influence on the Government of South 
Africa, whose response from the end of March was relentless.  According to the 
Express, the authorities tried to ban press photographers from the funeral of the 
Sharpeville victims.
148
  The Herald reported that the police had threatened 
correspondents when they had tried to take pictures and report on the arrival of 
African prisoners at Johannesburg Central Jail.
149
  In Cape Town, the police barred 
journalists from entering the two townships at the heart of the action: Langa and 
Nyanga.
150
  And, most significantly, under the State of Emergency, the Government 
introduced new powers to enable it to censor the press.
151
 
For South African newspapers these moves represented an important, but not 
a revolutionary change from those of previous years.  The freedom of South African 
English-language papers, in particular, to publish what they wanted had been 
curtailed for some time because of the cultivation of an atmosphere of intimidation, 
and legislation such as the Suppression of Communism Act, under which journalists 
such as Patrick Duncan had been detained.
152
  Benjamin Pogrund, who worked for 
an English-language paper in 1960, the Rand Daily Mail, recalled that ‘Over the 
years the English-language press was a particular target for the Nationalists’ on the 
grounds that it was ‘unpatriotic, disloyal, given to telling outright lies, and controlled 
by foreign-owned gold mining companies.  The fact that so much of the ownership 
resided in Britain for so long, that the presence and influence of British-born editors 
and journalists was so strong for even longer, and that so much of the news revolved 
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around London, fuelled their cause’.153  After the Nationalist victory at the polls in 
1948, the inroads into press freedom began.  ‘New laws and extensions of old laws’, 
Pogrund writes, meant that even by the time of Sharpeville ‘at least twelve statutes 
were in place that in one way or another denied or inhibited press freedoms’.154  The 
commission of inquiry into the press, set up in January 1951, and which ran for over 
a decade, Pogrund thought cast a particularly dark shadow.
155
 
Foreign journalists were also affected during this earlier period.  Pogrund 
notes that the commission started compiling dossiers on both local and overseas 
correspondents from the beginning of the fifties.
156
  Yet until the declaration of the 
State of Emergency in 1960, the South African Government had not censored reports 
filed from South Africa for overseas newspapers.  Indeed, one of the possible 
attractions for some South African journalists of stringing for British and other 
foreign publications was that doing so enabled them to circumvent the usual 
restrictions which affected their day-to-day work for the South African press.  
Because British papers were sold in South Africa, moreover, stringing for them or 
writing in to them was a potential way for South Africans to communicate with other 
South Africans that which would otherwise have remained ‘hushed up’.  This had 
been part of Reeves’ thinking when he had released details of the testimony of the 
Sharpeville survivors to overseas journalists in the week following the massacre.  
During this period, Anthony Sampson, in Johannesburg for the Observer, 
commented on how quickly foreign newspapers sold out.
157
 
With the State of Emergency some of this changed.  On 1 April, journalists 
reported Eric Louw’s warning that it was now possible to infringe the emergency 
laws in dispatches to overseas papers.
158
  It became an offence to disclose the 
identity of a person arrested or detained, without the written permission of the 
Minister of Justice, and there were no exceptions for journalists.  The Government 
also forbade anyone to write anything considered critical or subversive, on penalty of 
imprisonment. 
Many journalists were not initially willing to comply with these new 
regulations, as illustrated by the nature of British press treatment of police action in 
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Langa and Nyanga.  Yet this prompted a further onslaught, at first verbal, then 
‘official’, which proved more effective.  At the end of that week (8 April), Phillips 
recalled that Louw ‘was stung into attacking foreign correspondents for sending 
“wildly exaggerated and in many cases completely untrue reports to their 
newspapers and agencies”’.159  Blumberg remembered that ‘Official outbursts 
against foreign correspondents culminated in Parliament with Dr. Verwoerd 
announcing that there seemed to be “a source of information in Cape Town; this we 
are determined to deal with”’.160  Because of the nature of the relationship between 
the overseas, including the British, press and South African English-language papers, 
stringers were not immune to attack.  Indeed, they were often singled out as the 
source of the trouble.  Younghusband recalls ‘a parliamentary debate when a few of 
us sitting in the press gallery were pointed to by…Louw who said: “There they sit, 
Mr Speaker, so-called South Africans who would sell the good name of their country 
for 30 pieces of silver!”’.161 
The reports of Sharpeville, Langa and Nyanga which appeared in British and 
other overseas papers, some of which were written by South Africans, provided a 
pretext for the expression of more latent thoughts and fears that cut to the very heart 
of white South African society.  As in the Federation, British newspaper reports 
fuelled pre-existing fears, informed settler narratives of ‘self’ and ‘community’, and 
provided a means by which the ruling white minority avoided having to address 
more difficult issues, such as African discontent.  In Parliament on 30 March, the 
country’s Minister of Transport claimed that ‘British newspapers’ (meaning South 
African English-language newspapers) were ‘still fighting the Anglo-Boer War’: 
‘they have never forgotten that these despicable Boers succeeded, 46 years after the 
Treaty of Vereeniging, in taking over the reigns (sic) of government in South 
Africa’.162  The reports of South African English-language newspapers, English-
speaking journalists, and foreign – particularly British – papers fed into a debate 
within white society on the causes of the present trouble, which, on the Government 
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side, included ‘agitation’ and the cultivation of grievances amongst Africans.163  The 
centrality of Younghusband and Uys, both Afrikaners, to British press coverage of 
South Africa during these weeks, also points to the importance of situating 
Afrikaans-speakers at the heart of the story of the fight against apartheid, a dynamic 
which has been somewhat neglected by the historiography.  Younghusband had 
become a journalist out of ‘a pursuit of adventure and excitement’, initially, and he 
regarded Fleet Street as a sort of ‘Mecca’.164  Though his roots remained firmly 
Afrikaner, he also felt a degree of spiritual affinity with Britain, born of an early 
interest in British literature, and the influence of an inspirational school teacher from 
England.
165
 
Two days following Louw’s attack in Parliament on foreign press reporting 
of Langa and Nyanga (the 9
th
) came the first arrest of a foreign correspondent under 
the State of Emergency.  At seven in the morning ‘two obvious plain-clothes 
policemen’ knocked on the door of Phillips’s bedroom in Durban’s Edward Hotel, 
and after ‘(probing) his files and belongings’ (some of which they took), drove him 
to Durban jail.
166
  Phillips thought that there were three possible explanations for his 
arrest.  It was either ‘A warning to all foreign correspondents and a threat to their 
sources of information’; ‘A vindictive action revealing the jittery state of the white-
supremacy Government and the dominant position of its national police chief, 
General Rademeyer’; or ‘Because of the investigation I had commenced into the 
sinister secret society – the Afrikaner-Broederbond’.167  Phillips thought that ‘The 
timing and content of my last report on Nyanga was also relevant’.168  He had filed a 
report on Nyanga from Durban, which had been retained by Post Office staff.
169
  
Phillips had been to Nyanga, but he had not been present at the event he reported.  
He defended his actions by pointing out that no correspondents had been allowed 
into the township that day.
170
 
                                                          
163
 See ‘Assembly Debates’ for the whole period discussed here: Section B: Documents, Gail M. 
Gerhart Interviews and documents (A2422), Wits. 
164
 Correspondence with Younghusband, May 2013. 
165
 Ibid. 
166
 Phillips, Tragedy, pp. 187-9. 
167
 Ibid., p. 186. 
168
 Ibid. 
169
 Ibid., p. 187. 
170
 His report on Nyanga was subsequently published in the Telegraph, but as the first page had been 
confiscated, this version also had to be ‘reconstructed…from memory to the best of his ability’.  
Telegraph, 16 April 1960, fp.  When in Africa, he had apparently phoned the Star’s Cape Town 
correspondent, for information with which to write his article. 
219 
 
The South African Government may have over-emphasised the degree to 
which foreign journalists, certainly knowingly, distorted events in South Africa 
when they wrote their reports.  Indeed, a likely reason why they so feared the 
stringer, whose accounts were in many ways so similar, was that he or she did 
‘know’ South Africa and could thus not be so easily repudiated.  Foreign journalists 
were often a soft target.  Echoing the cases of the Federation and of Ghana, the 
Government also seemed most sensitive to the most critical or sensational aspects of 
coverage, which in some ways gave them a false picture of the whole.
171
  
Nevertheless, as the Philips’ case indicates, the South African Government was not 
entirely erroneous in its accusations, and nor did it accuse without reason.  It seemed 
profoundly anxious at foreign journalists’ approach to covering the country.  In the 
case of Britain, the South African Government feared press bias, and thought it saw 
evidence of double standards, as with the relative ‘under reporting’ of the deaths of 
white policemen at Cato Manor at the start of the year, for example, and in the way 
that British papers reported Britain in Africa.
172
  The exception was the Express, 
which was alone in putting the perspective of the Afrikaners (as it saw it) to British 
readers and in invoking the argument that no country was without sin.  For the rest, it 
is true that British journalists rarely, if ever, portrayed events in the British Empire in 
as negative a light as those in South Africa.  In addition, British journalists often 
showed a stunning lack of awareness of the forces that British imperialism had set in 
motion in South Africa; namely, that they had settled part of it and that it remained a 
British dominion. 
At the time of Langa and Nyanga, B. P. J. Erasmus, Information Officer at 
South Africa House in London, thought that ‘the tabloids and left-wingers’ were 
‘mercilessly (exploiting) every single event, incident or word’ in a ‘grim internecine 
circulation war’, that correspondents mixed comment with fact, that journalists 
ridiculed Government spokesmen, such as the Minister of Justice, and that Africans 
such as Kgosana were eulogised.
173
  He thought the ‘worst report’ had been Stephen 
Barber’s, but he was most concerned by the response of The Times and the 
Telegraph, ‘up to then two considerable voices of reason in the wilderness of blanket 
vituperation’.  Erasmus had measured The Times’s editorial of 6 April, which he put 
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at 25 inches, commenting that ‘it must have been one of the longest the paper had 
ever written on any one subject’.  Journalists’ perspectives flew in the face of British 
Government reticence, and belied the myth of Commonwealth solidarity it strove to 
promote.  The British press appeared to have a different, far more idealised, 
conception of what the Commonwealth should represent. 
The day of Phillips’ arrest, the Government paper, Die Burger, published an 
article which the Observer thought summed up the strong feeling of Government 
supporters towards foreign correspondents following Langa and Nyanga.
174
  
According to the Observer, Die Burger had stated that: ‘if there is there is one thing 
every right-minded South African with red-blood in his veins would have liked to do 
this week it was to take the group of visiting British journalists by their neck and 
throw them out of the country after giving them a sound thrashing with the rhino-
hide sjamboks they discovered in such large numbers in Cape Town’. 
Later that day, David Pratt, a South African trout farmer originally from 
Britain, shot Verwoerd twice in the head at an agricultural show just outside 
Johannesburg.  The fact that Pratt was British some Afrikaners viewed as evidence 
of treachery on the part of the South African English-speaking community, a 
characterisation which both mirrored and fed into their views of the role of stringers.  
Pratt’s actions were unanimously and unreservedly condemned in the British press, 
and he was generally dismissed as a lunatic.  Yet coming so soon after Langa and 
Nyanga, some Afrikaners perceived a connection between foreign press and local 
English-language press reporting of the police raids and the assassination attempt, 
which fed tensions between the Afrikaans- and English-speaking communities.  
Philips recalled that Louw ‘tried to prove that the misguided man who had shot at the 
Prime Minister had been inspired by reading “sensational newspaper reports”’.175  
Tom Hopkinson’s wife was assaulted by ‘a heavily built woman’ at a garden party of 
Afrikaner friends when news of the assassination attempt came over the radio.
176
  
Blumberg recalled that ‘five toughs’ had beaten up ‘a liberal journalist’ from the 
Cape Times after ‘a bar discussion on apartheid’ that day.177  The Rand Daily Mail 
and the Star received bomb threats.
178
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On the 11
th
, the arrests hit the British press directly, when two men from the 
C.I.D. came to Blumberg’s home in Cape Town to escort her to Caledon Square 
police station, and from there to Roeland Street Jail.
179
  Although no specific reason 
for her arrest was ever given, the reasons she and her husband cite are telling for 
what they reveal of the role of stringers and the British press during these critical 
weeks.  Mackenzie thought that his wife had been arrested as ‘part of the 
Government campaign to intimidate the Press, particularly foreign correspondents, 
who had been able, without the local emergency restrictions on which the South 
African Press choked, to disclose unwelcome facts freely’.  He also believed ‘the 
authorities were annoyed because they thought (Blumberg) went out of (her) way to 
introduce travelling correspondents to articulate African and Coloured leaders they 
tried to keep silent and hidden’.180  Blumberg highlighted the possible significance of 
her being ‘South African born’, which meant that ‘they could hold on to me as long 
as they liked without other Governments being able to force them to release or 
deport me’;181 the role of ‘vengefulness in choosing me as a representative of the 
hated Labour Press’;182 and the authorities’ desire for information about ‘African 
strike leaders’.183 
A number of stringers who reported from Cape Town during this period were 
indeed able to forge strong links with Africans, in addition to the Liberal Party and 
others involved in the fight against apartheid, and, as we have seen, these 
connections were reflected in British newspaper coverage.  The influence cut both 
ways.  The British press was far more receptive in March 1960 than it had ever been 
to publishing the views of African leaders, and doing so made for interesting news.  
Even in the early fifties, when Anthony Sampson returned from South Africa, he was 
‘astonished to find that (he) was marketable’ in Fleet Street, and that the right-
leaning Mail was particularly keen to snap him up.
184
  In many ways, then, these 
links were distinctly advantageous for journalists.  When Younghusband began 
freelancing for the Daily Mail, he attributed the fact that his stories ‘were getting 
good display in Britain’ to his ‘connections with Drum magazine and the contacts 
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made with the assistance of Howard (Lawrence) and other black colleagues on our 
staff’.185  Younghusband thought that his scoops at the time of Sharpeville led the 
Mail to believe he had ‘a certain magic of great value and that they had better buy it 
– and they offered me the job I held on their staff for the next 13 years’.186 
Yet these connections invited harassment too.  Two days after Blumberg’s 
arrest, Younghusband also became the subject of police attention.  On the 14
th
, he 
told Mail readers that in his absence, four members of the security branch had 
‘searched (his) office’ at Drum, ‘opened cables and personal correspondence’, and 
had informed his colleagues that they intended to find him.
187
  Younghusband wrote 
that he gave himself up at police headquarters later that day ‘expecting the worst’.  
He was released after a ten-minute interrogation, but the spectre of further action 
lingered.  Younghusband was told to ‘stick around’. 
The arrests, threats, raids and restrictions caused profound anxiety not only 
amongst South African journalists, who bore the brunt of the new emergency laws, 
but also within the British press.  On 20 April, a deputation from the National Union 
of Journalists visited South Africa House to deliver a copy of a resolution registering 
their ‘horror’ at events in South Africa and their ‘abhorrence of racial policies’.188  It 
expressed concern at the South African authorities’ interference with the press by 
threats, the detention of journalists and the suppression of publications; and asked 
the South African Government to enable journalists freely to report events in the 
Union.  A separate resolution protested against the imprisonment of Blumberg and 
Phillips.  The situation looked desperate. 
Indeed, the State of Emergency was having such an impact, on both Africans 
and Europeans, that very soon most British papers conceded that the National Party 
and Verwoerd (even with two bullets in the head) had won the ‘first round’.  Passes 
had been reinstated, hundreds of people had been arrested and detained, and police 
intimidation was rife.  ‘This isn’t the gale yet’, a headline to one of Anthony 
Sampson’s articles told Observer readers: ‘For the time being the Africans have been 
crushed’.189  Sampson chose to quote an African teacher, ‘gazing sadly into his 
brandy glass’ to illustrate the point.  ‘“This isn’t it”, the man mourned: “They 
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seemed to think that it was round the corner.  The guys have been busy talking about 
the wind of change, how it was going to be a gale or a hurricane of change.  It never 
seemed to occur to them that it might be only a breeze”.’190 
The effects of these developments on subsequent British press reporting of 
South Africa were numerous.  It became a harder country to cover.  Foreign 
journalists hoping to enter it were vetted more stringently.  Many were refused visas.  
Those who decided on ‘a full-frontal approach to Jan Smuts airport without visas 
were unceremoniously “bounced”’, Christopher Munnion recalled,191 and ‘Those 
who slipped through the net were followed day and night by agents of the new 
Bureau of State Security – BOSS… Phones were tapped, cables were intercepted and 
mail was tampered with and opened.  The upshot…was that most stories emanating 
from the correspondents who had managed to get into South Africa concentrated on 
the efforts and heroics in dodging BOSS rather than the critical social and political 
issues facing the country’.192  Even by the end of the second week of April, there 
were signs that the Emergency had indeed begun to affect the nature of British press 
treatment of the country in this way for it focused intensely on the arrests of Phillips 
and Blumberg over and above the issue of African action and apartheid. 
South African journalists operated under the same conditions, but daily, and 
they had families in the country to protect and support.  Younghusband recalls that 
‘although absolute press censorship never arrived’ during the apartheid era, ‘certain 
newspapers or issues were banned at times and eventually with more than 90 
restrictive laws to contend with editors faced an almost daily risk of fines or 
prison’.193  Some were influenced or intimidated by Government pressure.  Some 
ploughed on regardless.  Others, who felt particularly threatened, or whose raison 
d’etre was putting a stop to apartheid, chose to go into exile to work freely if they 
felt this impossible to achieve from within.  Importantly, there was also less to cover.  
British press reporting of events in colonial Africa had long ridden on the back of 
African action, usually as it clashed with the machinery of the State.  Under the 
Emergency, most prominent African leaders had been detained, indefinitely, and the 
protests subsided. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter supports the view that the British press criticised the South 
African Government and the system of apartheid strongly during these weeks.  Yet it 
argues that the press portrayed Sharpeville and the events which followed it as a 
story of African action, power and violence just as much as, if not more than, 
African victimhood.  The chapter also suggests that the British press displayed far 
greater ambiguity on the subject of direct responsibility for the deaths, and a greater 
lack of consensus, particularly initially, on appropriate international, including 
British, responses to the issue of white violence. 
Press content was born of more than a sense of shock and horror at the 
deaths, or a cultural or moral revulsion against apartheid.  The emphasis on African 
power at Sharpeville and after resulted from African efforts to stimulate a change 
locally.  It also stemmed from the nature of the press’s central narratological frames 
for Central and Southern Africa by 1960, which turned on the relation between 
African (as opposed to white) action, violence and opinion and the necessity of 
decolonisation, the perspective which informed its critique of the South African 
state; as well as the specific ways in which the British press produced its South 
Africa coverage, which hinged on its close relations with the South African English-
language press, many of whose writers were in daily contact with the PAC and other 
African nationalist organisations, tracking their operations.  Directly following the 
massacre, the difficulties inherent in covering unexpected events influenced 
journalists’ focus on African action and violence, too, because it forced the press to 
look to official South African police reports of the incident for information.  The 
British press’s initial ambiguity, and its lack of consensus on how Britain should 
respond to the issue of white violence also reflected the specific dynamics, and 
limitations, involved in evaluating unexpected events.  Yet the limits of the press’s 
vision for South Africa, and the political perspectives of some British journalists and 
editors were also continued key influences. 
The references to African violence Thörn identifies in some newspapers did 
not therefore merely provide a possibility to express support for one section of the 
anti-apartheid movement whilst repudiating those activists regarded as too militant.  
Instead, they formed an integral part of journalists’ understanding of the dangers of 
apartheid.  The ‘certain silences’ which he mentions, moreover, such as the absence 
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of comment on the desirability of full democracy, reflected more than ‘tacit 
assumptions’ regarding the limits of change in South Africa within a rising tide of 
increasingly critical discourse.  ‘Silences’ were fundamentally more active in genesis 
and effect, playing into a context in which apartheid thrived. 
The impact of coverage was more complex, then, than existing studies 
indicate in their focus on the international, including British, dynamic, global public 
opinion, and the rise of the anti-apartheid movement.  In the case of the British press, 
coverage appeared to have a greater impact in South Africa than in Britain, and in 
Britain it may even have encouraged passivity at key moments. 
During these weeks, the British press provided a space for a number of South 
African journalists, English-speakers and anti-apartheid activists residing in South 
Africa, in addition to some African leaders, to pursue political, career, and other 
objectives.  Their articles rebounded, fomenting division, circulating opposition 
views in the context of stringent internal censorship; and fuelling debates in white 
society on the causes of the troubles, which, in the Union Government’s view, 
included agitation and the cultivation of African grievances by English-speakers and 
‘sell-outs’.  British press content also stimulated the South African Government’s 
desire to crack down further on press and other freedoms.  It blew the myth of 
Commonwealth solidarity the British Government was vainly trying to promote.  It 
helped turn South Africa in on itself; thus, in the short-term contributing to the 
consolidation of apartheid. 
In Britain, the implications of coverage were less transformative, chiefly 
because interested organisations or institutions, such as the British Government, the 
Labour Party, and anti-apartheid activists, had their eyes and interests fixed on places 
other than the British press and public sphere.  In its initial ambiguity on direct 
responsibility for the deaths, however, and its lack of consensus on appropriate 
international responses to the issue of white violence, it may have played a small 
consoling or constraining role in relation to the British Government’s reluctance to 
condemn the behaviour of the South African authorities.  At some critical points, 
moreover, its emphasis on specific instances of African action and power contributed 
to the view that an African victory was imminent or at the very least achievable, a 
narrative which may have augured against public support for meaningful 
intervention.  The press also plied British readers with a selective, self-affirming 
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narrative, which may have eased the mental burden both of responsibility and of 
inaction. 
Lastly, it is hoped that the emphasis this chapter has placed on the South 
African dimension to British press coverage of Sharpeville as well as the ways in 
which British newspapers were affected by the train of events, sits better with the 
subsequent trajectory of South Africa/world relations during the ‘silent sixties’ than 
does an emphasis on the transformative impact of press coverage in Britain.  
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A view from inside the fence, 
facing south-west, 
immediately after the 
shootings.  Reeves, Shooting 
at Sharpeville. Illustration 
following p. 64. 
This photo appeared in all of 
the papers following the 
massacre, but I have found it 
hard to reproduce these 
images effectively. 
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From top to bottom: Mirror, 
31 March 1960, fp; Mail, 31 
March 1960, fp. 
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From top to bottom: Mirror, 1 
April 1960, p. 3; Mail, 6 April 
1960, p. 10; News Chronicle, 
7 April 1960, p. 6. 
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Chapter 6 
Supporting the Belgians on the Congo, 1960 
 
On 30 June 1960, the Belgian Congo became independent Congo, with 
Patrice Lumumba as its first Prime Minister.  Within a week, the Army had 
mutinied.  Within two weeks, its richest province, Katanga, had declared its 
independence from the central government, under the leadership of Moise Tshombe.  
The diamond-rich province of South Kasai followed suit, ushered out by its leader, 
Albert Kalonji.  The country descended into violence as Congolese political factions 
and interested Belgians grappled for power in the face of the efforts of the central 
government to retain control.  The UN mounted a huge peace-keeping operation.  
The West feared Russian intervention.  The Russians feared Western intervention.  
Cold War tensions spiralled.  The President, Joseph Kasavubu, dismissed Lumumba 
as Prime Minister, appointed a new one, Joseph Ileo, and reshuffled the Army.  
Lumumba dismissed Kasavubu.  Joseph-Desire Mobutu, the (new) Army chief 
dismissed them both.  Within eight months, Lumumba would be dead, the country he 
once presided over metaphorically consigned to the scrap-heap of history.
1
  In many 
ways, there it has remained ever since, cited by historians and political commentators 
alike as the ultimate ‘failed state’, at war with itself and others; bejewelled and 
resource-rich, poor, preyed upon, conflicted and conflictual. 
 A number of core reasons have been put forward to explain this calamitous 
series of events.  One concerns the character of Belgian colonial rule, both 
historically and immediately prior to independence.
2
  During the nineteenth century, 
King Leopold II’s notorious regime helped to condition a pattern of brutality, 
resource extraction and foreign intervention.  Belgium’s ‘paternal’ approach to 
colonial governance in subsequent years had the devastating effect of inhibiting the 
growth of national political parties until the eleventh hour; before which the colonial 
government channelled African political aspirations, somewhat divisively, into 
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‘ethnic’ form.  The fact that there are a vast number of ethnic groupings in the 
Congo, dating back to the pre-colonial era, made matters worse.
3
  A second 
explanation concerns personal agency at the time, in the form of the actions of 
Lumumba and his Congolese political opponents.
4
  In the case of the latter, these are 
considered to have reflected the potency of ethnic nationalisms, regional interests 
and the pursuit of personal power.  In the case of Lumumba, the majority of works 
(and most are early studies) detail factors such as ‘the instability of Lumumba’s 
personality’ and his ‘ruthless impatience’.5  A third factor relates to external (non-) 
intervention in all its forms in the Congo at and following independence.
6
  Earlier 
works in this category focused on the difficulties facing the UN and that 
organisation’s apparent failure in the face of forces greater than itself.  Yet more 
recent studies have elucidated the very effectiveness not of overt, but of covert 
foreign intervention in the Congo, including efforts by senior UN officials, the 
Belgian Government and the West to influence the outcome in ways initially 
unfavourable to Congolese national integrity. 
A last factor, which is particularly important for this chapter’s analysis, 
centres on the politics of identity and of identity construction.  Works in this 
category posit the existence of a direct and demonstrable relationship between 
identities as constructed and the inception and trajectory of the crisis.
7
  Kevin C. 
Dunn, for example, has shown how three groups (the Belgian Government, the U.S. 
Government and Lumumba) battled to ‘author’ Congolese identity during these 
critical months, each promoting their own narrative, chiefly through the media: one, 
a colonial narrative of paternalism and ownership (Belgium); two, a narrative of 
Cold War competition, Congolese barbarity and chaos (the U.S.); and three, a 
narrative of colonial exploitation, repression and resource extraction (Lumumba).  
Because of the ways in which identities, as understood, motivate or facilitate certain 
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political manoeuvres in any given situation, Dunn argues, and because of the 
inability in the case of the Congo of Lumumba to access ‘discursive space’, first 
Belgian and then international intervention taken in opposition to the Congolese 
government and its Prime Minister occurred without significant obstruction, 
fomenting division. 
The frequency with which the words ‘chaos’, ‘anarchy’, ‘heart of Africa’, 
and ‘darkest Africa’ occur even within the historical works cited here, and the fact 
that many of these terms are rooted in literary and other works of a much earlier 
period,
8
 appear to confirm the importance of Dunn’s observations because they 
suggest that cultural and other tropes of a certain kind indeed exist or existed 
whenever the Congo was and is discussed, framing the responses of outsiders.  The 
Nigerian author, Chinua Achebe, has famously written on the subject of depictions 
of Africa which prevail in the West and the damage they do.
9
  It is notable that 
Achebe’s seminal work on this topic, An Image of Africa, focuses on the Congo and 
is a critique of Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness. 
This chapter examines the nature and role of British press coverage of the 
Congo in the country’s first few months of independence.  It aims to complement 
Dunn’s work by concentrating on the coverage of one country (Britain) as opposed 
to three (Britain, Belgium and the US), enabling a fuller and deeper examination of a 
range of papers as opposed to one (The Times), and by drawing on additional 
sources, including archival records.  Newspaper articles from left- and right-leaning 
mainstream British papers have been consulted, both ‘popular’ and ‘serious’; the 
memoirs and other writings of British journalists and editors; the archive of The 
Times; the records of the British Government; the memoirs of British politicians; and 
the speeches of Lumumba. 
In addition to its being a further case study which takes us chronologically 
further on in time and which provides an opportunity to gain extra insight into the 
role of the British press at the end of empire, the Congo is included in this thesis 
because it provides an opportunity to engage with the question most often asked of 
this author at seminars; that is, how did the British press present Britain in 
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comparison to other European colonial powers during decolonisation?  It is also 
considered significant because of the extent to which the Congo has been etched into 
British journalistic folklore. 
This chapter argues that the primary significance of British press coverage of 
the Congo during this period was that it helped impede Lumumba’s ability to rule.  
In this, it has much in common with Dunn.  Yet it presents a different set of reasons, 
which, in the case of the British press, it suggests, had less to do with the ability of 
the primary actors to access ‘discursive space’ than it had to the internal workings of 
British newspapers, the British press’s partiality, and the ways in which journalists 
experienced events on the ground.  Moreover, it questions the extent to which 
representations of the Congo of the three types Dunn discusses, including historical 
cultural, truly guided or defined international media responses to the Congo crisis.  It 
asks whether we need to expand our understanding of the significance of newspaper 
texts in this instance to include other, more specific representations of individual 
day-to-day events. 
British press treatment concentrated on Congolese political and other 
divisions, violence against whites, the credibility of the different regions’ competing 
claims to sovereignty, and tensions between the Belgians and Tshombe on the one 
hand, and the UN on the other.  In this, it anticipated the earlier historiography.  Yet 
crucially, too, the press made little attempt to investigate the full significance of 
those of Belgium’s behind-the-scenes or more underhand activities (or those of 
senior UN officials) of which it was aware. 
These pro-Belgian, anti-Lumumba characteristics were born of a variety of 
editorial, cultural, institutional and experiential factors influencing British 
journalists; although, over time, the features detailed above also produced a set of 
narratological frames and descriptive terminology, which made subsequent anti-
Lumumba, pro-Belgian interpretations of local events appear the most plausible.  
One of the reasons why this case study is particularly interesting is that it provides an 
opportunity to analyse the birth, I would argue, of a set of press ‘frames’ for a 
particular country.  It seems that British journalists were far less able in the case of 
the Congo, as compared to the other countries and territories discussed in this thesis, 
to draw on previously-formulated contextual understanding or fully-fledged views of 
the events they were reporting.  Historically, they also had far less of a physical 
presence.  The jam-packed nature of the continual, momentous series of events 
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outlined earlier makes it easy to identify the significance British editors and 
journalists attached to previous, yet arguably almost contemporaneous, comment and 
content when interpreting incidents.  This is partly what made the crisis itself, and 
British press coverage of it, so significant. 
It had a number of important effects, not only regarding helping set the 
pattern, arguably, for later press readings of events in the Congo, Zaire and the 
DRC.
10
  Most fundamentally, it lent support to the idea of external intervention 
whilst obscuring the full extent of that intervention in practice, contributing to an 
international socio-political environment in which the West was able to act with 
impunity and Lumumba found few, and even lost some, allies.  It also served to 
advance the cause of Lumumba’s Congolese political opponents.  The divisive role 
British newspaper coverage played in local events can therefore be said to have 
mirrored its role elsewhere in Africa during this period. 
Throughout it all, as elsewhere, too, Britain came across well, partly because 
of the press’s positive portrayal of parallel constitutional developments in British 
colonial territories such as Nyasaland, but also – crucially – due to its depiction of 
the British and/or Western role in the Congo itself.  Importantly, journalists set 
Britain firmly on the side of Belgium, rather than in opposition to it.  This is not to 
suggest that the British Government viewed British press coverage in entirely 
positive terms, for it was the source of some diplomatic tension.  Yet it can be said to 
have been perceived as less damaging to British interests than British press coverage 
of other regions, such as Ghana and the Federation. 
 
1. The first ten days: Division, rape and rescue efforts 
 
Numerous reports of African-on-African violence, Congolese political 
rivalry, and even talk of secession for regions in the lead-up to independence framed 
the British press’s coverage of the independent Congo’s first two weeks.  The lead-
up to the elections of May to June, and then their implementation, were portrayed as 
having been very violent,
11
 and the results were understood to have been 
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inconclusive.
12
  No one leader had won a majority of the vote, although Lumumba 
and his party, the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), had won the most seats.  
Readers were told that Lumumba’s political opponents had challenged the result and 
that their supporters had clashed with those of the MNC in the streets.
13
  The 
subsequent political settlement, which involved the creation of a coalition of sorts, 
with one of Lumumba’s chief opponents, Joseph Kasavubu, appointed as President, 
was regarded as having brought much-needed relief; the result in large part, so 
correspondents indicated, of Belgian diplomatic interventions in favour of unity.
14
  
Yet tensions were understood to remain, marring the lead-up to the big day, and 
hanging over the festivities like a storm cloud.
15
  Moise Tshombe, the leader of the 
region of Katanga, was reported as having threatened secession.
16
  Europeans were 
said to have been threatened in the streets, news which only added to the sense of 
imminent doom.
17
 
To some extent, these reports merely reflected the course of events on the 
ground.  Violence did occur in the streets, no one leader had won a majority of the 
votes, and a coalition was created just in the nick of time through negotiations in 
which the Belgians had played an important role.  Tshombe had talked of secession.  
And Europeans had been threatened.  Yet there were important omissions in such a 
story.  The press’s emphasis on African division; and its neglect, in some cases, of 
the part played by Africans, including Lumumba, in the creation of the coalition, 
together with the attention given the Belgian role, gave life to the view that the 
differences that existed between the Congolese political leaders were somehow 
innate or irreconcilable, and that external intervention was the prime cohesive force.  
This early ‘framing’ of the Congo was important because it helped to cultivate a 
climate of opinion in which the subsequent violence and division was permitted to be 
regarded as little more than an inevitable consequence of the country’s fractured 
political composition.  In a pattern which would repeat itself, notably, too, the press 
devoted little space to the underhand ways in which Belgium helped forge the 
                                                          
12
 Mail, 26 May 1960, p. 15; Mail, 4 June 1960, p. 5; Mail, 9 June 1960, p. 11; Guardian, 9 June 
1960, p. 9. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Mail, 20 June 1960, p. 5. 
15
 Observer, 26 June 1960, p. 6; Mail, 28 June 1960, p. 9; Express, 28 June 1960, p. 2; Express, 29 
June 1960, p. 2; Guardian, 29 June 1960, p. 9. 
16
 Mail, 14 June 1960, p. 9; Express, 14 June 1960, p. 2.; Guardian, 15 June 1960, fp. 
17
 Mirror, 5 May 1960, p. 3; Mail, 5 May 1960, p. 13; Express, 30 May 1960, p. 2. 
  
236 
 
political settlement, which included its modification of the Basic Law to placate a 
restive Tshombe as well as to protect their own interests, and which, as de Witte has 
argued, helped pave the way for the eventual secession of the region.
18
 
On the specific issue of Katanga, the nature of British press content had 
repercussions in Whitehall.  The Foreign Office feared press interest chiefly because 
of the particular way in which Katanga, a region of the Congo which bordered 
Northern Rhodesia, had recently appeared in British newspapers.  The word 
‘Katanga’ had entered the public domain back in March (1960) as the direct result of 
an interview Rene MacColl had conducted with Sir Roy Welensky, in which the 
Federal Premier had spoken of the possibility of a link-up.
19
  This had caused a small 
diplomatic hiatus, when the Belgian Ambassador to Britain had contacted the 
Foreign Office to ask for clarification.
20
  The British Consul-General in Leopoldville 
reported that the Express article had received wide publicity there, too, causing ‘a 
few cases of mingled alarm and outrage by Congo leaders’.21  Because of the ways in 
which MacColl, and then further newspaper correspondents and their papers and 
other interested parties homed in on ‘Katanga’ from March, the region was marked 
out as ‘different’ in the British press imagination, contributing to the overall image 
of differentiation within the Congo prior to independence.  Importantly, this was 
despite the fact that the genesis of the idea of a link-up was to be found with Belgian 
mine directors, not Africans.
22
  Although some British papers, such as The Times, 
privately displayed awareness of these Belgian manoeuvres,
23
 the British press made 
very little effort to explore them in coverage. 
The theme of ‘division’ that characterised press coverage of the Congo in the 
lead-up to independence therefore reflected more than the replication of ‘tribal’ or 
‘paternal’ stereotypes of the kind Dunn discusses, because journalists were also 
responding to observable events in which tribal and other political groupings were 
undeniably significant.  It was also the product of other recent, observable dynamics 
such as the place of ‘Katanga’ in the press imagination by June, as well as the over-
                                                          
18
 De Witte, Assassination of Lumumba, pp. 5-6. 
19
 “There’s going to be hell because I’ve told you this”, Express, 2 March 1960. 
20
 Confidential Foreign Office memorandum by H.T.C. Smith, 18 March 1960, FO 
371/146632/1015/64. 
21
 British Consul-General, Leopoldville, to the Foreign Office, 7 March 1960, FO 
371/146630/1015/39. 
22
 Ibid.  Also Oliver Woods to the editor, 10 March 1960, MEM/Zaire file 1958-1961, TNL Archive. 
23
 Ibid. (TNL Archive). 
  
237 
 
reliance of British newspapers on news agencies and the reports of Brussels’s 
correspondents for their Congo coverage at this stage,
24
 which affected their ability 
to assess the situation independently.  The uniformity across British newspapers at 
this point is significant.  The majority of British papers did not have their own 
correspondent stationed in the Congo.  Those which did, did not necessarily select 
employees on the basis of their being well-versed in the history of the politics of the 
region.  This may have made them more reliant on ‘official’ sources.  David Holden, 
a journalist at The Times, noted that Arslan Humbaraci, The Times’s Leopoldville 
stringer, had at the time of his appointment (June 1960) ‘been in Africa for only a 
few months, but… he is very experienced, especially in the Middle East… and Far 
East’.25  By the end of August, he had disappeared.26 
Against this backdrop came coverage of the independence celebrations at the 
very end of June.  The two events which garnered the most press attention were, 
first, the snatching of King Baudouin’s sword as he rode through Leopoldville;27 and 
second, Lumumba’s speech to gathered dignitaries on Independence Day.28  Both 
were reported as needless affronts to the departing Belgians: the first rather amusing; 
the second much more serious.  Journalists quoted Lumumba’s now-famous speech 
extensively, documenting many of the leader’s accusations concerning the brutal 
nature of Belgian colonial rule.
29
  Correspondents had been handed a copy of the text 
before the ceremony, which probably enabled them to do this (although Lumumba 
was said to have added parts, upon hearing Baudouin’s speech).30  Press reports 
tended not to quote either the King’s speech or President Kasavubu’s, both of which 
journalists regarded as rather nondescript. 
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This was significant because the King’s speech was equally ‘surprising’ in 
that it functioned as a positive potted history of Belgian colonial rule in the Congo.
31
  
The privileging of the content of Lumumba’s speech in reports, and their critical 
nature, suggests that more lay behind press depictions of events than the ability of 
the major actors to access discursive space, although the Belgians’ earlier monopoly 
on the supply of information from the Congo had very likely left a representational 
legacy.  Indeed, it was Lumumba’s forceful, unapologetic entry into discursive space 
that was the story on Independence Day, a view which chimed with the private 
Belgian response according to historians,
32
 and which marked the new leader out as a 
resentful hothead who was predicted to cause trouble and who, some journalists 
seemed to believe, probably hated all white people.  During this week, the press 
discussed Belgium’s failure adequately to prepare the Congo for independence.  Yet 
this did not translate into sympathy for Lumumba or any emotional attachment to the 
content of his speech, pointing to the presence of a certain amount of ignorance on 
the part of British journalists of the full history of Belgian colonial rule in Central 
Africa, as well as the possible lack of a legacy in Britain of the efforts of the Congo 
Reform Movement to alter perceptions.
33
  Although it cannot be ruled out, there 
appeared to be no specific Belgian mediation behind the production of this critical 
narrative, 200 foreign correspondents having travelled to Leopoldville for the 
ceremony.
34
  Lumumba was alarmed by aspects of the local and international 
response to his speech, issuing an apologetic ‘compensatory speech’ later that day 
and then,
35
 subsequently, clarifying certain of his views on, for instance, white 
people, which he believed had been distorted by both the Belgians and the media.
36
 
What most concerned Lumumba, however, on the topic of international 
perceptions of events in the Congo during this period, would be the media’s 
portrayal of the actions of the Congolese Army and of his ability to control it.  Two 
days following Independence Day, the Army ‘mutinied’ against its white officers, 
whose Belgian head, General Emile Janssens, was unwilling to countenance 
                                                          
31
 Meredith, State of Africa, p. 93. 
32
 De Witte, Assassination of Lumumba, pp. 3-4. 
33
 For the Congo Reform Campaign, see: E.D. Morel, History of the Congo Reform Movement 
(Oxford, 1968); Kevin Grant, ‘Christian Critics of Empire: Missionaries, Lantern Lectures, and the 
Congo Reform Campaign in Britain’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 29: 2 
(2001), pp. 27-58. 
34
 Guardian, 2 July 1960, p. 5. 
35
 Speech delivered at luncheon, 30 June 1960, in Van Lierde (ed.), Lumumba Speaks, pp. 225-6. 
36
 Press conference in New York, 25 July 1960, in ibid., pp. 285-307. 
  
239 
 
Africanisation of the command structure.
37
  The press religiously documented the 
course of the mutiny, including the soldiers’ use of violence against their white 
officers, the rape of officers’ wives and other white women, including nuns, and the 
subsequent out-flux of refugees into Brazzaville (French Congo), Uganda, Angola 
and Northern Rhodesia.
38
  The soldiers were referred to as ‘rebels’ or ‘mutineers’ 
throughout, a term which seemed appropriate initially in the context of their defiance 
of authority, but which stuck, with significant consequences.  It affected the press’s 
portrayal of subsequent events, because the national army, when in battle either with 
secessionist elements within the Congo or Belgian troops (or the UN), as ‘rebels’ 
tended in news reports not to appear as part of the legal machinery of government, 
undercutting its claim to legitimacy and, to the extent to which international 
perceptions were important, thus perhaps denting its efficacy.
39
  Press reports of the 
rape of white women, and of nuns in particular, some journalists regard as the 
defining moment of the crisis, an event so significant that the Congo was never able 
to re-define itself internationally.
40
 
Lumumba certainly believed this to be so in the first few weeks of 
independence, when he travelled to the U.S. with the specific intention of informing 
international opinion, at the UN and more widely, of the reality of the situation on 
the ground.
41
  At a press conference at the end of July, he explained that Belgium 
was waging a campaign of disinformation against his government, which had at its 
core the assertion that Lumumba, and in fact all Congolese, disliked Europeans.
42
  
He did not deny that attacks against whites had occurred, but he asked his listeners 
not to privilege stories of violence, including rape, over others, and reassured them 
both that the Congo was not ‘anti-European’ and that the mutinous soldiers had had 
more on their minds, with gripes against Congolese politicians and economic 
grievances also significant factors.  Even if the media’s reports of rape and other 
forms of violence had not in fact changed international opinion on the Congo, they 
still had a direct effect on the course of the crisis because they played a role in 
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Lumumba’s decision to leave the country.43  The Congo was left without its Prime 
Minister at a critical time, which may have aided and abetted disorder and division.  
Lumumba had had some success, when touring the country with Kasavubu in the 
days following the mutiny, in restoring a sense of calm to the areas he visited,
44
 
something which changed in his absence.  Some journalists later criticised Lumumba 
for ‘wandering’ around the world at this time,45 suggesting that they continued to 
possess little cognizance of the significance of the international dimension to the 
crisis’s genesis, a view which readers’ interpretations may have mirrored. 
Was Lumumba right in claiming either that British and other foreign 
newspapers had devoted a disproportionate amount of space to reports of violence 
against white people or that the Belgian Government was behind it?  Certainly, some 
commentators at the time indicated that atrocity stories had to be treated with 
reserve.
46
  Others thought that the stories of rape, in particular, had been ‘somewhat 
exaggerated’.47  Most reporters, particularly initially, based their articles on 
interviews with Belgian and other white, European refugees many of whom by their 
own admission had fled the disaster spots before any disaster had occurred, and were 
thus merely reproducing stories they had heard from others.  At this time, most 
journalists found it hard to access the areas in which the majority of the violence had 
occurred and were unable alternatively to contact residents over the airwaves, partly 
because the main communication lines had been cut at the time of the mutiny.
48
 
Yet, there were enough first-hand accounts of rapes in the days which 
followed, either as a result of journalists’ efforts to visit the disaster spots or as a 
result of these women becoming refugees themselves and thus leaving the areas that 
were cut off, to justify their presence in British newspapers.  Even the sceptics, such 
as Humbaraci, who had told a member of the editorial team at The Times that ‘the 
Belgians had brought some of this on themselves’, with their ‘loose’ morals and 
‘provocative attire’, acknowledged that the rape count had been high, putting it at 
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approximately 300.
49
  Whether these stories were given a disproportionate amount of 
space in relation to stories, for example, of African deaths, is an important question 
and one must answer in the affirmative to some extent, but then, given the size of the 
European community, perhaps not.  All of the European women in some camps were 
affected.  Certainly, and remarkably, newspapers paid no real attention to news of a 
Belgian attempt on the Prime Minister’s life at this time, a story which one might 
consider important!
50
 
On the question of whether the Belgian Government was responsible for the 
proliferation of the reports of violence against whites appearing in the British and 
other foreign media, it would seem that this was only partly the case.  The Belgian 
Government was certainly keen to foster these stories by issuing press releases to 
this effect, particularly in the context of justifying a Belgian military intervention 
entirely in support, so they explained, of the survivors.
51
  Yet its most 
comprehensive efforts in this regard began at the end of July, after all the press 
reports had appeared, with an important press conference detailing the nature of the 
atrocities meted out to their countrymen and women.
52
  This was followed by the 
publication of a large booklet containing the same horrific information, which they 
sent out internationally, including to the Foreign Office.
53
  However, most British 
journalists based their accounts on the stories of refugees and victims of violence as 
opposed to the communiques of the Belgian Government. 
They were influenced by a number of factors.  One turned on the editorial 
directives of the journalists’ superiors, particularly in the case of popular papers 
whose businesses thrived on sensation.
54
  The centrality of this factor in the Congo 
case is encapsulated in the title of Ed Behr’s memoir “Anyone Here been Raped and 
Speaks English?”, words which Behr attributes to a BBC man roaming around 
Leopoldville airport in the aftermath of the mutiny seeking out potential 
interviewees.
55
  A second factor concerned physical access to stories, because most 
press representatives were stationed in the cities that refugees fled to, particularly 
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Brazzaville, but also Ndola in Northern Rhodesia, and Leopoldville.  This is borne 
out by the content of the datelines of the stories which appeared in the press, but it is 
also confirmed by archival evidence, such as in the case of Times.  During June and 
July, Humbaraci was based in Leopoldville, but he had also been provided with a 
house for his family in (safer) Brazzaville, across the river in French Congo.
56
  
Holden stayed at the Hotel Stanley in Leopoldville.
57
  Hotels appeared to be the site 
of some action, much camaraderie and a certain amount of ‘living it up’,58 which is 
one reason why journalists may not have wanted to venture far, although there were 
also numerous transport and communications difficulties, which shall be discussed in 
the following section. 
The apparently ‘simple’ nature of the story was a third contributory factor 
behind the press attention given the reports of rape and the white exodus.  Judging 
from the nature of their reports, many journalists approached the story at the level of 
individuals or ‘human interest’, which required of its writers and readers very little 
background knowledge of Congolese political and other events.  Accounts were 
often devoid of context, and photos were numerous.  Humbaraci confirmed the 
significance of this factor in his private conversation with Holden.  His emphasis on 
the loose morals of the Belgian women suggested that he interpreted the violence 
with reference to immediate, observable (even cultural?) dynamics, rather than 
deeper, bigger, older ones; most glaringly, the system of power and control which 
colonial rule entailed and which the African soldiers were, arguably, attempting to 
upend. 
A fourth factor concerned journalists’ own negative experiences as white 
people living in the Congo during these weeks, which many documented and which 
may have confirmed for them the sense that aggression against whites was a story 
that had to be told.  On 9 July, John Starr wrote an article for the Mail entitled ‘I am 
searched in street at gunpoint’.59  Starr wrote that he had been ‘frisked’ by 
‘mutineers’ whom he suspected were searching ‘any white’.  Overall, journalists’ 
representations of white settlers in the case of the Congo were markedly different 
from their depictions of the European communities of the Federation and South 
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Africa,
60
 although ‘white vulnerability’ stories which failed to tie up with papers’ 
editorial messages had appeared in popular press coverage at the time of the 
declaration of the State of Emergency in Nyasaland in March 1959.  In the Congo 
example, reports from the field and editorials meshed. 
Against this backdrop, Belgian rescue efforts were heavily publicised, 
receiving sympathetic treatment across the British press.
61
  In contrast, newspapers 
devoted little page space to the violence of Belgian soldiers against Congolese, as in 
Matadi on 11 July, when Belgian troops wreaked havoc in the city, killing 
approximately thirty Africans, including civilians.
62
  Neither did newspapers expend 
much energy analysing Lumumba’s protestations about the nature of Belgian 
military (and other) intervention.  Judging by the nature of editorial comment on 
these issues, the omissions stemmed from the fact that the press viewed Belgian 
violence against the backdrop of the violence of the mutineers, which was 
understood to have preceded, if not necessitated, it.
63
  Reports tended to focus on 
easily observable day-to-day events and practicalities, such as saving Belgian lives, 
as opposed to their interrogation or historical contextualisation.  This reflected not 
only perhaps Britain’s sense of a shared historical experience with Belgium, which 
may have inhibited the production of overly critical reports, but also the editorial 
imperatives or directives of British newspapers.  Over these weeks, The Times’s 
foreign editor continually sent instructions to its new stringer to focus on ‘what is 
happening’ over ‘background’ and ‘(speculation)’ because of the paper’s limited size 
as well as the costs of cabling long analyses.
64
  In the specific case of Matadi, 
neglecting to describe or to question the nature of Belgian intervention might also be 
attributed to Belgian efforts to restrict access to the site, as well as to the emergence 
on the very same day of ‘new’ news, with Tshombe’s announcement that Katanga 
had seceded from the Republic. 
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2. Mid-July to mid-August: Secession, violence, and the role of the UN 
 
Importantly, many papers portrayed the substance of Tshombe’s declaration 
as an established fact.  From this moment on, journalists described Katanga to have 
seceded, or even to be independent.
65
  While some referred to Tshombe more 
neutrally as the new Congo ‘strong-man’, others quickly dubbed him ‘Premier’ and 
some even ‘Prime Minister’.  This had a number of significant consequences, the 
most important of which was that it lent extra power and credence to one of 
Lumumba’s political opponents, whose challenges became ‘realities’ largely because 
of the ways in which they were understood by outsiders, including the media, which 
then propagated them.  According to an article in the Herald two days later (the 
14
th
), Tshombe had himself been alarmed at the media response to his words, 
claiming that he had been ‘misunderstood’, and that what he actually wanted was 
more power for his region in a federated Congo.
66
 
It should not be forgotten, moreover, when considering the role of the press 
in this specific case, that the Congo is vast, not particularly heavily populated and 
that internal telegraphic or telephonic communications for most people were not 
well-developed in 1960.  This was partly what prompted Lumumba and Kasavubu 
physically to visit areas of unrest following the mutiny.  In reporting, interpreting, 
and propagating the statements of Lumumba’s political opponents throughout this 
period, then, the press also helped nationalise or universalise that which might 
otherwise have remained local, and as Tshombe’s nervy initial response to coverage 
indicated, this was not simply the result of politicians’ (including his) skilful 
attempts at media manipulation.  A further significant point is that the press tended 
to portray the secession of Katanga, certainly initially, as an internal Congolese affair 
dominated by the person of Tshombe, despite the heavy Belgian presence in the 
region noted by the majority of correspondents.  This continued to give life to the 
view that the division of the Congo was at heart the consequence of the Katangan 
people’s claim to self-determination, a view which historians have shown to be 
manifestly untrue.
67
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Again, there seemed to be more at play behind these representations than 
journalists’ re-envisioning earlier colonial narratives.  Editorial content suggested 
that the press’s portrayal of the secession of Katanga as an internal Congolese affair 
stemmed from its earlier framing of the crisis.  The secession appeared as logically 
contiguous with the earlier election result, the difficult negotiations which followed, 
and the street violence which accompanied them.  It also appeared consistent with 
earlier Belgian efforts to ‘unite’ that which would otherwise supposedly have 
fractured.  Notably, too, the secession of Katanga received far more coverage than 
the subsequent secession of South Kasai, whose name had not entered the public 
domain to such an extent in the months prior to Kalonji’s announcement.  The 
press’s portrayal of Tshombe’s declaration as an established fact can be attributed to 
the continued pressure on foreign correspondents to report ‘what was happening’ 
day-to-day, as well as partly perhaps to the difficulties they faced in this new era of 
‘independence’ in transcribing in recognisable form the course and character of 
events in post-colonial African states for British metropolitan audiences, a 
complication which seems to have been uppermost in a number of journalists’ 
minds.
68
 
Contributing to the image of crisis, back in the Republic were further reports 
from white refugees of brutalities meted out by the Army rebels, which attracted 
significant coverage, and the story of a sensational clash between ‘Belgian 
paratroopers’ and ‘mutinous Congolese troops’ inside Leopoldville airport (N’Djili), 
which both were fighting for, and which the majority of British popular papers gave 
front-page treatment.
69
  N’Djili was easily accessible, most correspondents being 
based in the city.  This story further illustrates the sorts of pressures, competitive and 
otherwise, on British journalists to produce action-packed sensational reports as 
opposed to political or background analyses, introduced if possible with the line ‘I 
was there as…’.  The event appears to have been etched into British journalists’ 
memories for this reason.  George Gale was in the airport for the Express at the time 
of the clash, when he heard the phone ring, so the story goes.
70
  A Belgian airport 
official answered it, and handed the phone to Gale.  It was Sandy Gall of Reuters.  
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Gale’s report contained a prominent reference to the Reuters’ man phoning him to 
find out what was happening, a move which caused Gall considerable grief.
71
 
The way the British press represented the story more generally also illustrates 
its partiality for victims with white skins and the continued significance of its earlier 
framing of the crisis, including the use of specific terminology to refer to the 
different sets of combatants, but also the prevalence from independence of tales of 
white victimhood and survival.  Some of the white civilians present during the 
airport clash had been the victims of the sexual and other violence of the mutiny.  
The story’s focus might also have reflected the influence of editors.  Despite the 
extended descriptions in newspaper reports of Belgian violence throughout the 
airport drama, the general sense the articles conveyed, reinforced by now iconic 
shots of nuns cowering on the floor and white women on stretchers, all waiting for 
flights to Belgium,
72
 was of Europeans under siege.  Developments in the British 
Empire provided a welcome contrast.  The same day, the press gave prominence to 
Hastings Banda’s politically astute remarks that ‘the Congo terror’ would not occur 
in an independent Nyasaland because ‘the British have treated us too fairly for 
that’.73 
During the following week, the airport drama continued, now with the 
Belgians firmly in control, with a visit by Lumumba and Kasavubu, who were 
passing through on their way to Stanleyville.  The story illustrates the extent to 
which British journalists continued to overlook the unwanted or illegal Belgian 
presence in the Congo, as well as their continued indifference to Belgian attacks, 
verbal or otherwise, on Lumumba’s person, and their affinity for European victims.  
A report Lumumba made on 15 July to the Chamber of Deputies, which included a 
discussion of this incident, clearly illustrates the extent to which Belgians retained 
control of vast amounts of the country.
74
  The two men had just attempted to fly to 
Elisabethville, the capital of Katanga, but a group of Belgian military personnel had 
refused them permission to land.  They had then been refused permission to fly to 
Stanleyville, where they had hoped to return, being flown on to Leopoldville against 
their wishes.  There, they sought to charter a Sabena plane back to Stanleyville, 
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which they eventually secured, hoping to fly from Ndolo airfield (in Leopoldville) 
but being asked to return to N’Djili. 
It was here that the incident occurred, which Lumumba regarded as a 
‘ridiculous’ Belgian ‘trap’.75  When he and Kasavubu returned, ‘The Belgian troops 
stared at us in a very peculiar way’, he explained: ‘Then all the Europeans at the 
airport surrounded us and called us “apes,” “murderers,” “hoodlums,” “thieves,” and 
so on… some of them spat in my face and pulled my beard, and one of them jostled 
me and took my glasses.  We endured other humiliations, as the Belgian soldiers 
stood by and watched in amusement’.76  ‘There were foreign journalists present’, 
Lumumba added: ‘Instead of telling the world about this, they have come to ask us 
for statements, for press conferences!  What are we to do?’  Lumumba was wrong in 
one regard; and right in another.  The press had certainly reported the attack on 
Lumumba, including the punch the Prime Minister had received to the face, but had 
chosen to foreground the Belgian cries at the time of the assault of ‘How would you 
like it if someone raped your wife?’ and Lumumba’s response, all smiles and 
impassivity so they said, which journalists regarded as an affront to the victims, and 
which appeared to mark a definitive moment in the popular press’s portrayal of the 
Prime Minister.
77
  Lumumba’s account signifies that this was due to the way in 
which the Belgians successfully manipulated the media presence at the airport, but 
the partiality of the British press and its earlier framing of the crisis also remained 
significant factors.  In addition, the absence from the left-leaning popular press of a 
more sympathetic narrative during these months, in the Mirror’s case, seems to have 
reflected Donald Wise’s recent move from the Express, in addition to the absence of 
a desire on the part of the paper’s management to restrain him in the production of 
prolific yet rather ill-informed, sensational pieces.  Wise had a healthy disregard for 
Mirror readers, whose lips, he told his colleagues “move… as they read”.78 
Although the press began to devote more space during this slightly later 
period to reports of Belgian misdeeds, these kinds of stories never became dominant 
features of coverage.  The one big exception was a series of pieces Arthur Cook 
wrote for the Mail on the incidents which had occurred in Matadi on 11 July.  In the 
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following week, Cook had travelled to the port to gather the stories of Congolese 
survivors, which told of brutal Belgian reprisals in the wake of the mutiny, in which 
thirty Africans had died.
79
  Cook’s first report sparked a UN investigation.80  The 
Times’ special correspondent in Leopoldville, James Bishop, also wrote an article 
referring to Belgian ‘reprisals’,81 a move which caused the Belgian Government to 
complain to both the paper and the Foreign Office.
82
  In general, however, both 
critical articles on Belgian operations, and the testimony of Congolese civilians, 
were noticeably absent from British newspapers. 
Against this backdrop of secession and continued violence, the press viewed 
the prospect of UN intervention favourably.
83
  Again, this was not because British 
journalists regarded the Belgian military presence either as inadvisable or ineffective 
or divisive.  The press displayed little sympathy with Lumumba’s claim that UN 
troops were needed to help end Belgian aggression against the Congo, most editors 
remarking that any sensible country, faced with African attacks on its civilians, 
would have responded in exactly the same fashion.  But there was certainly a fear of 
racial clashes at this historical moment, as exemplified by press treatment of the 
Sharpeville massacre in South Africa,
84
 which seemed to inform the press’s opinion 
that intervention by a neutral, international body, such as the UN, represented the 
best way forward; and it gave considerable support to the UN operation. 
Significantly, however, this editorial support co-existed on the page with 
reports from the field which may in fact have dented the organisation’s capacity for 
effective action, thus potentially bolstering the Belgian case for an on-going colonial 
presence and continuing to undermine that of the elected Congolese central 
government.  Two kinds of reports had this effect.  The first were reports which 
highlighted the British role, such as those which documented the tremendous 
effectiveness, so correspondents claimed, of General Alexander’s leadership in the 
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first few days (before a Swedish General, General von Horn, took over).
85
  General 
Alexander was the British commander of the Ghanaian forces sent to the Congo as 
part of the UN operation.  The way in which certain sections of the British press, 
such as the Express, a paper much-hated in African nationalist circles, homed in on 
the British role, vaunting the exploits of Alexander, caused some to remark that it 
was virtually ‘kill(ing)’ the organisation’s efficacy because it had the effect of 
breeding distrust as to the ‘real’ nature of UN operations.86 
The second category of reports which may have dented the UN’s capacity for 
effective action were those which sensationalised or valorised Tshombe’s defiance of 
the organisation in his refusing initially to permit UN troops (and even UN officials) 
access to Katanga.
87
  The production of these reports can be attributed partly to the 
press’s penchant for conflict or sensation.  Yet by this stage journalists appear also to 
have begun to be influenced by Tshombe’s rather successful public relations 
efforts,
88
 which may have included ready access to his residence.  For some, the 
links were close, and Katanga’s defiance of the UN was mediated by the British 
press in more than one sense.  At one point, Peter Younghusband told Mail readers 
that he had contacted Tshombe late at night to deliver the first news that the UN had 
decided to postpone its entry date.
89
  ‘He was asleep’, the reporter explained: ‘I sent 
in a message, and he replied with a polite note thanking me and saying he was going 
back to sleep.  Soon his bedroom light went out again’. 
Some journalists later spoke of Katanga as an oasis of calm in an otherwise 
turbulent region,
90
 there being no real sense amongst British journalists that the 
secession had itself sparked violence.  When first reports of ‘tribal’ conflict in South 
Kasai emerged, the violence was presented as the consequence of the eruption of an 
‘ancient enmity’ between two groups, the Lulua and Baluba, which was said to have 
‘reignited’ following the Belgian exodus.91  Yet the violence was closely connected 
to Katanga’s secession.  Tshombe’s declaration had devastated the ability of the 
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central government to assert its authority and to deter further secessionist movements 
in other provinces,
92
 including Kasai, where, following Kalonji’s declaration, the 
minority Baluba (of which Kalonji was one) clashed with the majority Lulua, who 
supported Congolese integrity as articulated by Lumumba’s MNC.93  In northern 
Katanga, where the Baluba were also in a minority, the group held fast to the idea of 
Congolese integrity to save their skins, yet in doing so found themselves the object 
of attacks by Tshombe’s army as it marched north to consolidate CONAKAT’s hold 
over the province.
94
 
This border region became the site of much violence over the weeks and 
months to come, attracting considerable, yet fluctuating, press interest.  The area was 
certainly difficult to cover.  The Herald’s Anthony Carthew had been the first 
newspaperman since independence to reach Luluabourg, the capital of Kasai, yet to 
do so he wrote that he had had to fly 500 miles from Leopoldville, ‘hitch-hike airlifts 
for 1,000 miles’, and ‘travel hundreds of miles by car’, with only two oranges for 
sustenance.
95
  He had then had to fly ‘500 miles’ to find a cable office to send his 
story.  Carthew’s account may have been embellished as part of the journalistic 
tradition of producing stories ‘hard-won under fire’.96  Yet it did not appear to be 
unrepresentative of the experiences of most foreign correspondents, as internal 
letters and memoranda circulated at The Times, for example, attested to.
97
  Transport 
and communications difficulties affected the ability of most foreign correspondents 
to stray too far from Leopoldville.  The TELEX machine appeared to the source of 
much apprehension; and safety was also a concern.  The British ambassador to the 
Congo, Ian Scott, thought that this factor fuelled the production of ‘highly coloured 
accounts’ because journalists had to rely on their own imaginations for copy.98  Yet 
the obverse was also true, as Carthew’s lively report from the scene demonstrated. 
His portrayal of the violence in Kasai as the eruption of an ancient enmity 
might be attributed to editorial pressures on correspondents for sensational stories.  
Yet perhaps more importantly, it also appeared to stem from the fact that he did not 
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interrogate events deeply.   His report, like those from the region which followed, 
continued to ply British readers with the view that at the heart of the Congo’s crisis 
lay deeply-rooted Congolese political and other divisions as opposed to the more 
contemporaneous developments that de Witte amongst others has explored, and 
which included the actions of Tshombe and Kalonji and their Belgian and other 
Western (financial) supporters.  In doing so, the British press continued to promote 
the view that the secession of the two regions was either inevitable, or just, or both.  
The absence of a more nuanced or interrogative press narrative benefited the 
Belgians and the UN over Lumumba, who continued to find little international 
support for his protestations both on the nature of the Belgian presence and on the 
role of the UN, an organisation whose mandate the Congolese Prime Minister 
criticised on the basis that its ostensible impartiality, its inability to involve itself in 
‘internal disputes’, had very partial consequences in that it effectively consolidated 
the territorial division of the country. 
Significantly, these narratives continued to exist alongside an awareness on 
the part of the press both of the Belgian presence in key areas of the Congo such as 
Katanga, and even, at this slightly later date, of its true significance - in the sense 
that some journalists came to understand the secession of the region as having 
involved the actions of Belgians.
99
  In other words, these issues came to exist in 
‘discursive space’.  Yet when the Belgian presence or role was discussed, either 
editorially or within news reports, it tended to be portrayed sympathetically either as 
a continuation of the initial Belgian response to the mutiny and the attacks on 
Belgian civilians; or as a logical state of affairs given the region’s vast material 
resources in which Belgium had a financial stake; or as an irrelevancy in the sense 
that it was viewed as a symptom of Congolese political division as opposed to one of 
its very causes.  Notably, however, the press’s sense of affinity with Belgium’s 
plight never quite extended to negative depictions of events in Britain’s own empire.  
On 5 August, for example, even the left-leaning Mirror, commenting on the 
successful conclusion of the constitutional discussions on Nyasaland, was quick to 
draw the distinction.
100
  Hitherto, the paper had criticised the Government’s slow 
handling of the crisis in Central Africa.  It now chose to emphasise the preparatory 
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aspect.  ‘What a contrast to the chaos in the Congo, where the Belgians did nothing 
to prepare Africans for independence until it was too late’, the paper declared, ‘What 
a contrast to the smack-the-Africans-down policy of the South African Government.  
Mr. Macleod and the Nyasaland leaders show themselves men of vision.’ 
 
3. Mid-August to October: Leopoldville as storm centre, violence in South 
Kasai, and Lumumba under fire 
 
The following week, the press began to report instances of African violence 
against Lumumba, who had by now returned from the U.S.
101
  These articles 
appeared in the context of reports of continued violence more generally in 
Leopoldville involving clashes between MNC supporters and members of the 
ABAKO party, the Alliance des Bakongo, of which Kasavubu was the head.  Again, 
these sorts of reports reinforced the view that Congolese political and other divisions 
lay at the heart of the crisis, and by their very prevalence effectively obscured the 
Belgian or Western role in fomenting the conflict.  They also reinforced the view 
that Lumumba himself was deeply unpopular amongst the Congolese people, 
journalists’ vivid descriptions of the Prime Minister’s face-to-face interactions with 
these men on the street leaving perhaps an even stronger impression on readers than 
their earlier reports of happenings at the high political level, which had involved the 
announcements of politicians. 
In one sense, these reports purely reflected the train of events on the ground.  
Yet, thinking in terms of Congo coverage as a whole, significantly, they also 
stemmed from the constraints on British and other foreign correspondents’ freedom 
of movement, which meant that they were often confined to the capital, a city in 
which support for Lumumba had never been strong, being an ABAKO stronghold.
102
  
Arguably, the prevalence of reports from Leopoldville meant that the British press 
conveyed an unrepresentative picture of the Prime Minister’s popularity in the 
country at large.  Congolese troops and MNC supporters were also beginning to 
confront British and other foreign journalists at this stage,
103
 an acknowledgement, 
perhaps, that this was the case; yet also, counter-productively, fuelling a vicious 
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circle of distrust that then informed subsequent press reports of events in which these 
men were protagonists. 
Against this backdrop of continued dissent and violence, the press received 
the news of the eventual entry of the UN to Katanga and then to the whole of the 
Congo with a sigh of relief, again lending editorial support to the UN operation.  
News reports from the field, however, continued to paint a more equivocal picture in 
which the UN often appeared as the object of derision or ridicule.  Importantly, the 
press portrayed the entry of the UN to Katanga not as a victory for the organisation, 
but rather, a concession on the part of Tshombe.
104
  When Dag Hammarskjöld, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, landed on the tarmac at Elisabethville 
airport, with Tshombe there to greet him, journalists such as Younghusband noticed 
a certain frostiness between the two men, which became the focus of their reports.
105
  
The first category of articles (on Tshombe’s concessions) may have continued to 
dent the organisation’s capacity for effective action, by bolstering or valorising the 
exploits of its opponents and the contempt with which the latter held it.  The second 
category of articles (on the character of the relationship between the two men) 
appears to have contributed to a background context which had the effect of 
undercutting the validity of Lumumba’s subsequent accusations on the subject of 
collusion between certain UN officials, Tshombe and the Belgians, again 
contributing to an overall picture that obscured the issue of Western intrigue, and in 
the eyes of observers only turned the Congo in on itself once more. 
The subsequent raids, at the behest of Lumumba, by Congolese troops of UN 
offices in the hope of finding Belgian ‘spies’ the British popular press generally 
treated with extreme scepticism bordering on ridicule.
106
  Sections of the Western 
media’s portrayal of Lumumba as ‘irrational’ or ‘mad’ from this period on, together 
with press calls for his removal, must therefore be understood not purely as part of a 
U.S.-imposed narrative inspired by cold war politics, as Dunn has suggested, but 
also in the context of a specifically press-generated narrative which centred on 
tensions between the Prime Minister’s opponents - in this case, Tshombe and the 
Belgians on the one hand, and the UN on the other.  It was specifically press-
generated because British and other foreign journalists were able to witness events 
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on the ground, including the nature of interactions between men, at much closer 
quarters than any other international observers, and those interactions formed their 
sources.
107
  Journalists’ experiences at Lumumba’s press conferences probably only 
added to this general picture of confusion or unreasonableness, some having to wait 
hours longer than they had been told for the man to arrive.
108
  Others had been 
arrested by Lumumba’s men.109 
Fuelling this story of internal Congolese dissent and division, which lent tacit 
support to the idea of external intervention whilst obscuring the full extent of that 
intervention in practice, were further reports of what was happening in South Kasai, 
as more journalists, possibly inspired by Carthew’s example, made strenuous efforts 
to reach the region, chartering flights to the ‘trouble spots’.110  Correspondents 
continued both to document the violence between Lulua and Baluba and to tie the 
conflict to ancient tribal enmities.  Added to this, were fresh reports of the violence 
of the Congolese national army, which had entered the region in order to try to bring 
about the end of its secession.
111
 
Brutality and chaos were the dominant tropes the press used to describe what 
was happening in the area on all sides, at once a reflection of what they were seeing, 
yet also continuing to betray a certain degree of ignorance of the root causes, and 
thus the full significance, of the conflict.  Journalists were still under pressure to get 
out of the area quickly in order to file their stories, which prevented them from 
engaging deeply in the politics of the region.  They also appear at this time to have 
been spooked by the death in Bakwanga, the capital of South Kasai, of a foreign 
(U.S.) journalist, who, wearing ‘a khaki outfit which had a paramilitary look about 
it’, had apparently been mistaken for a Belgian soldier and shot.112  The press’s 
initial framing of events in the Congo as a fractious struggle prior to, at, and then 
immediately following independence may also have lain behind the production of 
this narrative of chaos and tribal enmity; as might editorial pressures on 
correspondents to report ‘what was happening’ over background analyses; and also 
the very ‘foreignness’ of the place, which some journalists later said defied objective 
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analysis, lending itself to anecdotal accounts which conveyed a ‘mood’ as opposed 
to historical or political evaluations based on familiar, Western, models or frames of 
reference.
113
 
Importantly, the character of the violence just over the border in northern 
Katanga received far less press attention.  That which did appear tended to be very 
unfavourable to Lumumba’s national army in the sense that its entry to the region, 
after its incursion into South Kasai, was presented as an ‘invasion’ rather than as an 
operation by the state to restore the republic’s territorial integrity, following the 
perceived failure of UN operations in this regard.
114
  Additionally, the violence of 
Tshombe’s army against the Baluba in the north tended not to be reported.  This 
appeared to owe something to the extent of Tshombe and the Belgians’ hold over the 
region, which made the free movement of outsiders, such as press reporters, 
difficult.
115
  British journalists had to rely on official press releases for information if 
they were not as intrepid as men such as Younghusband, who wrote that he braved 
the crocodile-infested waters of the river that separated the two regions to gain 
access to the territory.
116
  This over-reliance on official statements, in addition to the 
testimony of a continuing deluge of white refugees, seems to have led to the 
replication both of specific terminology such as ‘invasion’, and of descriptions of the 
nature of the violence, in which Tshombe’s troops were supposedly primarily 
fighting an incursion and ‘drug-crazed tribesmen’ as opposed to additionally 
repressing a minority.
117
 
Back in Leopoldville, riots and violence against the person of Lumumba 
continued to attract considerable press interest.
118
  Journalists continued to be 
handled ‘roughly’ by Congolese troops, possibly reinforcing a sense of solidarity 
with the opposition.  And then in the midst of this came news that Kasavubu had 
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sacked the Prime Minister, and had appointed a new one (Ileo) in his place.
119
  The 
British press reported Kasavubu’s announcement in much the same way that it had 
previously documented Tshombe’s statement that Katanga had seceded from the 
Republic; in other words, by reporting his claims as established facts, rather than as 
insubstantial or illegal challenges to the authority of the elected leader of the country.  
Although journalists also reported Lumumba’s subsequent refutation of Kasavubu’s 
assertion, together with Lumumba’s announcement that he had decided to dismiss 
Kasavubu from office, British press treatment of these events did continue to 
undercut Lumumba’s authority, making it more difficult for him to govern the 
country, if only because they made the Congolese leadership seem faltering or 
vacillating, even ridiculous, in the eyes of the world.  That there was more to 
Lumumba’s crisis here than Kasavubu’s actions is suggested by the Prime Minister’s 
decision to try to restrict journalists’ access to radio stations and cable offices at this 
time because it suggests that he regarded the mediation and dissemination of stories 
by the international press as an integral part of their formulation.
120
  Again, the press 
failed to report the Belgian role in Kasavubu’s machinations, so that the crisis in the 
Congo appeared once again as a purely home-grown affair. 
Over the following few days, the stories appearing in British newspapers 
displayed further continuity with earlier press narratives.  Congolese troops were 
reported to have beaten up a group of U.S. and Canadian airmen, working with the 
UN, whom they accused of being ‘spies’, a claim the press regarded with deep 
suspicion, choosing instead to present the story as one of white victimhood and 
survival.
121
  The UN was reported as having tightened its grip on the capital, and 
over the Congo more generally, where it had seized as many airports and radio 
stations as it had been able to.
122
  The British role, this time in the guise of a 21-year-
old Lieutenant, who defied Lumumba (and thus ostensibly headed off a crisis), by 
denying the Congolese Prime Minister access to Leopoldville radio station, was 
again vaunted in papers such as the Express.
123
  Lumumba’s parliamentary victory, 
in which members expressed their support for the Congolese leader, attracted some, 
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but little page space, and where it was publicised, the news tended at once to be 
overshadowed by more negative stories, such as the Prime Minister’s adoption of 
‘dictator powers’ (his declaration of a state of emergency),124 which recalled the 
press’s portrayal of independent Ghana during 1957,125 and his unreasonable, in the 
opinion of the press, call on the UN to depart tout de suite. 
Then came one of the most important stories of all in light of the subsequent 
future political trajectory of the country: the announcement from the (new) head of 
the army, Mobutu, that he had decided to sack both Lumumba and Kasavubu and 
govern the Congo himself.
126
  It followed hot on the heels of an embarrassing story 
the popular press gave front-page treatment, involving the apparent ‘arrest’ of 
Lumumba by the army, his ‘release’ and his subsequent efforts to ‘seize’ 
Leopoldville radio station, where he was reported as wishing to deny the claim that 
he had been arrested earlier on.
127
  The ways in which the press reported Mobutu’s 
announcement reflected its earlier coverage of Tshombe’s announcement regarding 
Katanga’s secession, and Kasavubu’s statement concerning the dismissal of 
Lumumba, in that it tended to portray the substance of his claims as credible.  Again, 
this bolstered the power of Lumumba’s opponents, for although the press also 
reported Lumumba’s subsequent denial of all of the above, the very fact that these 
competing narratives continually emanated from the Congo painted its leadership as 
vacillating and incompetent.  Arguably, Mobutu and his backers were well aware of 
this, and manipulated the media presence for their own ends.
128
 
Journalists followed Lumumba throughout Leopoldville during these weeks, 
often waiting for him outside his residence, and then tailing him when he left.
129
  
This may have been irritating for the Prime Minister and likely accounted for some 
of the ‘irrationality’ correspondents thought they saw in him.  Given the extent of the 
press attendance, reports of Congolese ‘mobs’ protesting in the area near his house 
were therefore plentiful, as were those which documented the presence of Congolese 
troops, by now opposed to their Prime Minister, standing around ominously, waiting 
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to arrest him journalists thought, eyeballing the UN troops that formed a protective 
cordon.
130
  Again, the profusion of these reports may have owed something to the 
fact that transport and communications difficulties across the Congo confined much 
of the press to Leopoldville.  Yet by this time, there was also a sense amongst some 
correspondents that even if they could or should leave, it would now be unwise to do 
so because they anticipated the imminent death of the Prime Minister, a story they 
were loath to miss.
131
  Importantly, there was no press outcry; just an acceptance that 
his death would soon come to pass, and also that he had been lucky to live so long.  
The Herald’s Dennis Eisenberg soon dubbed him ‘four-lives Lumumba’.132 
These characteristics had implications for the subsequent ways in which 
British readers understood Lumumba’s later disappearance and then his eventual 
assassination at the hands of the Belgians.  Press portrayals of the extent and nature 
of Congolese opposition to Lumumba’s rule, as exemplified by reports of the heavy 
mob and troop presence outside the Prime Minister’s residence, provided an 
interpretive context or frame in which the agents of Lumumba’s doom appeared 
obviously to be his own countrymen.  At that later date, and again, the British press 
would not perform the independent or interrogative analysis they perhaps could or 
should have done, reflecting its extreme and continued partiality.  Although 
Tshombe did not inform journalists of Lumumba’s death until three weeks after it 
had occurred,
133
 sections of the press were aware of it, and also of its true nature, 
including the involvement of Belgian officers.  Yet they displayed a strong 
disinclination to make anything of it.  When an internal memorandum on the subject 
of Lumumba’s death and the role of the Belgians was circulated at The Times, the 
author, Oliver Woods, wrote that his only objective was to make the information 
known within the office: ‘He was shot kneeling over a shallow grave by a Belgian 
captain whose name is in the hands of the UN’, Woods explained, casually adding 
that ‘It will probably come out when a commission of inquiry is sent’.134 
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Conclusion 
 
British press coverage of the Congo between June and October 1960 can be 
characterised as anti-Lumumba and/or pro-Belgian.  British newspapers presented 
the country as tribally diverse, extremely politically divided, and violent.  They 
devoted more page space to African-on-African violence, and to white, European 
victims of Congolese violence than to Africans who suffered at the hands of the 
Belgians.  They portrayed Belgian intervention as understandable, if not wholly 
desirable; whilst describing UN intervention as desirable, if not wholly effective.  
They lauded the British role, depicted Lumumba as unpopular, vacillating and 
erratic, and devoted much page space to the verbal challenges of his opponents.  
They also made little attempt to investigate the full significance of Belgium’s 
behind-the-scenes or more underhand activities (or those of senior UN officials) of 
which they were aware. 
British press coverage of the Congo’s first few months of independence 
therefore contributed to Lumumba’s difficulties.  Most important was its continual 
emphasis on internal Congolese dissent and division, which lent tacit support to the 
idea of external intervention whilst obscuring the full extent of that intervention in 
practice.  British newspaper articles also advanced the cause of Lumumba’s political 
opponents, contributing to nationalising or globalising their reach by propagating 
(and thereby lending credence to) their verbal challenges to Lumumba’s authority.  
At the beginning of the crisis, press depictions of the Army mutiny contributed to 
Lumumba’s decision to leave the Congo at a critical time, further aiding and abetting 
disorder and division.  Subsequently, the right-leaning press’s lauding of the British 
UN role, and journalists’ decision to sensationalise or valorise Tshombe’s defiance 
of the UN, helped dent the organisation’s capacity for effective action, both locally, 
and on the global stage, which further bolstered the Belgian case for a continued 
colonial presence and undermined the position of the elected Congolese central 
government. 
In addition to its playing a divisive role in local events in a manner 
reminiscent of its role in other regions of Africa during decolonisation, the British 
press continued to perform the function of mediating Britain’s actions favourably to 
its readers.  This was due partly to its portrayal of the actions of Belgium and the 
West, with which the press associated Britain to some degree; and partly to its 
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depictions of parallel constitutional developments in British colonial territories such 
as Nyasaland.  Despite this, press coverage continued to cause the British 
Government a degree of anxiety, but this was far less marked than in relation to the 
British colonial territories discussed in Chapters One to Four. 
 Although these press representations stemmed partly from the ability of the 
primary actors to access ‘discursive’ space, as Dunn has argued, this factor alone 
cannot fully account for the nature of British press coverage of the Congo during 
1960.  The British press displayed a consistent awareness of ‘the other side’ to the 
story throughout these months, as articulated by men such as Lumumba, but also the 
result of some journalists’ investigative and other communicative efforts or attempts 
at historicisation.  Similarly, it is true that British journalists used historically-rooted 
words, imagery or tropes to describe the violence in the Congo, as dark or tribal, for 
instance; and that they talked indirectly of paternalism and ownership; and directly 
of Congolese barbarity and chaos, narratives which Dunn attributes to the Belgians 
and the U.S. respectively.  Yet the historically-rooted words and imagery of the 
Heart of Darkness kind appeared not to be the factor from which coverage flowed, 
but rather, in the absence of understanding, a descriptive tool; whilst the second and 
third characteristics were present only partly because of the efforts of these two 
countries (U.S., Belgium) to deluge the media with their points of view.  Of perhaps 
more importance to the production of coverage over the British press as a whole 
were the internal workings of British newspapers, the ways in which journalists 
experienced events on the ground, and the press’s partiality, which included its 
indirect racism and its insufficient knowledge of the country.  These were factors 
whose significance snowballed over the months as journalists interpreted new events 
in the light of their previous ‘frames’ of reference.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to identify the relationship between British newspaper 
coverage of Africa from 1957 to 1960 and the process of decolonisation.  It has 
spoken to historiographical debates on the role of the British press at the end of 
empire, the significance of British low politics or public opinion to decolonisation, 
and the cultural impact of the end of empire in Britain.  Overall, it has suggested that 
press content and, relatedly, public opinion, bore a more significant relation to the 
process of decolonisation than most studies have either suggested or assumed.  It 
examined the role of press content with respect to three main readerships: the British 
Government; groups in Africa; and the British public.  Further, in some contrast to 
existing works on the press, which focus on its interactions with the British 
Government, the thesis has described newspaper content as the embodiment of a 
range of influences, with more room for the individual and collective agency of 
papers, journalists and editors. 
 
1. British newspapers, the British Government, and British policy 
 
Firstly, newspaper content influenced Macmillan and the Government on 
matters of policy.  Existing studies have tended to investigate, and also to highlight 
the opposite; namely, the impact of the British Government on British newspapers.
1
  
Concerning the direct influence of the press on the Government, the thesis 
concentrated on two regions: the white settler colonies of Central and South Africa.  
Regarding Central Africa, it found that over the period as a whole, influence flowed 
from the press to politics; politicians seemed nervous and frustrated in their dealings 
with British newspapers; and many of the actions they took were reactive.  Although 
chapters two, three and four discussed everyday interactions between the press and 
British politicians and officials, at the same time they began to draw out some of the 
neglected connections between press coverage, public opinion and more substantive 
changes in British colonial policy towards decolonisation, which existing works have 
either examined in terms of alternative factors,
2
 or have more directly stipulated bore 
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little relation to public opinion.
3
  Indeed, the thesis has attempted to begin to define - 
as well as to emphasise - the possible significance of the special constitutional 
relation between the British Parliament, British public opinion and political 
developments in British Central Africa up to and throughout 1960.  Concurrently, it 
underscored the Government’s inherent (though pliable) conservatism on Central 
African affairs.  The appointment of the Monckton Commission, it suggested, 
represented at once a response to British public, including press, debate on 
Federation, and a vain attempt to condition the views of these important groups in 
favour of the continuance of the structure.  Throughout this period, the Government 
also displayed interest in public discussions on Banda, the prospect or importance of 
his release, and the terms thereof, and there is evidence to suggest that these 
informed British policy. 
Concerning South Africa, Chapter Three argued that British newspaper 
coverage of the country during 1959, and of the tour, played a role in influencing 
Macmillan to speak out on apartheid in Cape Town in February 1960.  This was the 
consequence partly of its own criticisms, but also due to its efforts to publicise the 
views of South Africans opposed to the system.  Also, by expressing their concern 
over the tour itinerary, and by knowing and making known the fact that Macmillan 
had received requests for meetings from the ANC and other groups opposed to 
apartheid, the press prompted the British Government to push for an expanded tour 
programme, with room to meet Africans and white liberals.  In short, the British 
press helped to set the agenda for British policy towards white settler colonies at the 
end of empire.  In the case of the Federation, I would argue, further investigation 
would reveal more interconnections over the longue durée. 
Any assessment of the influence of newspaper content on the British 
Government should, however, be expanded to include more than demonstrations of a 
direct causative relationship between newspaper articles and Government policy, for 
the press affected the achievement of British policy goals in other, more indirect, 
ways as well. 
During the period 1957 to 1960, for example, press content functioned as an 
irritant, and an obstacle in the path of the British Government’s claim to sole 
authorship of ‘Britain’s view’ in Africa.  During 1957, the Government worried that 
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newspaper coverage of Ghana was furthering the cause of those groups within the 
country which argued that the Commonwealth was a mud-slinging organisation that 
it might be well-advised to leave.  For large sections of the white communities of the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, over the period as a whole, newspaper 
articles in Britain undercut British Government pronouncements, due to the specific 
nature of settler fears concerning the relation between press content, public opinion 
and British policy.  A similar dynamic was noticeable in South Africa directly 
following the tour, when British press responses to the ‘wind of change’ speech 
resonated within Nationalist circles to a degree Macmillan’s words had not.  Press 
depictions of the speech helped to synthesise its meaning and lift it to a ‘higher 
plane’, which, though arguably beneficial for the British Government in some 
respects, was not entirely what was either envisaged or desired.  Similarly, British 
press coverage of South Africa in the period immediately following the Sharpeville 
massacre strained Anglo-South African relations. 
This is not to say that the British Government failed entirely to influence 
British newspapers.  The conclusions reached here confirm that the Government 
tried to influence the press, particularly in regard to Kenya and Nyasaland during 
1959, the focus of previous studies; and did so somewhat successfully.  The thesis 
also finds much evidence of the special position of Kenya in the imagination of both 
the Government and the press, and in the case of the latter, suggests that this 
reflected, in large part, the Government’s propaganda efforts during the fifties.  
Additionally, although this thesis’s focus is the period 1957 to 1960, the research on 
which it is based points to the importance, prior to these years, of the probable 
relative monopoly on the supply of information on Africa as a whole, of the British 
Government, its allies or supporters of the Empire.  This is significant for my 
analysis because it helped to inform the press’s commentary in later years. 
However, in all of these cases, as elsewhere, the agency of the British 
journalists and editors should also be acknowledged.  The Government’s media 
management strategy for Kenya and Nyasaland during 1959, and related events in 
Britain, for example, was not the only important factor which lay behind either the 
press’s overall diminution of the issue of British colonial misconduct, or the 
relatively progressive views that large sections of the press expressed on the future 
of the Federation.  Rather, Chapter Two described press content as the embodiment 
of a range of different influences, including ‘internal’ or ‘press-related’. 
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In regard to the Government and its allies’ probable monopoly on 
information on Africa over preceding years, this dynamic cannot be characterised as 
wholly Government-induced, for it seemed also to stem from the press’s relative lack 
of a sustained physical presence and its consequential over-reliance for stories on 
stringers drawn from the resident white settler community.  The possibility that 
right-leaning papers had more money to send correspondents abroad in the period 
preceding decolonisation could also be relevant.  Yet, notwithstanding these points, 
neither should it be assumed that the press was utterly unable to override the 
dynamics which the past had set in motion.  The relative dearth of critical comment 
on British colonial rule in British newspapers in these later years, for example, must 
also be attributed to journalists’ failure fully to investigate background causes, a 
dynamic which was partly linked to editorial imperatives, which, in turn, centred on 
the press’s preference for information on ‘what is happening’, and on future-oriented 
opinion pieces. 
 
2. The African dimension to British newspaper coverage of decolonisation 
 
Here, the thesis has continued to underscore the significance of British low 
politics and British press or public opinion to the process of decolonisation, this time 
through the analysis of African and white settler responses to newspaper content.  No 
previous studies have investigated this dynamic because they have analysed British 
press/reader relations in national terms.
4
 
In Africa, British press coverage fomented a mix of anxiety, conflict and 
division among competing social and political groups.  In Ghana, during 1957, the 
British right-leaning press, in particular, championed the cause of the main 
opposition party, the NLM, which forged links with British journalists.  The British 
press’s extremely harsh critique of Nkrumah’s rule immediately following 
independence made Ghana harder to govern, and, relatedly, damaged the image of 
the newly-independent state overseas, which worried the new Prime Minister.  
British press intervention also fuelled fears of lingering colonialism or neo-
colonialism locally, fostered distrust between supporters of the governing party and 
white capitalists, and caused a degree of career-related anxiety for British expatriates 
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such as Bing, which may have tested the capacity of the newly-independent country 
to entice and retain these sorts of advisers. 
For large sections of the white settler communities of the Federation, 
newspaper content fuelled fears as to the future direction of British colonial policy.  
British newspaper articles invigorated profoundly defensive, resentful, desperate, yet 
proud, settler narratives of ‘self’ and ‘community’.  Press content provided a means 
by which settlers were able to avoid having to confront more difficult issues, such as 
African discontent.  Yet, at the same time, the Federal Government, for one, sensed 
that its focus on African agency played a role in denting the morale of settler 
groupings.  By providing ready access to the British public, the British press offered 
a means by which African nationalist organisations, such as the MCP, challenged the 
rule of white settlers in ways which allowed them to circumvent the Federal, colonial 
and, indeed, the British governments. 
British newspaper content performed similar roles inside South Africa, 
particularly concerning settler narratives of ‘self’ and ‘community’, scapegoating, 
and the issue of African discontent.  Yet there were also many important differences.  
The British press provided one means by which white South Africans opposed to 
apartheid, chiefly journalists and Cape Liberals, challenged the system.  Their 
articles rebounded, fomenting division locally, in the context of stringent internal 
censorship, and helping to prompt the Union Government to crack down further on 
press and other freedoms.  British newspaper articles also exploded the myth of 
Commonwealth solidarity.  They exacerbated the tensions between the English- and 
Afrikaans-speaking communities, adding fuel to the fire of historical debates which 
stretched back to the Anglo-Boer War.  They promoted the cause of the Africans.  
Yet, as in the Federation, white settlers responded by digging in their heels, which, 
in the short-term contributed to the prolongation of European colonial rule, and 
played a role in causing the State to augment the structures which kept dissenters, 
including Africans, at bay. 
The British press also aggravated tension and division in the Congo 
following independence in 1960.  Newspaper content advanced the cause of 
Lumumba’s political opponents.  It lent support to the idea of external intervention.  
Yet, at the same time, it obscured the full extent of the intervention in practice, 
thereby contributing to an international socio-political environment in which the 
West was able to act with impunity. 
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On the issue of why British newspaper content had these effects, it seems 
pertinent to ask whether the press merely catalogued, reflected or fuelled an existing 
state of affairs or trends that were occurring or would have occurred anyway.
5
  At 
first glance, this might seem to be the case, as, for example, in South Africa, where 
British newspaper articles fed into debates within the white community which 
stretched back to the Anglo-Boer War; or, in the case of Ghana, where the NLM, 
already opposed to Nkrumah, exploited the British press to advance its cause.  
However, this thesis has offered reasons why we might not so readily accept such a 
view.  In the case of South Africa, for example, internal debates on the nature of 
white society and the causes of African opposition to white minority rule can surely 
be traced back to the nineteenth century, but so can the British press, and it seems 
that the two had long been intertwined.  In other words, these debates did not exist 
independently of the structures, mental or substantive, which helped to bring them to 
fruition and which sustained their momentum; and the British press informed both.  
Similarly, in the case of Ghana, although the NLM would surely have opposed 
Nkrumah and the CPP without the use of the British press, finding some other 
strategy, the British press was – in reality – one important means by which it did. 
A related concern is whether or not the British press was merely ‘used’ by 
others, or whether it possessed, at the same time, an intrinsic kind of significance.  
The conclusions reached here confirm both views.  African nationalists and white 
settler groupings certainly tried to influence British press treatment of Africa during 
this period, with varying degrees of success.  Yet journalists and editors also 
displayed profound independent judgment, ‘external’ groupings had more success in 
getting their voices heard in papers whose political stance meshed with their own, 
and editorial imperatives were important factors affecting the nature of press content.  
Indeed, the sheer range of influences affecting press content during this period 
suggests that there might be no other way of usefully defining it than by describing it 
as uniquely ‘press’. 
Lastly, it might be objected that the question which really needs answering is 
what relationship press content bore to the end (or not) of European colonial rule in 
Africa.  In other words, how useful is this thesis’s emphasis on anxiety, conflict and 
division in Africa to understanding the role of the press in ‘decolonisation’ in the 
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most ‘essential’ or common use of that term?  The first point to make is that this 
thesis has focused on decolonisation as a process, which extends to the study of post-
colonial states; as well as on what the range of events associated with the end of 
empire meant to large groups locally, as opposed to the reasons which lay behind the 
formal act of devolution.
6
  Anxiety, conflict and division were, it argues, integral to 
the ‘lived experience’ of decolonisation of the majority of these overseas readerships 
in their interactions with the British press. 
Nevertheless, the conclusions reached here suggest that, with caveats, British 
press content bore a ‘positive’ relation to the end of empire (hence the anxiety 
among white settler communities).  Without the press, fewer dissenting voices would 
have been heard, and powerful groupings would have been better able to proceed as 
they wished.  As mentioned in the previous section, this thesis has also explored 
some tangible links between newspaper content and British policy, which moved the 
latter ‘forward’. 
But the relationship of press coverage to the end of empire cannot be 
described purely in terms either of an upward, or of a plain, liberal, trajectory.  In the 
years which form the focus of this study, the white settler response translated into 
retrenchment, which, in the short-term, contributed to the prolongation of white 
minority rule.  Further, press content was in tune with African aims, as official (and 
other) histories of British newspapers have claimed.
7
  Yet, it should not be assumed 
that ‘liberal’ comments reflected a liberal turn on the part of all of those concerned, 
for journalists’ views on African nationalism and empire were also informed by 
older, racial fears centring on African violence, as well as a hard-nosed pragmatism.  
At times, political partisanship was also very much in evidence, particularly in the 
popular press, journalists often directly replicating the views of either the 
Conservative Party or the Labour Party, whose public stance on Africa differed 
greatly during these months.  Adding to the complexity was the important matter of 
the disjuncture between editorial comment and the nature of news reports, which 
meant that different facets of press coverage performed different and sometimes 
opposing functions simultaneously. 
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Neither should it be assumed that British newspapers supported the post-
colonial states.  Indeed, it seems that the press was inclined, in many ways, to oppose 
ruling nationalist parties, due to the historical ties of right-leaning papers, for 
instance, to ‘traditional’ ruling groups in African societies such as Ghana, which 
tended to assume the role of the opposition at independence; the press’s interrogative 
nature in general; and the difficulties most journalists experienced in fully 
comprehending the challenges faced by newly-independent countries. 
 
3. The cultural impact of the end of empire in Britain 
 
This element of my thesis has striven, essentially, to build on the conclusions 
reached in Lewis’s article, ‘“Daddy Wouldn’t Buy Me a Mau Mau”’, because it is in 
full agreement with it.  These conclusions concern British newspapers’ potential role 
in Britain’s peaceful decolonisation.  Although, therefore, the thesis does not dispute 
the specific arguments of works by Ward, Schwarz, and Webster, which focus on the 
links between decolonisation and increased British domestic fears or anxieties,
8
 its 
overall emphasis differs.  It is in agreement with all of these writers, however, in 
their emphasis on ‘impact’, as opposed to the study by Sandbrook, for example, in 
which the historian claims that the British public knew little and cared less about 
events in the colonies.
9
  The research conducted here suggests that the public had a 
great deal of Africa-related material available to them through the press, which 
indicated that editors believed the subject interested consumers. 
This thesis suggests that the likely overall impact of British press coverage 
on the British newspaper-reading public was that it mitigated feelings of loss, regret, 
weakness and decline.  There were two dimensions to this.  Firstly, as Lewis argues 
in her Kenya piece, the newspapers presented British readers with helpful ideas 
compatible with the trend to decolonisation, such as those which centred on the rise 
of African nationalism and the increasing obsolescence of empire.
10
  Secondly, they 
depicted Britain’s involvement in the process in non-negative terms.  In ‘“White 
Man in a Wood Pile”’ Lewis discusses the probable implications of the press’s 
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positive portrayal of Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ speech in similar terms;11 and 
Darwin has emphasised the importance of Macmillan’s skilful use of ‘the 
Commonwealth concept’.12  This thesis discusses these two dynamics, but it has also 
extended the second (on Britain’s involvement) to include an appreciation of the 
press’s non-negative portrayal of British limitations and even misdemeanours. 
During 1957, the press described both Ghana’s transition to independence 
and the celebrations in March in triumphant, self-affirming terms.  In subsequent 
weeks and months, it sorely criticised Nkrumah and the CPP, enlightening its readers 
on the errors and underhand activities of Africans, yet offering them very little 
information on comparable moves taken by the British colonial state in preceding 
years, nor insight into the possible relation between colonial rule and the nature or 
strictures of the post-colonial state.  Although some sections of the press certainly 
displayed anxiety over Ghana’s apparent rejection of symbolic links with Britain 
following independence, these moves prompted little self-reflection.  Rather, they 
merely appeared as proof, in the right-leaning press, in particular, of mounting 
authoritarianism, and thus also of the relative serenity and stability of the colonial 
period. 
Concerning the issue of colonial brutality in Kenya and Nyasaland during 
1959, to cite a further example, Chapter Two found that British newspaper content 
tended to undercut its potency and, in the case of Central Africa, in particular, to 
distance it from the metropole.  In the case of the Federation, the presence of white 
settlers allowed for the conceptual separation of Britain and British people from 
unsavoury aspects of the decolonisation process.  In both of these regions, too, as in 
Ghana, newspapers portrayed Britain’s role, historically, either in positive or in non-
negative terms.  This was also the case in regard to South Africa.  There, most 
British papers held enlightened British colonialism up against the white racialism of 
the Afrikaner state.  It might be objected that it would not have been either natural or 
practicable to document Britain’s misdeeds at every corner.  This view must be 
acknowledged.  Yet newspapers did offer their readers interpretations on the causes 
of things, which suggests that we must interrogate the meaning of any omissions. 
The material presented here might also prompt a fresh reading of the role of 
non-Anglo-centric depictions of events in Africa, which may have soothed British 
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readers’ understanding of their country’s involvement in the decolonisation process, 
the most prominent of which centred on African action or African nationalism.  
Indeed, African action was the central prism through which the British press 
depicted, and seemed to understand, the events of these years.  Overall, African 
nationalism appeared as a powerful, organic, elemental force,
13
 which, I would 
argue, promoted the view that developments in Africa at the end of empire were born 
as much of an innate, and now burgeoning, human desire to be free as of any specific 
abuses or other characteristics of European colonial rule.  Most British journalists 
discussed the events of these years in terms of accruals, which included beginnings, 
the formation and onward march of nations and nationalism, independence and the 
bestowing of freedom rather than finalities, metropolitan decline, or the ‘end of 
empire’.  Although it might be argued that the focus on African nationalism and 
power served only to throw Britain’s relative decline into relief, on the contrary, it 
seemed that, for the most part, journalists supported, even championed, the cause of 
the Africans and, helpfully, tied it to Britain’s future influence. 
It is important to consider the significance of the contradictory nature of 
some of the above representations, many of which appeared simultaneously in the 
same paper.  At the Ghana independence celebrations, for instance, the sense 
conveyed by Nkrumah and other Ghanaians that Ghana loved Britain was taken as 
evidence of the latter’s virtues.  Yet just weeks later, the sense conveyed by 
Nkrumah and other Ghanaians that Ghana did not love Britain was also taken as 
evidence of Britain’s virtues because of how British papers characterised the nature 
of the CPP’s rule at that time (but of which they had very strong inklings years 
before, and so also at the time of the independence celebrations).  This would appear 
to confirm the centrality to British journalists of what Lewis has taken care to 
emphasise in a number of her works; that is, the liberal image of the British Empire 
at home,
14
 for part of what the press seemed to be doing during these years was 
interpreting the process of decolonisation in light of that core belief.  On top of this, 
however, we might also factor in extraneous, region-specific factors affecting news 
coverage, because these often worked to the same end, either consciously, as in the 
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case of the NLM, which flattered Britain, thus exploiting its emotional weakness; or 
unconsciously, as, for example, in instances where the comparatively light British 
press presence in preceding years affected the institution’s ability fully to 
contextualise events in the period 1957 to 1960. 
On the issue of why the British press presented its readers with ideas 
compatible with the trend to decolonisation and with either positive or non-negative 
views on Britain’s involvement in the process, the thesis therefore acknowledges, 
even highlights, the importance of the change in thinking in Britain towards a more 
liberal consensus, which Lewis discusses in her Kenya piece.  Yet it also emphasises 
the significance of conservative patterns of thought, including pragmatism, and the 
legacy of embedded ways of thinking about race and the Empire.  It also examined 
the non-ideological ways in which the press channelled these helpful impressions to 
readers, and which included a discussion of the press’s narratological and contextual 
framing of events to which practical editorial imperatives contributed. 
Lastly, although this thesis focuses on a short time-frame of three years, and 
therefore cannot comment on the likely impact, culturally, of decolonisation in 
Britain in subsequent years,
15
 it is hoped that its identification of historically-rooted 
patterns of interpretation and of reporting, and of patterns and trends in coverage, 
such as those which worked to uphold Britain, in particular, might inform our 
understanding, albeit tentatively, of later developments. 
 
4. Further, non-press-related characteristics of the experience of 
decolonisation
16
 
 
Chapter Four discussed some further non-press-related characteristics of the 
process of decolonisation, which this study of the role of the British press brings to 
light, and which the historiography tends not to accentuate.  The first of these 
concerned the significance of ordinary people and publics to developments.  In 
Central Africa, for example, both white settlers and African nationalists regarded the 
British public (and themselves) as motors of historical change, and this belief 
informed their actions.  From 1957 to 1960, these groups appeared not to experience 
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‘the end of empire’ as a high-level political affair; but rather, a process in which the 
day-to-day actions of ordinary citizens were perceived as ‘game-changing’. 
The second characteristic the chapter discussed concerned the sense of 
contingency which suffused each moment.  It seems that for groups in Africa, as in 
Britain, the future was not conceived of as pre-ordained, even in 1960.  The thesis as 
a whole moves away from the themes of momentum, of planning and of 
inevitability, which characterise grand narratives of the experience of decolonisation.  
Rather, it emphasises that the ‘end of empire’ was experienced as an event with a 
range of possible outcomes, and, in this, is therefore in agreement with Stockwell 
and Butler’s introductory commentary to their edited volume, The Wind of Change.17 
Thirdly, and relatedly, and as Lewis and Darwin, for example, have argued, 
the thesis has suggested that the British Government’s handling of the business of 
decolonisation was not always smooth, but could be muddled at times, and even 
amusing.
18
  This was best exemplified by the case of ‘the Blantyre riot’ and its fall-
out.  But this thesis’s emphasis on the reactive nature of British colonial policy on 
Federation, in particular, and the nature of the British Government’s day-to-day 
dealings with British journalists over the period as a whole, also throw into relief the 
jittery mental state of members of the Government when it came to African or 
colonial affairs, and the resultant dichotomous nature of some of the policies they 
pursued. 
Fourthly, the chapter foregrounded the significance of African action, 
including violence, both to the very process of decolonisation, and to British 
perceptions of it.  By focusing on British strategies and viewpoints, imperial 
histories typically promote the British, as opposed to the African, place in the order 
of things, even when African actions are discussed.  There are also many 
representations of the events of these years which do not foreground Africans that 
are common to British popular perceptions of the decolonisation process, such as the 
association of colonial brutality with Sharpeville and the events of 1959.
19
  Yet this 
thesis has indicated that British popular perceptions of both sets of events 
concentrated as much, if not more, on African action, power and violence as on 
white brutality; and not, primarily, it would appear, because journalists regarded 
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Africans as ‘lesser’, although racial perceptions undoubtedly played a role.  The 
Blantyre incident also provided an illustration of when and how historical actors in 
positions of power, though understanding African actions to be crucial, effectively 
wrote them out of the official government record.  Although the conclusions this 
thesis reaches, both in relation to Blantyre and more generally, suggest that British 
politicians considered white responses, including those of the British press, public 
and Parliament, to be more significant than African action at certain pivotal 
moments, and that these were therefore critical motors of historical change, 
newspaper coverage of Africa over the period as a whole is useful in reminding us 
that white actions cannot be understood without reference to African nationalism. 
Although, therefore, many of the tropes which are said to characterise 
Western understanding of Africa today were present in British newspaper coverage 
of Africa during the period 1957 to 1960, such as those which centre on African 
violence, and race; the image of Africa as ‘the hopeless continent’ was far less so.  
Rather, Africa appeared to be regarded as an extremely important continent, whose 
people were understood to be ultimately in control of their own destiny, and whose 
‘love’ and ‘trust’, it was believed to be very ill-advised to jeopardise. 
Lastly, this chapter underscored the significance of ‘imaginaries’, such as 
representation, perceptions, image, hopes and fears, to the historical process.  In 
other words, the thesis adds to a discussion of the importance of events and actions, a 
bigger appreciation, it is hoped, of the significance of what did not happen, what was 
said or believed to have happened, and what it was feared would happen.  This 
thesis’s focus on mediation brings to the fore the moments at which words and 
actions were ‘lost in translation’, why and with what effect.  Mediation played a 
significant role in the historical outcomes, often in surprising ways, due to the nature 
and the range of the influences which affected the process; and provides a lens 
through which we can better understand the thoughts and behaviours of important 
groupings.  Indeed, part of what it felt like to live the end of empire appeared to lie 
less with the nodules of an historical timeline, or physically with certain prominent 
people and places, than the spaces which resided in between such poles as British 
policy and rhetoric, British policy and the British public sphere, the locality and the 
metropole, representation and reality, and African action and white appropriation.  
Fundamentally, this echoed the experiences of Sampson in Germany in the 
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immediate aftermath of the Second World War, and in South Africa, and which 
contributed to his desire to pursue a career in journalism. 
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